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  INTRODUCTION   
During the tenure of President Barack Obama, scholars and 
advocates viewed the best route for federal court review of police 
practices to be consent decrees negotiated between municipal po-
lice departments and the Special Litigation Section in the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to 
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28 U.S.C. § 14141.1 DOJ fact-finding reports and settlements, 
like the one in Ferguson, Missouri,2 exposed egregious practices 
and sought a culture shift by decrees in police departments 
across the country. The DOJ Process sometimes also bolstered 
mobilization to achieve police reform already underway outside 
the court.3 Today, the current Administration has taken an offi-
cial position against using 28 U.S.C. § 14141 authority in favor 
of potentially unconstitutional exercises of police discretion.4 
Although the federal executive branch is no longer a driving 
force behind police reform litigation, the institution of policing is 
no less harmful to Black and Brown communities. Thus, the 
questions motivating this Article are: “What can legal advocates 
do now? How can communities and their lawyers mobilize within 
the legal process?” Without the DOJ’s involvement, injured com-
munities interested in court intervention may turn to section 
19835 impact litigation, and what legal scholarship terms public 
 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 14141 (2018); see, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Organizational 
Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 527 (2004); Kami 
Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration 
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507–15 (2008); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58–64 (2009); Jonathan 
M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police 
Use of Force Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic In-
stitutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 337–44 (2016). 
 2. Sunita Patel, Towards Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Commu-
nity Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
793, 856–67 (2016) (discussing the death of Michael Brown, the investigation, 
and resulting settlement). 
 3. I have explored the unstudied connection between police reform mobi-
lizing and DOJ consent decrees elsewhere. See generally id. 
 4. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVIL 
CONSENT DECREES AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/ 
file/1109681/download [https://perma.cc/6YCC-LB7R]; see also Stephen Rushin, 
Police Reform During the Trump Administration, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 
29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/police-reform 
-during-the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/H854-QNVU].  
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any stat-
ute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.”). It lay dormant until 1961, when the Supreme Court resur-
rected the provision to allow tort liability against individual officers. See Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), partially overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Social 
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (ruling that municipalities are “persons” for 
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law, public interest, or structural reform litigation.6 Rather than 
seek monetary damages against particular officers for abusive 
conduct against individual plaintiffs, structural reform litigation 
seeks redress from police departments and municipalities for 
their law enforcement practices and policies.7 Its goal is to 
achieve an injunction against, or change in the policies or prac-
tices of, a governmental entity. These are cases typically brought 
as class actions.8 
Legal scholars have pointed to conservative judicial appoint-
ments and Supreme Court doctrine as causes for the shrinking 
of liberal structural reform litigation.9 Scholars’ views range 
from “[t]he courthouse door is closed,”10 to “[p]rocedure and doc-
trine make it really difficult to obtain substantive review of civil 
rights and constitutional harms.”11  
 
purposes of section 1983 liability). 
 6. Some variation exists in the literature with regard to definitions. For 
purposes of this Article, these terms carry enough overlap to fit within my de-
scription. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1288–89 (1976).  
 7. See Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015). 
 8. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd III), 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 9. E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Dep-
utizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1384, 1393–95 (2000) (“By the mid-1970s and early 1980s, however, a number 
of events signaled the demise of the structural reform revolution, including 
the appointment of a number of conservative Justices to the Supreme Court.”); 
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1416 (2007) (“[T]he increasing conservatism of the federal 
bench—the usual explanation for the supposed retrenchment in structural re-
form litigation—is reinforced by specific doctrinal obstacles.”). 
 10. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Closing the Courthouse Door: How Your Consti-
tutional Rights Became Unenforceable 47 (2017) (criticizing the Court’s treat-
ment of litigants suing police as closing opportunities for review of harmful and 
unconstitutional practices). 
 11. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 
CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s “increasing hostility 
to constitutional tort claims” and arguing an ideal regime would expand entity 
liability for constitutional violations); accord Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions 
and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 187 
(2017) (“Given these barriers to securing and defending systemic relief, it is not 
surprising that institutional reform litigation is commonly understood to be in 
retreat.”); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 346 (1989) (“[M]any courts have enforced nu-
merous rules in ways that adversely affect public interest litigant.”); cf. SARAH 
STASZACK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
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Scholars and litigators cite standing, municipal liability, 
and class certification as concerning doctrinal hurdles when 
plaintiffs aim to achieve government accountability for constitu-
tional norms. Frequently discussed is the doctrinal hurdle asso-
ciated with demonstrating standing for injunctive relief under 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.12 This case often allows police de-
partments to use standing to evade court review of abusive prac-
tices. The Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York 
line of cases presents another doctrinal barrier to court reform 
of municipal agency practices, including police practices.13 While 
Monell opened the door to holding a municipality liable for gov-
ernmental harm, subsequent decisions required plaintiffs show 
the municipality displayed deliberate indifference to plaintiff ’s 
constitutional rights.14 A variety of theories developed over 
time.15 Particularly relevant to this Article, Monell’s progeny es-
tablished that where plaintiffs challenge an unofficial policy, 
plaintiffs must prove the employees’ illegal actions were author-
ized by the municipality or that the practices were “so persistent 
 
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015) (arguing that certain classes of litigants and 
types of litigation were foreclosed from bringing suits prior to the Warren Court 
era and discussing progressive arguments in favor of limited review during the 
New Deal); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on 
Civil Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 897–904 (2016) (reviewing STASZACK, su-
pra) (discussing the role of liberal law makers and Justices in efforts to close 
the courthouse doors while pointing to the limits for civil rights plaintiffs that 
follow cases such as Lyons, Iqbal, and Monell). 
 12. E.g., Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 
47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1334 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, 
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce 
a Legal Duty, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277 (2013); Harmon, supra note 1, at 11–12 (not-
ing that structural reform litigation is a weaker tool to force police department 
change as a result of Lyons and Rizzo); Michael J. Schmidtberger, No Holds 
Barred in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Standing to Seek Injunctions in Federal 
Court Against Municipalities, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 183 (1984).  
 13. Although Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), allowed plaintiffs to proceed with 
claims against a local municipality for unlawful discriminatory conduct, it 
struck down the plaintiffs’ theory of respondeat superior for an official’s super-
visory liability. Id. at 690; see also Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 
(1989); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Prap-
rotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); 
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986); City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 
471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (“Policy . . . implies a course of action consciously cho-
sen from among various alternatives.”).  
 14. See infra Part I.B; see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 379.  
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
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and widespread” that persons with decision-making authority 
possessed actual or constructive knowledge of wrongdoing.16 
More recently, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, confirmed a 
higher “significant proof” standard for Rule 23(a)17 class certifi-
cation requirements and specifically tightened the basis for 
showing commonality for class members challenging policies or 
practices.18 Scholars view Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as part of 
mounting attacks on aggregate litigation itself, undermining key 
processes in civil rights cases.19 These doctrines seem to erect 
hard barriers to achieving substantive review for governmental 
harm.  
Some have pointed to the particular difficulties facing liti-
gants suing police.20 Other scholars look to the district courts to 
bring into focus what options remain available and offer a 
broader view of structural reform litigation.21 Charles Sabel and 
 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 18. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 19. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility 
to Class Certification, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (2010); Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (arguing many courts now require plaintiffs 
prove substantial portions of their cases on the merits during class certifica-
tion); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and De-
clining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013); cf. Robert H. Klonoff, Class 
Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017) (exam-
ining a more recent trend resisting additional restraints on class actions). On 
policing specifically, see Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional 
Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2012) (arguing the move towards individ-
uation in constitutional rights adjudication, including the Fourth Amendment 
context, presents a challenge for class certification). 
 20. E.g., Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416 (“Of all the areas in 
which structural reform is generally accounted a failure, by far the most im-
portant is [local police] law enforcement.”); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: 
The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1199, 1233 (2005) (“Over the years, however, [the Court] has insisted that lia-
bility be imposed only upon a high level of proof of culpability . . . . Moreover, 
the Court has ruled that a plaintiff seeking to prove liability where the munici-
pality has not directly inflicted an injury . . . [must meet] rigorous standards of 
culpability and causation . . . .”). 
 21. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation 
and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 
827–45 (2010) (examining federal litigation against government employees us-
ing Bivens in five districts); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over 
Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 
602–04 (2006) (arguing prison litigation continues in the district court despite 
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Bill Simon’s path-setting article focused on injunctions in many 
contexts, but focused comparatively little attention on policing 
or the legal mobilization that led to liability findings.22 Promi-
nent scholars have meaningfully reviewed district court cases 
and undermined the assumption that prison litigation “died” in 
the face of Supreme Court doctrine and the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act.23 In reality, how many police structural reform cases 
have failed as a result of the doctrinal and evidentiary hurdles 
the Supreme Court erected is unknown.24  
This Article fills the gap between Supreme Court determi-
nations and district court practices in police structural reform 
litigation.25 This Article argues the nature and quality of infor-
mation gathered—informally and formally through discovery—
is a critical factor in the success of racial profiling litigation. 
When litigators succeed as they did in the three case examples 
presented in this Article, the tactical and strategic details of in-
formation-production deserves close attention from scholars. As 
the case examples demonstrate, litigators take the law seriously 
and attempt to meet the difficult standards, but do not presume 
doctrine is fixed or formal. This is not to say evidence is the only 
 
mounting doctrinal obstacles and federal litigation creating additional proce-
dures); see also Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunc-
tion . . . Oops, It’s Still Moving!, 58 MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003); Susan P. Sturm, 
A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1361–62 (1991). 
For a similar perspective for structural reform remedies, see Charles Sabel & 
William Simon, Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1029–52 (2004). 
 22. Sabel & Simon, supra note 21. 
 23. See Schlanger, supra note 21.  
 24. The total number of section 1983 police misconduct claims brought each 
year is not reflected in available data, let alone data reflecting cases brought for 
purposes of equitable relief or structural reform. See Katheryn E. Scarborough 
& Craig Hemmens, Section 1983 Suits Against Law Enforcement in the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1999). However, the results 
of Joanna Schwartz’s multiple studies give some insight. Joanna Schwartz, How 
Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How 
Qualified Immunity Fails]. She recently studied section 1983 litigation brought 
by civilians against police defendants in five district courts in five circuits. Id. 
She found 99 (8.4%) out of 1,183 cases were brought solely against municipali-
ties and/or sought only equitable relief (injunctive or declaratory). Id. at 27. Alt-
hough we cannot assume the 99 cases were all structural reform cases—that is, 
class actions seeking an injunction against a particular police practice—this is 
a larger proportion and raw number than scholars would likely predict.  
 25. See Rudovsky, supra note 20; Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments 
Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016); 
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 24. 
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consideration. Indeed, judicial management, opposing counsel, 
local politics, plaintiffs’ resources, media attention, and grass-
roots mobilizing play roles in the outcomes of such structural re-
form litigation. This Article does not paint a rosy picture for lit-
igators, but any fair examination of public law litigation needs 
to account for those cases that win. 
This Article presents three significant examples of litigation 
that managed to overcome the Supreme Court’s demands and 
achieve class-wide injunctive orders. The cases are against large, 
urban police departments and involve Equal Protection chal-
lenges under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unreasonable 
stop and seizure claims under the Fourth Amendment.26 That is 
to say, the litigants center race and ethnicity in their claims 
though they understand that racial profiling class actions are 
extremely difficult to win. The case studies are part of a growing 
archive of section 1983 structural reform litigation against police 
departments.27 The case studies are also relevant to larger de-
bates about access to justice, the role of federal courts, the grow-
ing study of district courts (providing a different focus than 
solely on the Supreme Court), and the salience of race in chal-
lenges to police department practices. 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV, § 1. 
 27. In the category of cases where race and/or national origin claims are 
included, see Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 1:17-cv-04467, 2018 WL 1989767 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2019); Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, No. 
1:18-cv-00719, 2019 WL 6907294 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019); Raza v. City of New 
York, No. 1:13-cv-03448-PKC-JMA, 2013 WL 3079393 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013). 
First Amendment and Eighth Amendment challenges in circumstances of polic-
ing protesters and policing homelessness are likewise another category of suc-
cessful litigation. To date, those cases have not included race as a basis for chal-
lenging the police practices. See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616–17 
(9th Cir. 2019) (finding it unconstitutional to prosecute homeless individuals for 
sleeping on streets when no shelter is available), amending and superseding on 
denial of reh’g 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 19-247, 2019 WL 
6833408 (Dec. 16, 2019); Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 7921 
(RJS)(JCF), 2012 WL 4513352 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012) (granting, in part, 
plaintiff protestors’ motions for summary judgment); Jones v. City of Los Ange-
les, No. 2:03-cv-01142 ER, 2004 WL 7321250 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2004) (challeng-
ing statute criminalizing sitting, lying, or sleeping on any street, sidewalk, or 
public way because it effectively criminalizes homelessness), rev’d, 444 F.3d 
1118, vacated pursuant to settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (2006); Service Employee 
Intern. Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (holding the city’s restrictions on the protestors prior to Democratic Na-
tional Convention unconstitutional and granting a preliminary injunction). Fur-
ther study is needed to understand more generally the opportunities and chal-
lenges with class action litigation against police.  
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The three district court cases show that in racial profiling 
litigation plaintiffs must at least gather extensive hard data on 
police practices and convincing anecdotal evidence of discrimina-
tory conduct. District courts managing (1) Floyd v. City of New 
York, (2) Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, and (3) Bailey v. City of 
Philadelphia issued decisions within the span of a year.  
These victories provide an opportunity for further inquiry 
into the range of possibilities for litigants, at least at the trial 
court level. From the lens of doctrinal barriers to successful po-
lice structural reform litigation this Article asks, “How did the 
litigators overcome doctrinal hurdles?” At a time when scholars 
and advocates view public law litigation in policing as a weak 
tool, I argue district court structural reform litigation is a viable 
option for police reform worthy of invigoration.28 Secondarily, 
the information-production of the litigation served a valuable 
purpose, as does the process by which information is gathered. 
The case studies reveal important information gathering ave-
nues available through media, advocates, and prior litigation.  
The Article focuses on these three cases for specific reasons. 
While Floyd has received scholarly attention, the academic 
treatment of Floyd has primarily focused on its statistical anal-
ysis and proof for its Fourth Amendment claims.29 Less attention 
has been paid to the procedural lessons from the case or the con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment race claims for the sub-
class of Black and Latino stops. Ortega-Melendres is now recog-
nized as the underlying case that led President Trump to pardon 
Sherriff Joe Arpaio’s criminal contempt of court.30 The litigation 
is well-known among immigration scholars, but it has not been 
mined by proceduralists to date. Bailey v. City of Philadelphia is 
 
 28. Different questions should be explored to discern the circumstances 
when police structural reform litigation should be pursued (beyond merely 
availability of evidence to prove allegations of unlawful police practices), the 
relationship to advocacy outside the courtroom with litigation, and the struc-
tural reform remedies process. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10; Bagenstos, 
supra note 11; Fallon, supra note 11; Parkin, supra note 11; Tobias, supra note 
11. I plan to take up some of these questions in another project.  
 29. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitu-
tionality and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 
1495 (2014).  
 30. Julie H. Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who 
Became the Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump 
-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/3P96-JMK7].  
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significant as the first of the three to achieve a class-wide reme-
dial order,31 and for its influence on reform litigation in New 
York. As litigation that settled,32 its inclusion may seem odd be-
cause the doctrinal concerns were not formally overcome 
through motion practice. Nonetheless, the parties’ proposed or-
ders made the expected outcome concrete, and even delineated 
specific elements of class certification and Monell liability.33 Bai-
ley provides a fair example of statistical information used in the 
section 1983 context to achieve police reform, comparable to the 
Civil Rights Division, but on a smaller scale.34 Finally, the Bailey 
example juxtaposes the demanding motion practice in Floyd and 
Ortega-Melendres, with a primarily behind-the-scenes strategy 
of achieving a class-wide injunction, remarkably, in the racial 
profiling context.35  
To the extent police litigation to obtain damages for uncon-
stitutional actions is unavailable due to qualified immunity, it 
puts pressure on access to injunctive and equitable relief as the 
only alternative method to deter police misconduct. This makes 
the question of how to succeed in equity all the more salient. An 
important boundary for this Article is that these cases did not 
pursue damages for the class of harmed individuals; therefore, 
qualified immunity was not available to the municipal defend-
ants. Other challenges beyond the scope of this Article include 
heightened pleadings,36 strict standards for equitable relief in 
 
 31. See infra notes 567–73 and accompanying text.  
 32. See infra notes 568–73 and accompanying text.  
 33. See infra Part. IV.B.  
 34. See infra Part. IV.B. 
 35. Of course, it is hard to know the precise representativeness of the cases 
studied. The point is that they tell a story about overcoming various litigation 
hurdles that is not fully a part of the scholarly literature.  
 36. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) to claims of discrimination). Scholarship on 
heightened pleadings abound. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revis-
ited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 
(2010); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dis-
missal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights 
Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of 
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 
(2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary 
Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS 
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civil rights cases,37 broadly construed doctrines of qualified im-
munity38 and sovereign immunity.39 
Part I examines the standing, municipal liability, and class 
certification doctrines that make structural reform litigation 
against police practices very difficult. For purposes of this Arti-
cle, the Lyons standing hurdle is presented as the “future in-
jury,” “speculative harm,” and “innocence” impediments. Where 
no official policy is challenged, the Monell line of cases hurdles 
are labeled the “widespread practice” and “factual parallel” bar-
riers for proving municipal liability. And the Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. class action commonality hurdle is described as the “early 
merits inquiry” obstacle. These categorizations provide a way to 
understand the litigation process and evidence marshalled in the 
case examples, but undoubtedly there are other thematic clus-
ters or categorizations embedded in the Supreme Court cases.40  
This Article focuses on structural reform where equitable re-
lief is at stake. Parts II, III, and IV provide comprehensive case 
studies of Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey. The case studies 
are a window into moves lawyers have made and evidence they 
have mobilized to overcome the doctrinal hurdles faced when su-
ing police. Each case study is based on interviews with former 
 
& CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mis-
matches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 37. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1990); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 281 (1977). 
 38. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982), prescribed a quali-
fied immunity test that protects governmental officers from liability if the law 
on the particular rights violation was not “clearly established” at the time of the 
violation. To defeat qualified immunity, the court must determine, in light of 
the facts of the case, that the contours of the right were so clearly established 
that a reasonable officer would know that his conduct violated the Constitution. 
Id. The Court has extended the doctrine to immunize conduct that violates 
plainly foreseeable decisions, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207–08 (2001), and 
has ruled that qualified immunity protects all but the “plainly incompetent” or 
those who intentionally violate rights. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1986). For a comprehensive study of the role qualified immunity plays in con-
stitutional litigation, see Schwartz, supra note 24.  
 39. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 
(1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers 
for violations of state law). For an overview of the Court’s jurisprudence related 
to state sovereign immunity, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988). 
 40. The point is that the themes I prescribe offer new ways of understand-
ing how those cases potentially—underscoring potentially—bear on other struc-
tural reform litigation, particularly class actions against police department 
practices.  
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and current plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys and staff, re-
view of the docket sheets to identify relevant pre-trial motions 
for analysis, examination of motions and the exhibits submitted 
to support each motion, and the evidence submitted at trial. In-
formed by these primary sources, I examined media coverage, 
advocate reports, press releases, and websites for the organiza-
tions and municipalities that litigated the cases, served as or-
ganizational plaintiffs, or were otherwise implicated in the cases’ 
histories. Parts II, III, and IV largely demonstrate how, in these 
cases, litigators were able to navigate the doctrine, even if the 
requirements were challenging.  
Based on the three case studies, Part V collects the lessons 
learned for police structural reform litigation. As a group of suc-
cessful litigation, these case studies are noteworthy for what 
they teach us about how  police structural reform litigators, tak-
ing doctrine seriously, might approach information gathering 
and data collection in innovative and new ways to build eviden-
tiary bases for possible success. The case studies show that a 
court ordered injunction is very difficult to achieve in these types 
of cases, even with the “right” data and information, and re-
quires other sorts of subterranean factors. Yet, certain kinds of 
evidence can assist plaintiffs in overcoming the standing, munic-
ipal liability, and class certification barriers: hard data and sta-
tistical evidence, discriminatory statements by supervisors and 
central decision-makers, and/or proof of a history of notice and 
failure to remedy constitutional violations. Layering the evi-
dence presented in the three case studies over the doctrinal re-
quirements reveals that a type of convergence operates in over-
coming the hurdles. That is, the same or similar evidence can be 
used to overcome interlocking aspects of the doctrine. The Article 
also discusses other mechanisms to obtain information, such as 
relationships with advocates and community organizations; pub-
licity that creates leads and opportunities for further fact gath-
ering; and court orders requiring data tracking and disclosures 
following prior litigation. These means are outside the tradi-
tional discovery process, but also allow plaintiffs to satisfy the 
doctrinal standards.41 
 
 41. One could ask for stronger takeaways or suggest the Article make 
strong claims on the prospects of police structural reform litigation. I am not in 
a position to do so because of the representativeness of these case studies. 
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I.  POLICE STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION   
The modern Supreme Court has made it very difficult for 
those asking federal courts to intervene in the business of an-
other branch of government. For civil rights plaintiffs seeking to 
reach trial, the Court’s requirements are even more demanding. 
The Court’s reluctance to substantively review rights-based 
claims most often manifests itself in related bodies of law some-
times categorized together as “justiciability.” On the basis of in-
terpreting procedural rules and justiciability doctrine, the Su-
preme Court has made decisions that narrow access to 
substantive federal court review.42 When it comes to regulating 
the government’s interference with constitutional or civil rights, 
the Supreme Court uses varied justiciability doctrines—stand-
ing, political question, ripeness, mootness, and immunity—to 
avoid disposition of substantive rights.43 Scholarship points pri-
marily to a conservative Supreme Court limiting access to 
courts, resulting in harms to society’s notions of due process, 
fairness, democracy, and the legitimacy of courts.44 Justiciability 
 
 42. Extensive bodies of literature examine growing limits on substantive 
federal court review. The literature critical of the Supreme Court’s opinions in 
this regard following the Warren Court era is too voluminous to recount and 
frames the move as backlash, retrenchment, and restricting access to justice, 
among others. I generally agree with the view that the Court’s justiciability and 
procedural case law has moved merits questions into the pre-trial arena, alter-
ing the cost-benefit analysis of litigation and settlement; and creating a poten-
tial chilling effect for meritorious civil rights actions. For some examples of 
scholarship analyzing the doctrinal limitations for civil litigants, particularly 
civil rights plaintiffs, in the context of multiple areas of procedure, see generally 
STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) (analyzing the con-
servative reaction to the enablement of private plaintiffs by Democratic Con-
gresses); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10 (arguing a combination of justiciability 
and remedial doctrine has nearly completely foreclosed federal court review for 
civil rights plaintiffs); ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017) 
(pointing to the Supreme Court’s procedural decisions cutting off substantive 
review of civil rights and discrimination claims as a failure in democratic values 
due to its result in limiting access to justice, due process, and fairness); 
STASZACK, supra note 11 (criticizing the Court’s judicial retrenchment through 
the subterranean context of procedure to limit the gains of the rights revolution 
by restricting access to the courts); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. The Linkage Between 
Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 
VA. L. REV. 633 (2006); Thomas, supra note 36. The purpose of this Article is to 
examine what has succeeded at the trial court level in the face of specific doc-
trinal hurdles in police structural reform cases. 
 43. Fallon, supra note 42, at 637. 
 44. See id.; Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416.  
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ultimately serves as the government’s shield, as the Court’s pro-
cedural decisions sanction violence and harm against marginal-
ized communities by limiting court review. 
Section 1983 litigators and police scholars, among others, 
have long understood that the Supreme Court has made it diffi-
cult to reach substantive review of police practices or orders that 
affect the culture of a police department. Prominent scholars 
worry that the Supreme Court deploys certain doctrines to avoid 
review when plaintiffs ask federal courts to closely examine the 
structure and culture of police departments or to intervene to 
reform police practices.45 Legal scholars have viewed Supreme 
Court doctrine as narrowing the scope of review for police liti-
gants who want systemic change rather than damages.46 Most 
commenters have largely focused on police use-of-force or brutal-
ity claims. This Article’s focus on three successful challenges 
brings to light room within the doctrine for challenges to car or 
pedestrian stops.  
This Part turns to three pivotal Supreme Court cases and 
doctrines that create roadblocks to achieving police structural 
reform injunctions. Scholars concerned with the viability of po-
lice structural reform litigation point primarily to the barriers 
associated with demonstrating standing to seek an injunction 
under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. The evidentiary burden as-
sociated with proving deliberate indifference through a wide-
spread unconstitutional police practice, required by the Monell 
v. Department of Social Services of New York line of cases, is an-
other barrier to reform.47 More recently, following Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, scholars focus on the mounting attacks 
against class certification and aggregate litigation for civil rights 
causes.  
 
 45. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 46. See supra note 11; see also Bandes, supra note 12, at 1278–80; Jeffries 
& Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1403.  
 47. E.g., Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1402–03 (“In time . . . the 
Court so narrowed the threshold requirement of ‘official policy or custom’ that 
the door once thought open is now nearly closed. The Court also defeated the 
ingenious stratagem of depicting individual misconduct as evidence of a govern-
mental policy or failure to train. As a result, direct governmental liability is 
quite exceptional.”); Christina Whitman, Government Responsibility for Consti-
tutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 230–48 (1986) (analyzing the Monell line 
of cases and the challenge of demonstrating a municipality caused “its own vio-
lation” of constitutional norms). 
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A. STANDING TO OBTAIN POLICE INJUNCTIONS: LYONS 
Today, standing is a particularly difficult hurdle when 
plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent constitutional harm re-
sulting from an unwritten policy or to require departmental re-
form to prevent future injury.48 With regard to criminal enforce-
ment, challenges to an allegedly unconstitutional or unlawful 
statute or regulation are considered distinct from structural re-
form litigation based on a pattern of events. Pattern, practice, 
and custom cases are typically viewed with a deep skepticism for 
several reasons.49 First, courts often view them as requiring a 
court to infer future government conduct based on past events.50 
Second, the class of individuals who will be harmed in the future 
may be difficult to identify.51 Third, such challenges involve 
structural remedies—court injunctions that require a govern-
ment agency or a set of government actors to modify their actions 
through institutional reforms.52 
To satisfy standing for such an injunction, injured plaintiffs 
must show, with some degree of certainty, that they will be sub-
jected to exactly the same police practice in the future.53 In  
 
 48. Permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by a district 
court. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 310 (1982). A plaintiff 
must demonstrate: (1) irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that a remedy in equity is warranted when considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant; and (4) that the public interest counsels a 
permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); 
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 311–13. 
 49. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Make Sense of Supreme Court 
Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 105, 116–18 (2014); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9. 
 50. See Fallon, supra note 49, 117–18. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 211–12, 217 (6th ed. 2009)). 
Scholars define structural reform injunctions in different ways, but the element 
of institutional reform is foundational. See Jefferies, supra note 9, at 1387 
(“‘[I]nstitutional decrees’ [were structural reform] injunctions issued by federal 
courts ordering comprehensive changes in state and local institutions, such as 
prisons, mental hospitals, and schools, and resulting in pervasive and ongoing 
judicial supervision.”); Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative 
Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 301, 316–17 (2004) (“A structural injunction alters the organizational 
structure, rather than behavioral aspects . . . .”). 
 53. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983). 
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Lyons, law enforcement officers in Los Angeles stopped twenty-
four-year-old, African American Adolph Lyons for a burned out 
taillight.54 Guns drawn, they instructed Mr. Lyons to exit the 
car.55 In the course of the stop, an officer applied either a “bar 
arm control” and/or the “carotid-artery control” chokehold until 
Mr. Lyons passed out.56 When he regained consciousness, he had 
defecated and urinated and was spitting blood.57 He suffered 
permanent damage to his larynx.58 Mr. Lyons subsequently 
brought suit against the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 
for damages and equitable relief.59 He argued that an injunction 
was necessary to prevent the LAPD from further harming him 
and other members of the public pursuant to application of the 
LAPD’s chokehold policy “where [officers] are not threatened by 
the use of any deadly force whatsoever.”60 On remand from the 
Ninth Circuit, the district court enjoined the Los Angeles police 
from using chokeholds under circumstances in which there was 
not a threat of death or serious bodily injury.61 However, the Su-
preme Court reversed and held that Mr. Lyons did not have 
standing to seek injunctive relief, because he had not demon-
strated one of the required factors for an injunction: “a likelihood 
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.”62 Showing an 
irreparable injury required a “real” and “sufficient likelihood 
that he will again be wronged in a similar way.”63  
Justice White’s standing rationale erects three barriers to 
structural reform injunctions: the repeated harm, speculative 
harm, and innocence barriers. The Court refused to acknowledge 
that the number of chokeholds used by LAPD officers constituted 
a pattern of repeated harm. Even though the record included ev-
idence of nine illegal chokeholds in the department’s history,64 
 
 54. Id. at 114 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 97–98 (majority opinion). 
 57. Id. at 115 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 98 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id. at 97. 
 60. Id. (quoting Count V of Mr. Lyons’s amended complaint). 
 61. Id. at 98–99. 
 62. Id. at 111 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). 
 63. Id.  
 64. But see id. at 115–16 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the city 
instructs its officers that use of a chokehold does not constitute deadly force, 
since 1975 no less than 16 persons have died following the use of a choke-
hold . . . .”). For an excellent detailed review of the Lyons decision, see Vicki C. 
Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in 
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the 5–4 Lyons majority concluded that the history of past illegal 
conduct was simply insufficient to rise to a level requiring in-
junctive relief against the entire police department.65 As a result, 
Justice White found that the mere possibility that Mr. Lyons 
“may again be subject to an illegal chokehold [did] not create the 
actual controversy that must exist” to continue the case.66 No 
“repeated harm” had been shown sufficiently to establish a pol-
icy, practice, or custom of illegal chokeholds. 
In addition, the Court’s holding requires that many claims 
of future injury based on police misconduct be dismissed as 
“speculative,” unless the plaintiffs establish that a particular 
chain of events will lead to the same injury. According to the 
Court’s logic, to establish “a likelihood of substantial and imme-
diate irreparable injury,” Mr. Lyons would have to “violate the 
law” (e.g., drive with a broken tail light) such that the police 
would then stop Mr. Lyons and, only after Mr. Lyons acted in a 
way to provoke a chokehold (e.g., resist arrest, attempt to escape, 
threaten deadly force), finally, illegally use its chokehold pol-
icy.67 Alternatively, Mr. Lyons’s actions would have to lead offic-
ers confronting him to use the chokehold in a manner that, con-
trary to their training, renders him unconscious again.68 Thus, 
the “odds” of LAPD officers subjecting Mr. Lyons to the illegal 
chokehold again was “conjecture” and just as likely as any other 
resident of Los Angeles being subjected to the same treatment.69 
It is this simultaneous requirement of some probability of future 
injury and the dismissal of Mr. Lyons’s claim of a future injury 
 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127 (2014). 
 65. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104. The Court specifically relied on Rizzo v. Goode, 
423 U.S. 362 (1976), to refute Mr. Lyons’s claim that the number of incidents 
showed an unlawful policy by the LAPD. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104. The Court in 
Lyons summarized the “bad apple” sentiment of police culture baked into Rizzo: 
“the Court also held that plaintiffs’ showing at trial of a relatively few instances 
of violations by individual police officers, without any showing of a deliberate 
policy on behalf of the named defendants, did not provide a basis for equitable 
relief.” Id. (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372). 
 66. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 104.  
 67. Id. at 102–03 (“[I]f [plaintiffs] proceed to violate an unchallenged law 
and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before pe-
titioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners 
are alleged to have followed.” (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497) (emphasis in 
original)).  
 68. Id. at 106. 
 69. Id. at 108. 
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that has blocked many prospective police abuse cases for lack of 
a case or controversy.70  
Finally, the Court in Lyons also imputed an “innocence” fac-
tor into the standing test. The Court found significant LAPD’s 
policy of only allowing the use of chokeholds “to gain control of a 
suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to es-
cape.”71 Mr. Lyons had not established that, contrary to this pol-
icy, LAPD officers used chokeholds “without any provocation or 
resistance.”72 Subsequent courts have interpreted this reasoning 
as requiring plaintiffs to be blameless in provoking officers in 
order to have standing to enforce injunctions against police.73 
The entrenchment of the innocence barrier is visible when 
viewed from the defendants’ side. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the same obstacle to standing does not apply 
in circumstances where the plaintiff is “unable to control or pre-
vent the behavior that prompted the [police officer’s] alleged mis-
conduct.”74 Meaning, plaintiffs must not do anything that could 
be construed as provoking an officer’s misconduct. In light of the 
police officers’ control over their own documentation of civilian 
encounters, such an innocence requirement is difficult to over-
come. This formal notion of innocence in Lyons restricts plain-
tiffs and protects defendants: when a plaintiff actually or alleg-
edly violates the law, the doctrine punishes him and others 
similarly situated by denying future relief from police violence; 
when a defendant actually violates the law, the doctrine treats 
him as an anomaly within the system.  
 
 70. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1416–17; see JW v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2018); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1984); Whitfield v. 
City of Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779 (S.D. Miss. 2012); MacIssac v. Town of 
Poughkeepsie, 770 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 
649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 
568 U.S. 398, 399 (2013) (“Respondents’ standing theory also rests on a specu-
lative chain of possibilities that does not establish that their potential injury is 
certainly impending or is fairly traceable to § 1881a.”). 
 71. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110 (citation omitted). 
 72. Id. at 105. 
 73. E.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988) (“[W]e generally have been 
unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of miscon-
duct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury.”); see also 
Bray v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Roe v. 
City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Weiser v. Koch, 632 
F. Supp. 1369, 1373–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318, 
1327–28 (D. Conn. 1984).  
 74. JW, 904 F.3d at 1265. 
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As one example of the Lyons barriers in operation, in JW v. 
Birmingham Board of Education, the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
a judgment, following a twelve-day bench trial that found six 
school resource officers personally liable for failing to decontam-
inate students subjected to chemical spraying.75 It also reversed 
the district court’s class-wide injunction ordering the parties to 
devise a plan to improve training and the policies related to the 
use of chemical spray in Birmingham schools.76 The district 
court had determined the plaintiffs showed that the future in-
jury was not speculative: children were at risk of concrete future 
harm because school was mandatory for the class of plaintiff chil-
dren, and they continued to be exposed to the same officers.77 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, evoking the innocence barrier, 
stating that the misbehavior that resulted in being pepper-
sprayed was not mandatory.78 Furthermore, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reasoned that without an official policy of pepper-spraying 
students, all future incidences would be essentially random, 
making the odds of harm “speculative.” Assessing the actual 
numbers, the Eleventh Circuit calculated there was only a 1.77% 
chance of being exposed to spray and improperly decontami-
nated, rendering the plaintiffs’ injury too speculative.79 There-
fore, the plaintiff students could not overcome the Lyons hurdle 
to injunctive relief. 
Civil rights scholars are critical of Lyons for narrowing in-
junction-driven policing reform.80 According to the traditional 
view, following City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, structural police re-
form litigation challenging unofficial policies became a dead let-
ter.81 In Lyons, the Supreme Court incorporated the already 
 
 75. Id. at 1253, 1273. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 1269. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1270. 
 80. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1417–18 (stating that Lyons 
remedial standing “preclude[s] the use of systemic remedies for what are, at 
bottom, institutional and systemic problems”); David Rudovsky, Running in 
Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Limiting Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1199, 1233, 1236–37 (2005). On broader concerns regarding the review 
limiting role of standing doctrine, including Lyons, see Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1859–62 (2015). 
 81. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 1; Schmidtberger, supra note 12, at 183–
84; cf. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 215–24 (1983) (ex-
plaining the Lyons holding and what it means for standing and equitable relief 
doctrines). 
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heightened standards for obtaining injunctive relief into stand-
ing doctrine itself.82 Thus, by creating a “precondition,”83 or an 
additional high threshold before even substantive review of the 
merits, the Court limited future plaintiffs’ abilities to seek in-
junctions against police departments. Lyons gives credence to 
the pessimistic view that standing to obtain injunctive relief in 
cases without a formal policy presents a formidable barrier to 
police reform litigation.84 Despite this obstacle, however, some 
commentators still urge litigation, while acknowledging its diffi-
culty.85  
B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: MONELL 
Municipal liability under section 1983 is a key component of 
structural reform police litigation and mirrors other sectors of 
public law litigation. Illegal and violent police conduct often in-
dicates and directly flows from an infirm organizational culture 
in police departments.86 Thus, to effectively address harmful po-
licing practices through litigation, the entire police department, 
and the municipality with authority over its decision-making, 
must be party to the action. Municipal liability under section 
1983, established in Monell, allows exactly that: a municipal 
 
 82. See Fallon, supra note 12, at 5–7; cf. William A. Fletcher, Standing: 
Who Can Sue To Enforce a Legal Duty, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277 (2013) (discussing 
his 1988 article on standing and what has changed since then); William A. 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (criticizing the 
current state of standing doctrine and offering a less-stringent alternative); 
Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477 
(2018) (describing how the phenomenon of narrowing remedies against police 
misconduct creates tension in the doctrine and removes oversight and account-
ability in practice). 
 83. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he issue 
here is not whether that claim has become moot but whether Lyons meets the 
preconditions for asserting an injunctive claim in a federal forum.”); see also id. 
at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority’s decision to make 
entitlement to relief an issue in standing). 
 84. Cf. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322–23 (1988) (distinguishing the prob-
ability of a future unconstitutional injury in Lyons from the probability of a fu-
ture violation of a statute prohibiting the stay-put provision of a statute meant 
to protect children with disabilities).  
 85. See Gilles, supra note 9, at 1384, 1398–99, 1453; see also Jeffries & 
Rutherglen, supra note 9, at 1418–19 (discussing benefits of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
DOJ structural reform litigation). 
 86. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 454 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Such failures [to train, supervise, monitor, and discipline ad-
equately] . . . have caused the patterns of widespread Fourth Amendment vio-
lations and widespread Fourteenth Amendment violations.”). 
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body can be held liable for its employees’ unconstitutional ac-
tions when taken pursuant to “a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by 
that body’s officers” or “governmental ‘custom.’”87  
In 1978, the Supreme Court formally recognized municipal 
liability under section 1983 in a sometimes-celebrated opinion, 
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York.88 Monell 
took the doctrine two steps forward, but one step back. Reversing 
a prior opinion on section 1983’s legislative history,89 the Court 
extended liability, in certain circumstances, to municipalities 
and cities for civil rights violations by their employees.90 Follow-
ing Monell, a city and police department employing a police of-
ficer engaged in unlawful conduct could face monetary conse-
quences under section 1983.  
The Court, however, rejected a respondeat superior theory.91 
Instead municipalities would be liable for their employees’ ac-
tions only where the municipality itself was responsible for the 
plaintiff ’s injuries, upon a showing that harm resulted from a 
“government’s policy or custom” as created by “lawmakers or by 
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 
policy.”92 Meaning, the Court viewed acts of employees as dis- 
 
 87. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). 
 88. See id. at 695. 
 89. Monell, 436 U.S. at 659 (overturning Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961)). Erwin Chemerinsky discusses the lower courts’ work-around of Justice 
Douglas’s reading of section 1983. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 46. Lower 
courts circumvented Monroe and even created municipal liability based on other 
civil rights laws or inferred rights of action directly from the Constitution. Id. 
(citing Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977) (using section 1981 to 
create liability for racial discrimination by police officers), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 
904 (1978)); see, e.g., Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975).  
 90. 436 U.S. at 664–65. 
 91. Id. at 701 n.66. 
 92. Id. at 694 (“[A] local government may not be sued under [Section] 1983 
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when exe-
cution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or 
by those whose edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
injury that the government as an entity is responsible . . . .”); cf. City of Okla-
homa City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that section 1983 supports respondeat superior liability). As even early com-
mentators noted, the Court’s rejection of respondeat superior liability imposed 
a substantial limitation for litigants. See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking His-
tory Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over 
Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2187, 2192–95 (2005); Karen 
Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Fed-
  
2278 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
tinct from acts of the municipality.93 In subsequent cases, the 
Supreme Court has elaborated that a government “policy” or 
“custom” is an official or unofficial action traceable to persons 
with “final authority” to create policy.94 Three types of “policies 
or customs” have been identified by the Court: official policies 
“on the books” (directly implicating the person with final author-
ity); individual actions authorized by persons who possess “final 
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action 
ordered”;95 and unofficial custom, defined to mean “practices so 
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law” 
(where actual or constructive knowledge is attributed to persons 
with policy making authority).96 Examples include when formal 
governmental policy or custom violates the Constitution, or 
where a sufficiently widespread pattern of official conduct 
amounts to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons.”97 
This standard of proof has been extended to all suits, whether 
for monetary or equitable relief.98  
For cases without a formal governmental policy or custom, 
the Monell line of cases establishes what this Article calls the 
“widespread practice” and the “factual parallel” requirements. 
The “widespread practice” requirement encompasses the delib-
erate indifference standard. In City of Canton v. Harris, the 
Court established that failure to train police officers could create 
municipal liability, where that failure reasonably caused the 
rights violation at issue.99 In the same decision, however, the 
Court determined a government entity is liable for damages only 
 
eral Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 438–39 (1978); Christina B. Whitman, Govern-
ment Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 236 n.43 
(1986). Critics also cite the “doctrinal mess” the Court created by rejecting re-
spondeat superior liability, as courts have delivered alternative holdings re-
garding municipal liability and muddled the standard. Lisa D. Hawke, Note, 
Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analy-
sis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 831, 845 (2005). 
 93. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986).  
 94. Id. at 480–81. 
 95. Id. at 481. 
 96. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 
 97. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see Bd. of the Cty. 
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1997). Regardless of one’s view on the 
logic of the Court’s limits to municipal liability, Monell and its progeny estab-
lished a high evidentiary standard in circumstances relevant to this Article. See 
Susan Bandes, Introduction: The Emperor’s New Clothes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
619, 620–21 (1999).  
 98. Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 29 (2010).  
 99. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390. 
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for “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons” upon a show-
ing of a widespread practice of constitutional harm, not for all 
employee wrongdoing or negligence on the part of the entity.100 
To succeed, plaintiffs must show that, considering “the duties 
assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or 
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to 
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy-
makers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliber-
ately indifferent to the need.”101 The “failure to” theory has been 
expanded beyond training to include supervising, hiring, disci-
plining, and monitoring officer activities.102  
Subsequent decisions in cases brought under a Monell “fail-
ure to” theory demonstrate the “factual parallel” concept this Ar-
ticle utilizes. In the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Connick v. 
Thompson, the Court further explained that in claims that plain-
tiffs’ injuries stem from a municipality’s failure to train its em-
ployees, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by un-
trained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 
deliberate indifference.”103 The Court required the constitutional 
violations in an alleged pattern be similar enough in their facts 
to show deliberate indifference.104 In the criminal prosecution of 
Mr. Thompson, prosecutors from the Orleans Parish District At-
torney’s office failed to disclose a crime lab report, blood evi-
dence, and physical and scientific evidence—clear Brady viola-
tions.105 Citing four other reversals based on Brady violations, 
Mr. Thompson alleged that his Brady violation stemmed from 
“[District Attorney] Connick’s deliberate indifference to an obvi-
ous need to train the prosecutors in his office in order to avoid 
such constitutional violations.”106 In a 5–4 opinion, written by 
Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court overturned Mr. Thompson’s 
 
 100. Id. at 388. 
 101. Id.; accord Johnson v. City of Vallejo, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1220–21 
(E.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that the number of police shootings in the city over an 
approximately two-year period did not show that the city had a policy or practice 
of violating citizens’ rights against use of excessive force); see Jeffries & Ruth-
erglen, supra note 9, at 1403. 
 102. Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in Police Failure To Train Liability, 
23 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 169, 172–73 (2000). 
 103. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). 
 104. Id. at 72. 
 105. Id. at 55. 
 106. Id. at 57. 
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favorable verdict and monetary award.107 The four other rever-
sals were deemed inadequate proof because none involved fail-
ure to disclose the same evidence (e.g. blood, crime lab re-
ports).108 The Court found no obvious need for training, since 
prosecutors presumably received appropriate training in law 
school to prevent Brady violations.109 Despite the rigorous evi-
dentiary requirements to establish liability for a pattern or prac-
tice of constitutional harm, Connick left intact the basic principle 
that municipal liability can “be imposed for a failure to train, 
supervise, or discipline.”110  
Monell, Harris, and Connick show the high burden to estab-
lish municipal liability for unlawful practices under section 
1983, particularly where no official policy is at issue.111 Lower 
court decisions further define the “widespread practice” and “fac-
tual parallel” requirements and commenters note the unworka-
ble nature of precedent that has emerged from decisions inter-
preting Monell’s requirements.112 Because municipalities 
typically do not write or enforce policies that are explicitly un-
constitutional, plaintiffs bear the burden of “meeting ‘rigorous 
standards of culpability and causation’” imposed by the Court.113 
Yet, as I reveal through the case studies presented in Parts II, 
 
 107. Id. at 72. 
 108. Id. at 62–63. 
 109. Id. at 64. In the Court’s view, merely showing “that additional training 
would have been helpful [for prosecutors] in making difficult decisions” was not 
sufficient to establish municipal liability under a failure to train theory. Id. at 
68. 
 110. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Estab-
lishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline Subordinates in 
A Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 309 (2012). 
 111. See Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 Independ-
ent of Employee Liability, 17 TOURO L. REV. 551, 573 (2001) (opposing the high 
burden for showing municipal liability); Matthew J. Cron et al., Municipal Lia-
bility: Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway Toward Effective Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2014); Fallon, supra note 11, at 995–
96 (calling for an expansion of municipal liability under section 1983); Levinson, 
supra note 110; Metzger, supra note 80, at 1866–69 (“[A]pplication of the delib-
erate indifference standard has significantly limited the viability of failure-to-
train and failure-to-supervise challenges.”). 
 112. Cf. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (describing widespread practices as “ac-
tion[s] for which the municipality is actually responsible”). 
 113. Cron, supra note 111, at 584 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical 
Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1920–21 
(2007) (discussing the disadvantages that individual plaintiffs have against mu-
nicipal governments).  
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III, and IV, courts can still find deliberate indifference to an un-
written discriminatory police practice, for certain claims, if the 
right evidence is presented. 
C. CLASS CERTIFICATION: WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES 
Class action status is a common feature in structural reform 
litigation. The modern class action is viewed as a mechanism for 
remedying violations of law, particularly for those who face chal-
lenges in seeking legal redress due to lack of knowledge of legal 
mechanisms and/or burdensome legal costs.114 For smaller inju-
ries affecting a large number of individuals, many understand 
that the class action is an essential tool for vindicating their 
rights.115 Most individuals will forgo the trouble of filing a case 
with small monetary damages (e.g., challenging a short, but un-
lawful, Terry stop), and attorneys are typically not willing to 
take such cases.116 But as a large group, and with the goal of 
preventing future harm, the calculus sometimes changes in fa-
vor of litigation.117 
Class-wide relief is particularly helpful for the police litiga-
tion in Parts II, III, and IV, where aggregating the harms more 
clearly expresses the extent of state-imposed harm on Black and 
Brown communities. This Section proceeds with a textual, or 
rule-based, view of the certification requirements followed by a 
discussion of the aspect of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. raised for police 
litigants: the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of commonality. It char-
acterizes the challenge for class action commonality as an “early 
merits inquiry” barrier. This Section also explains the Rule 
23(b)(2) requirements for obtaining class-wide injunctions.118  
 
 114. See Judith Resnick, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Con-
cepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 142–
43 (2011). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. The defendants in the case studies in Parts II, III, and IV raised other 
arguments typically associated with Rule 23(b)(3) class actions that wish to ob-
tain damages for members of the class. These arguments, while addressed by 
the district courts, are inapposite to class-wide injunctive relief and are not dis-
cussed in this Part. I address these other concerns—necessity and opt-out pro-
visions—briefly in Part V in the context of how the class certification doctrine 
may limit the availability of other systemic litigation against police department 
practices.  
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1. Class Certification Requirements Under Rule 23 
As with standing for injunctive relief, class certification im-
poses a barrier even before courts review the substantive merits 
of plaintiffs’ claims. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides the requirements for federal class action suits. 
Plaintiffs must first meet the four prerequisites in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity (too numerous for joinder), 
commonality (there must be common questions of law or fact), 
typicality (the named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses are typical of 
the class), and adequacy of representation (the named plaintiffs 
and their attorneys are able to fairly represent the interests of 
the entire class).119 Although plaintiffs must meet all four Rule 
23 requirements, commonality presents an across-the-board 
class certification problem and is the focus within the case stud-
ies.  
In addition to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, plaintiffs must also 
satisfy Rule 23(b), which provides for three types of class ac-
tions.120 For this Article, it is important to distinguish between 
class actions filed under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires that common issues of law and fact “predominate” over 
questions affecting individuals, along with a determination that 
the class action tool is superior to other methods of adjudica-
tion.121 This predominance issue proved a sticking point for the 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class.122 In contrast, the actions in the case 
studies were filed as (b)(2) class actions. Traditionally, under 
(b)(2) plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the defendant acted 
in the same manner towards the class.123 This is usually satis-
fied where class members “complain of a pattern or practice that 
is generally applicable to the class as a whole.”124  
Rule 23(b)(2) reflects the class action’s social justice roots 
and provides textual support for my argument that class action 
status has proven the most difficult hurdle for police structural 
reform litigants. Amended in 1966 during the Civil Rights move-
ment, Rule 23 effectively encouraged aggregation of individual 
 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 120. Id. 23(b). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363–64 (2011). 
 123. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 124. Id.; see also Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988) (em-
phasizing that although “the claims of individual class members may differ fac-
tually,” certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is a proper vehicle for challenging “a 
common policy”). 
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claims brought during this period.125 The text of Rule 23(b)(2) 
permits courts to utilize the class action tool where defendants 
“acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding relief is ap-
propriate respecting the class as a whole.”126 The Advisory Com-
mittee’s Notes for the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 explain that, 
at the time of its revision, (b)(2) was created to curb discrimina-
tion and foster institutional reform by facilitating challenges to 
widespread rights violations for certain class actions: “usually 
one[s] whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”127 
Indeed, the class tool was essential in major public institution 
reforms of segregated schools, segregated neighborhoods, and ju-
venile justice systems, among others.128 It created access to court 
review for entire communities of harmed litigants seeking in-
junctive relief to end discrimination or other civil rights viola-
tions.129 To offset the potential for abuse by litigants, decertifi-
cation is available at the trial stage if class status is incorrectly 
granted.130 
2. Commonality Under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
Over the several decades following Rule 23’s amendment in 
1966, as the number of civil rights class action suits grew, and 
with the Court’s conservative turn, the Supreme Court began 
imposing constraints on the ability to bring class action suits in 
federal courts.131 These cases set the groundwork for its seminal 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.132  
 
 125. See Francisco Valdes, Procedure, Policy, and Power: Class Actions and 
Social Justice in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
627, 642 (2008). 
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 127. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights 
Roots and Relevance Today, 66 KAN. L. REV. 325, 332–33 (2017); see also David 
Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the 
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011) (explaining how de-
segregation litigation affected the origins of Rule 23(b)). 
 128. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 21, at 1021–53. 
 129. See id. at 1016–21. 
 130. Marcus, supra note 127, at 715. 
 131. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Fal-
con, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In the mass tort class action context (asbestos litiga-
tion), see generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  
 132. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. has been the subject of much civil rights scholarship. E.g., Maureen Carroll, 
  
2284 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia—who was notori-
ously hostile to civil rights class actions133—the Court solidified 
a heightened standard to meet the commonality requirement.  
What I am calling an “early merits inquiry” marks a shift in 
line with other procedural requirements, where plaintiffs are re-
quired to show an indicia of success based on facts and infor-
mation prior to substantive review of the parties’ evidence. In 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court pronounced that 
“some proof” of common questions of law and fact was not 
enough. Instead, Justice Scalia demanded a “common conten-
tion” that “must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-
wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or 
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 
one of the claims in one stroke.”134 Applying General Telephone 
Co. v. Falcon,135 the Court was unconvinced that plaintiffs put 
forward “significant proof” of “a general policy of discrimination” 
in employment promotion decisions.136 While acknowledging 
 
Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843 (2016); Tristin K. Green, On Employ-
ment Discrimination and Police Misconduct: Title VII and the Mirage of the “Mo-
nell Analogue,” 95 B.U. L. REV. 1077 (2015); Malveaux, supra note 127; David 
Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 828–33 (2016).  
 133. Justice Scalia expressed this hostility in decisions over the previous 
decade. In Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), the Court reviewed decisions 
related to two class actions—Coleman v. Brown, sub. nom Coleman v. Wilson, 
912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (dealing with a class of mentally ill 
persons in prison) and Plata v. Brown, sub. nom Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. 
CIV S–90–520 LKK, JFM P, 2010 WL 99000 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (dealing 
with a class of prisoners with serious medical conditions)—where both classes 
alleged that overcrowding in California prisons was the primary cause of con-
stitutional violations of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment and due process under Fourteenth Amendment. In a dissenting 
opinion, Scalia expressed concerns with a plaintiff class being able to allege a 
claim of a constitutional violation based on systemwide deficiencies. Plata, 563 
U.S. at 550–54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view, the plaintiff should not qual-
ify as a class member unless he or she could make an individualized showing of 
mistreatment. Id. at 554. His reasoning here was similar to that articulated in 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), a class action in Arizona filed on behalf of 
adult prisoners who alleged they had been deprived of access to the courts by 
not being able to access the prison law library. There, Scalia noted, “[named 
plaintiffs who represent a class] must allege and show that they personally have 
been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members 
of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Id. at 
357 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights, Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)). 
 134. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
 135. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. 
 136. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 353. 
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that Rule 23 does not establish a pleading standard, the Court 
applied a “rigorous analysis” of Rule 23’s requirements for class 
certification.137 It surmised that such a review “will entail some 
overlap with the . . . plaintiffs’ underlying claim,” and that this 
“cannot be helped.”138 Plaintiffs, he wrote, “must be prepared to 
prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, com-
mon questions of law or fact, etc.” at the pleading stage.139 It re-
iterates the Court’s preference to avoid discovery and limit sub-
stantive review for liberal civil rights claims.  
The Court justified its commonality determination by reject-
ing and minimizing testimony from plaintiffs’ experts. Up front, 
Justice Scalia determined the only evidence of a general policy 
of discrimination was presented through sociological expert wit-
ness testimony that linked Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and 
personnel practices to its employees’ discriminatory supervisory 
decision-making.140 One of the most significant barriers to Title 
VII gender and race discrimination for plaintiffs today is the 
Court’s rejection of evidence pointing to a corporate culture vul-
nerable to gender bias. Plaintiffs’ sociological expert was unable 
to determine with sufficient specificity how regularly stereotypes 
and gender-biased culture in the workplace played a meaningful 
role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart.141 Justice Scalia 
stated that without demonstrating uniformity in stereotyping 
and gender bias and decision-making, plaintiffs had not shown 
a centralized policy: “Without some glue holding the alleged rea-
sons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say 
that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will 
produce a common answer to the crucial question.”142 Because 
the expert could not answer the question of how prevalent gen-
der discrimination at Wal-Mart was, the Court disregarded the 
testimony completely.143  
Second, Justice Scalia rejected plaintiffs’ statistical expert’s 
showing of disparities in the number of women promoted to man-
agement positions as proof of a discriminatory policy. Data was 
 
 137. Id. at 351. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 350. 
 140. Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 43 (2011). 
 141. 564 U.S. at 354 (the expert was asked, and unable to provide an opinion, 
whether gender bias played a role in .05% or 95% of instances).  
 142. Id. at 352.  
 143. Id. 
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collected at the regional and national level, and therefore, Jus-
tice Scalia found, could not establish the existence of disparities 
at individual stores or even at the district level.144 Justice Scalia 
theorized that the data presented may merely indicate the avail-
ability of women who are qualified or interested in the position, 
rather than discriminatory employment practices.145 Ultimately, 
he determined that at most, plaintiffs established a policy of dis-
cretionary decision-making at the regional or store level that did 
not rise to the level of a policy of discrimination common to the 
class. In short, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes created a regime 
where “overly aggregated” statistics cannot establish commonal-
ity when the decisions at issue are made at a local level.146  
The primary concern for future structural reform litigation 
rests on Justice Scalia’s use of the concept of “indivisibility.” He 
wrote that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) applies “only when a 
single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to 
each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification 
when each individual class member would be entitled to a differ-
ent injunction or declaratory judgment against the defend-
ant.”147 This portion of the decision related to Rule 23(b)(2) class 
members is generally viewed as an issue of class cohesion, but 
has led to some confusion and lack of uniformity in lower 
courts.148 Most recently, following remand of Jennings v. Rodri-
guez,149 a class action based on the blanket policy to refuse bond 
hearings to non-citizen class members detained by the govern-
ment, the Court invited a Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. level of scrutiny 
for the purely Rule 23(b)(2) class action on the theory that each 
non-citizen seeking a bond hearing would require an individual-
ized determination. This reasoning evokes the concern that class 
members’ claims are divisible due to the requirements of proce-
dural due process. For purposes of the racial profiling cases in 
this Article, where plaintiffs raised no procedural due process 
 
 144. Id. at 356.  
 145. Id. at 357. 
 146. Mary Dunn Baker, Class Certification Statistical Analyses Post-Dukes, 
27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 471, 475 (2012). 
 147. 564 U.S. at 360. 
 148. Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 
B.U. L. REV. 59 (2019); cf. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 
GEO. L.J. 777, 828–33 (2016) (arguing that while there is some confusion, coun-
terweight function provides guidance for determining a plaintiff ’s evidentiary 
burden at class certification). 
 149. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
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allegations, the effect on future certification decisions is likely 
minimal.150  
Civil rights scholars express concern that Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes limits access to the courts and undermines the pur-
pose of Rule 23.151 Indeed, the decision is consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s other procedural decisions that also created sig-
nificant barriers for civil rights plaintiffs, including rulings 
addressing sufficiency of pleadings, standing, government im-
munities, jurisdiction, and summary judgment.  
In summary, this Part examined the specific procedural 
roadblocks civil rights plaintiffs often face in police structural 
reform litigation. It named the Lyons standing hurdle as the fu-
ture injury, speculative harm, and innocence requirements. The 
Article presents the Monell line of cases as the widespread prac-
tice and factual parallel barriers for municipal liability. And the 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class action commonality hurdle is framed 
as the early merits inquiry barrier. As the next Parts show, cases 
at the district court level offer a rich understanding of how liti-
gants prevail in the face of the challenging procedural and justi-
ciability doctrines discussed in this Part. Focusing on the Su-
preme Court often hides these on-the-ground moves. By 
analyzing the evidence and litigation processes in the trial court 
for three significant cases, this Article reveals what has been ob-
scured by the popular view that racial profiling structural reform 
injunctions are very difficult to achieve.  
Parts II, III, and IV endeavor to show how plaintiffs suc-
ceeded in jumping each doctrinal hurdle discussed in this Part 
in three racial-profiling police-structural-reform cases: (1) Floyd 
v. City of New York, (2) Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, and (3) Bai-
ley v. City of Philadelphia. Each case involves racial profiling in 
a stop context. Filed as class actions for injunctive relief in large 
urban police departments, these cases are not typical. Lawsuits 
seeking damages for misconduct in individual cases are more 
common, where plaintiffs request monetary remedies. Individ-
ual actions seeking damages may also ask for Monell style liabil-
ity. The section 1983 cases studied in this Article seek structural 
 
 150. See Alexandra D. Lahay et al., Government Class Actions After Jen-
nings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://blog 
.harvardlawreview.org/government-class-actions-after-jennings-v-rodriguez 
[https://perma.cc/DB3S-B]. 
 151. Marcus, supra note 132, at 830 (noting that after Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
“[s]ome courts continue to treat the Rule 23(b)(2) inquiry as a test for class ‘co-
hesion’”). 
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relief from racial profiling using the class action tool, but request 
injunctions (not damages) for a class of plaintiffs. These types of 
cases are considered very difficult to pursue. What information 
and evidence, then, allowed the plaintiffs to satisfy standing to 
seek injunctions, municipal liability, and class certification? The 
types of evidence used to overcome the doctrine—hard data and 
statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors 
and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of notice 
and failure to remedy constitutional violation—often overlap to 
meet the standards. The case studies also bring to light infor-
mation gathering techniques outside of formal discovery through 
other advocates in each local context.  
II.  FLOYD V. CITY OF NEW YORK: N.Y. STOP AND FRISK   
In 2008, on behalf of a class of individuals routinely sub-
jected to illegal stops between 2004 and 2012 (totaling 4.4 mil-
lion over eight years), David Floyd, David Ourlicht, Lalit Clark-
son, and Deon Dennis filed a section 1983 class action lawsuit 
challenging the stop and frisk practices of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) as violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.152 Now-retired U.S. District Court Judge Shira 
Scheindlin presided over a nine-week bench trial from March to 
May 2012, and ordered the NYPD to engage in a process to de-
velop reforms with plaintiffs and community organizations rep-
resentative of the harmed class members.153 The court’s lengthy 
decision was a watershed in police reform and criminal proce-
dure because it found the NYPD had engaged in widespread ra-
cial profiling in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.154  
This Part dissects and summarizes the evidence put forward 
in this litigation to surmount the difficult doctrinal hurdles. 
Floyd is an extension of a prior class action stop and frisk law-
suit, settled as Daniels v. City of New York. The case study de-
votes space to Daniels for several reasons. The City’s failure to 
correct its unlawful stop and frisk practices following the Daniels 
 
 152. Complaint, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2012 WL 
1031760 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 28, 2012). Over 4,400,000 stops were conducted in 
this eight year time period. See Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd V), 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 153. Id. at 667. 
 154. See id. See generally MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY E. FRADELLA, STOP 
AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC (2016) 
(chronicling the impact of N.Y. stop-and-frisk tactics and Floyd).  
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order does much to lay a foundation for the plaintiffs’ delibera-
tive indifference theory, and to overcome the Lyons’s speculative 
harm and future injury requirements. Further, the context sur-
rounding Daniels and broken windows policing shows the infor-
mation-gathering that is necessary prior to filing in order to 
overcome the barriers discussed in Part I.  
A. DANIELS V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
Floyd v. City of New York grew out of a broader movement 
against the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy and the violence that 
often ensued from the encounters.155 With corruption and bru-
tality pervading its history, the NYPD has long used the tactic 
of stopping and frisking people without suspicion.156 The prac-
tice, which refers to brief police investigative stops and subse-
quent pat downs if the police suspect that the individual is 
armed, had been deployed by the NYPD since the 1970s and wit-
nessed a resurgence beginning with the 1994 election of Rudolph 
Giuliani.157 Giuliani, who ran on a campaign promise of law and 
order, directed his police commissioner William Bratton to de-
ploy the nearly all-white and male Street Crimes Unit (SCU) of-
ficers in so-called “high crime” areas populated overwhelmingly 
by Black and Latinx158 communities.159 The officers, called “com-
mandos” patrolled the streets of New York, often at night, in un-
marked cars and in plain clothes.160 Their mission was to  
 
 155. Joo-Hyun Kang, Fighting Broken Windows Policing in New York City 




 156. See MARILYNN S. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VI-
OLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 297–300 (2003); JAMES LARDNER & THOMAS REP-
PETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE 331–34 (2000); RIMA VESELY-FLAD, Po-
licing Dark Bodies in Polluted Spaces: Stop and Frisk in New York City, 1993–
2013, in RACIAL PURITY AND DANGEROUS BODIES: MORAL POLLUTION, BLACK 
LIVES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 119–39 (2017) (ebook); Bernard E. Har-
court, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of 
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New 
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 377–80 (1998).  
 157. JOHNSON, supra note 156, at 297–300. 
 158. When referring to the community in a general sense, Latinx will be used 
as an identifier. At other points in the Article, the terms Hispanic or Latino/a 
reflect the language used by courts or other official records. 
 159. LARDNER & REPPETTO, supra note 156, at 331–32. 
 160. Id. 
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“interdict violent street crime” and remove illegal firearms from 
the streets of New York.161  
Under the guise of “Broken Windows” theory,162 which sug-
gests that neighborhoods with a greater concentration of physi-
cal and social disorder should evince higher stop and frisk activ-
ity, SCU targeted Black and Latinx communities to “maintain 
order.”163 Aggressive policing strategies hailed by Giuliani and 
Bratton, and the violence that ensued from their implementa-
tion, spurred mobilization. In the mid-1990s, the late Richie Pe-
rez—co-founder of the National Congress for Puerto Rican 
Rights’ Justice Committee—led much of New York’s organizing 
against the Giuliani administration’s violent police practices. He 
convened the Coalition Against Police Brutality (CAPB) to com-
bat the “daily abuses” faced by those on the receiving end of bro-
ken windows and routine police violence in 1998.164 Composed of 
a diverse coalition of New York City grassroots organizations, 
including Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) representa-
tives, the CAPB pursued an ensemble of varied and malleable 
strategies, including lawsuits, direct action, and policy cam-
paigns.165 Their organizing effort was invigorated by widespread 
media coverage of the tragic killing of Amadou Diallo in 1999 by 
 
 161. Id.; Damaso Reyes, NYC Street Crimes Unit Out of Control, PHILA. 
TRIB., Mar. 16, 1999, at 7A.  
 162. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 [https://perma.cc/ 
TVJ8-FBTS] (using the analogy of a broken window to describe the relationship 
between disorder and crime). 
 163. Id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, POLICY 
STRATEGY NO. 19: GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS (1994) (linking disorder to 
violence and rationalizing the concentration of order-maintenance policing 
(OMP) strategies in the city’s neighborhoods with the highest crime rates); 
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996); ELIOT 
SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP AND FRISK PRAC-
TICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 89 (1999) (showing through empirical analysis 
OMP was not implemented in a race-neutral manner by the NYPD).  
 164. Kang, supra note 155. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of 
Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2429–40 (2017) (discussing patterns of routine police 
violence). 
 165. Kang, supra note 155. 
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NYPD officers.166 I provide these details to situate the filing of 
the Daniels litigation.  
Shortly after Mr. Diallo’s killing, the NYPD released numer-
ical data it maintained: in 1997 and 1998, 35,000 of the 45,000 
stop and frisks reported by the SCU did not result in arrests.167 
Advocates interpreted the numbers to mean the police officers’ 
suspicions that criminal activity was afoot were wrong in a vast 
majority of cases.  
On March 8, 1999, plaintiffs National Congress for Puerto 
Rican Rights, Kelvin Daniels, Poseidon Baskin, Djibril Toure, 
Hector Rivera, Victor Rodriguez, and Kahil Shkymba, repre-
sented by CCR attorneys Arthur Kinoy and Bill Goodman and a 
private plaintiff-side attorney, Jonathan Moore, filed Daniels v. 
City of New York,168 a class action lawsuit in the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs challenged the 
NYPD’s stop and frisk policy on two grounds: (1) NYPD officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting stop and frisks 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and (2) NYPD 
officers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by conducting stop and frisks solely on the basis of 
their race and national origin.169 The plaintiffs primarily sought 
a judgment and injunction declaring that the NYPD SCU’s stop 
and frisk practices were without reasonable suspicion and based 
on race and/or national origin; to prevent the police from using 
formal or informal productivity standards (de facto quotas) in 
stop decisions; to improve training, monitoring, and supervision 
of SCU stop and frisk policies; to implement psychological test-
ing for SCU officers; and to require documentation for the basis 
of every stop and frisk.170 
Importantly for this Article’s illustration of how litigants 
navigate procedural hurdles, the Daniels defendants initially 
moved to dismiss the case on the basis that plaintiffs lacked 
standing under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, arguing plaintiffs 
 
 166. Telephone Interview with Kamau Franklin, Staff Attorney, Ctr. for 
Const. Rts. (Aug. 13, 2018). 
 167. Daniels et al. v. the City of New York, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/daniels 
-et-al-v-city-new-york [https://perma.cc/U43B-JA22]. 
 168. Class Action Complaint, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99-CV-1695 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1999); see also Daniels et al. v. the City of New York, supra 
note 167.  
 169. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 170. Id. at 422 n.2. 
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faced no realistic threat of future injury from their stop and frisk 
practices.171 The court denied the motion to dismiss and distin-
guished Lyons.172 As she did later in Floyd, Judge Scheindlin 
looked at the number of alleged constitutional violations (tens of 
thousands) and found the number materially different than the 
roughly ten incidents cited by the Lyons Court.173 She also relied 
upon the repeated stops alleged by three of the named plain-
tiffs.174 Finally, she noted that plaintiffs were engaging in “inno-
cent” behavior when stopped, which she distinguished from the 
characterization of Mr. Lyons’s actions leading to the LAPD of-
ficers’ illegal chokehold in his case.175 The court’s treatment of 
Lyons is rarely mentioned in legal scholarship from that time.176 
I point to it here to acknowledge the need for more systematic 
examination of district court treatment of Lyons. 
The NYPD disbanded the SCU due to the combination of 
public pressure and the Daniels settlement. While the case was 
in progress, large anti-police brutality mobilizations took place 
after the Diallo killing and organizers used the Daniels litigation 
as an opportunity to focus attention on the NYPD’s violence.177  
The court granted plaintiffs’ request for class certification in 
January 2001.178 The class consisted of all persons who had been 
or will be subjected to the SCU’s policy and/or practices of stop 
and frisk in violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments.179 Under the more relaxed interpretation of Rule 23 of 
the pre-Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. era, Judge Scheindlin found com-
monality under the Second Circuit’s theory of certification where 
putative class members were harmed under a unitary course of 
conduct:180 “[t]he fact that the claims of the proposed class ‘stem 
 
 171. Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 
154, 159–62 (1999). 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 161. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Dep-
utizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1384, 1396–99 (2000). 
 177. Telephone Interview with Kamau Franklin, supra note 166. 
 178. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 416 (quoting German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F. 
Supp. 537, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
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from the same alleged unconstitutional conduct of the defend-
ants’ proves the existence of common questions of law or fact.”181 
Defendants appealed and, in June 2001, the Second Circuit up-
held the district court’s decision, and the mandate was returned 
in July.182 A pretrial conference was held in August 2001.183 
A month later, September 11th occurred. For two years, the 
parties engaged in discovery disputes, settlement conferences, 
and requests to adjourn the trial date.184 In the shadow of the 
tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the City’s out-
pouring of support for the NYPD eclipsed the strong outcry over 
police abuse only months before. Activists were silenced and lost 
the will for reform. Thus, the City Law Department, with more 
public good-will on their side than six months earlier, likely en-
tered negotiations and pre-trial discussions with the Daniels at-
torneys emboldened.  
The case settled.185 Defendants did not admit any wrongdo-
ing in the settlement order. No monitor was put in place.186 
Nonetheless, the City agreed in the settlement terms to collect 
extensive race and crime data, which plaintiffs’ counsel could ac-
cess; improve documentation of reasonable suspicion supporting 
stops and the basis for frisks; develop and conduct periodic au-
dits of stop-and-frisk practices; and maintain its anti-racial pro-
filing policy.187 Judge Scheindlin approved the settlement in De-
cember 2003.188  
Any momentum for reform or gains from the Daniels settle-
ment, however, faded in the post-9/11 era. The NYPD enjoyed a 
 
 181. Id. at 417. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See Civil Docket, Daniels v. City of New York, No. No. 99-CV-1695 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1999).  
 184. Daniels v. City of New York, 2007 WL 2077150, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“The parties settled this class action in September 2003, after vigorously nego-
tiating the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement over several months.”). 
 185. See generally Stipulation of Settlement, Daniels v. City of New York, 
No. 99-CV-1695(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003), https://www.clearinghouse.net/ 
chDocs/public/PN-NY-0010-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA6T-C55S]. 
 186. The NYPD was also required to engage in public education efforts, in-
cluding joint public meetings with class members and representatives on its ra-
cial profiling policy, provide workshops at approximately fifty city high schools 
on the legal rights of those subjected to stops and frisks and develop handouts 
on these issues for distribution at these and other events. Stipulation of Settle-
ment, supra note 185, at 10.  
 187. Id. at 5–9. 
 188. Id. at 18. 
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renewed hero status. The expansion of war on terror policies at 
the federal level led to a pipeline of resources for police to expand 
surveillance technologies.189 It gained unprecedented financial 
support to expand surveillance under the guise of national secu-
rity, and the mayor increased the numbers of officers and spe-
cialty units.190 The NYPD also expanded the stops and frisks, 
monitoring, and surveillance of activists.191 Police shootings con-
tinued.192 The post-9/11 policies also hampered advocates’ ability 
to protect the terms of the Daniels settlement. In response to the 
War on Terror, progressive foundations began shifting their pri-
orities and portfolios away from police reform toward protecting 
civil liberties and combatting war on terror policies.193 CCR, 
busy litigating to stem the tide against the most egregious of 
these policies, expended few personnel resources to monitor the 
Daniels consent decree.194 Similarly, some police reform advo-
cates shifted focus areas, joining efforts to prevent civil rights 
violations under the REAL ID Act of 2005 and to draw attention 
to abuses stemming from other national security measures.195 
The police reform movement that had coalesced for Daniels be-
came fragmented and struggled to draw attention to police vio-
lence in the immediate years following September 11. 
The landscape changed again in late 2006, following the kill-
ing of Sean Bell in November of that year.196 A student at the 
 
 189. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 1595 (2016). 
 190. See, e.g., Craig Roush, Comment, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Limits 
on Widespread Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering by Local Law Enforce-
ment After 9/11, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 315, 330–34 (2012); Editorial, The NYPD’s 
Spies, NATION (N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2012, at 4–5. 
 191. Patrick F. Gillham et al., Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of 
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 192. See e.g., Stephen Rex Brown, NYPD ‘Executed’ My Son and Then Cov-
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Man’s Mother Had Called 911, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2016, at 8; Molly 
Jackson, Trial Begins for New York Cop in Shooting of Unarmed Black Man, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Bos.), Jan. 19, 2016; Zolan Kanno-Youngs, State to 
Probe NYPD Shooting: Video, 911 Calls Depict Man Who Was Shot Waving Ob-
ject in Hand in Crown Heights, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Apr. 6, 2018, at A9A. 
 193. Telephone Interview with Marc Krupanski, Legal Worker, Ctr. for Con-
stitutional Rights (Aug. 15, 2018). 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
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time, Mr. Bell was shot over fifty times outside of a nightclub on 
the eve of his wedding.197 Groups again convened in a coalition. 
Given the facts of the Bell shooting, and the temporal distance 
from September 11, mobilization ensued.198 CCR also resur-
faced. CCR analyzed the hard data provided by the NYPD under 
the terms of the Daniels settlement, which showed an increased 
racial disparity in stop and frisk encounters.199 The annual num-
ber of stops conducted by the NYPD had increased by about 
200% during those years, approximately 88% of which did not 
lead to evidence of a crime.200 More importantly, approximately 
85% of those stopped were Black or Latino, while only 10% were 
white.201 The information was presented to the city council as 
part of a larger hearing for transparency with the NYPD spear-
headed by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU).202 
While campaigning, then-mayoral candidate Michael 
Bloomberg had pledged to continue the Guiliani administration’s 
aggressive police practices. He was elected in 2002, ushering in 
the possibility of further injury to the Daniels class members. 
 
 197. For background on the case and responses from local officials, commu-
nity activists, and N.Y. State, see N.Y. STATE TRI-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE TASK 
FORCE, IMPROVING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OUR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008) https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/ 
articles/attachments/Senator%20Smith_%20Improving%20Public%20 
Confidence%20in%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Criminal%20Justice% 
20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GBK-PM94]. Three of the five officers involved 
in the shooting were indicted. The NYPD’s counter-narrative and response to 
Sean Bell’s shooting and resulting mobilization relied upon crime data. Heather 
Mac Donald, No the Cops Didn’t Murder Sean Bell: And Here’s What Decent 
Black Advocates Would Say, CITY J. MAG., Winter 2007, https://www.city 
-journal.org/html/no-cops-didn%E2%80%99t-murder-sean-bell-12990.html 
[https://perma.cc/8M2C-8GDB].  
 198. Telephone Interview with Marc Krupanski, supra note 193. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief and Individual Damages at 26–29, Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034).  
 201. Id. at 26. 
 202. See NYCLU Analysis of NYPD Reports Reveals Troubling Patterns in 
Police Shootings, Lack of Diversity in NYPD Leadership, N.Y. CIV. L. UNION 
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B. ORIGINS OF FLOYD: CONTINUED RACIAL DISPARITIES AND 
PRE-LITIGATION INFORMATION GATHERING  
The NYPD’s noncompliance with the Daniels settlement 
and increasingly racially disparate practices galvanized New 
York City’s police reform advocacy community and triggered the 
Floyd litigation. The principal plaintiffs’ attorneys from Daniels, 
in consultation with local police accountability groups, decided 
to file a new suit. Attorneys filed the class action lawsuit Floyd 
v. City of New York in 2008, alleging that the NYPD deliberately 
targeted Black and Latinx persons for stops and frisks, without 
objective reasons to suspect them of criminal behavior.203  
The actors in Floyd are nearly identical to those in Daniels. 
Named plaintiffs again included members of the Malcolm X 
Grassroots Movement, Lalit Clarkson, and David Floyd.204 At 
the time of filing, plaintiffs’ counsel included the same plaintiff-
side police attorney Jonathan Moore, with the Center for Consti-
tutional Rights.205 Heidi Grossman and others from the City Law 
Department were again assigned as defense counsel. The liti-
gants and Judge Scheindlin all entered the litigation under-
standing that the case continued Daniels.  
The discovery process in cases alleging municipal liability 
for constitutional injuries uncovers and exposes information on 
the political and cultural forces that give rise to police mis- 
behavior.206 Allegations of municipal liability and class-wide re-
lief permit wider discovery, and in particular facilitate the devel-
opment of systemic evidence of deliberate indifference, repeat-
offender officers, functioning internal monitoring systems, and 
attitudes of police towards disciplinary and supervisory con-
cerns.  
Discovery is not only essential to overcome the hurdles dis-
cussed in Part I, but also to further informal information gath-
ering. Of the hard data turned over to plaintiffs, their attorneys 
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 205. Demand for Jury Trial, Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd IV), 283 F.R.D. 
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 206. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent 
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provided the New York Times portions that were not subject to a 
protective order. The newspaper ran a series of articles that dra-
matically influenced public opinion on stop and frisk.207 With 
this backdrop, several videos of aggressive stops went viral.208 
The increased attention from the information generated through 
formal discovery and informal fact gathering, resulted in city 
council hearings. Local legislative advocacy, sometimes led by a 
city-wide coalition of police advocates, followed sporadic revela-
tions from discovery material. The NYCLU led efforts to reform 
and expand authority for the Civilian Complaint Review 
Board.209 
Public attention can foment gains for litigation—for exam-
ple, by encouraging witnesses to come forward to support struc-
tural reform litigation.210 This is precisely what happened in 
New York. In part due to the media attention around racial dis-
parities in stop and frisk tactics, two officers came forward as 
whistleblowers.211 NYPD officer Adrian Schoolcraft wore a re-
cording device during weekly roll-calls in the infamous Bedford-
Stuyvesant 81st precinct.212 Officer Adhyl Polanco, a member of 
the NYPD’s Black police officer organization, also recorded his 
supervisors instructing him to increase his numbers of UF-250s 
(code for increasing stops and frisks or summonses), the assump-
tion being not to worry about individualized, articulable suspi-
cion, as required by the Constitution. Local newspapers also ex-
posed supervisors demanding beat cops to “clean up corners” and 
“take back the streets”—a prescient phrase connected to the 
Street Crimes Unit and the 1990s era of extreme police violence. 
 
 207. Ray Rivera conducted an in-depth analysis of stop and frisk data and 
ran a series of articles in the fall of 2012. E.g., Ray Rivera, Pockets of City See 
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Both police officers believed the pressure they were under to in-
crease police activity was wrong, and the public outcry against 
overzealous policing gave them the courage to report the abuse 
of authority to the media.213 The recordings were entered into 
evidence during the Floyd trial and were important to the plain-
tiffs’ theory of quota-driven (rather than constitutionally based) 
stop and frisk practices. 
Plaintiffs gathered evidence from multiple sources. Formal 
discovery tools were essential, as were advocates and organizers 
who provided information before discovery became available. In 
addition, the public profile of the case made it possible for plain-
tiffs to discover critical information informally and through me-
dia revelations.  
C. ADDRESSING DOCTRINAL HURDLES IN FLOYD 
This section divides Floyd’s pre-remedies litigation into the 
doctrinal hurdles discussed in Part I: standing (Lyons), police 
practice claims (Monell and its progeny), and class certification 
(Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.). The City of New York followed the Su-
preme Court’s pro-defendant playbook on how to dismiss struc-
tural reform cases against police departments; and the plaintiffs, 
at each stage, mustered the evidence necessary to overcome the 
procedural and evidentiary hurdles.214 The close examination 
that follows brings to light possibilities and challenges for future 
structural police reform litigants.  
1. Standing To Obtain an Injunction: Lyons 
As in other structural reform police actions, particularly 
those where plaintiffs challenge an unwritten policy, the City of 
New York argued plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek 
injunctive relief.215 The issue arose as part of defendants’ re-
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sponse to plaintiffs’ class certification request. Similar to the de-
fense’s motion in Daniels, defendants argued that three of the 
four named plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have 
a present real or immediate injury and could not show a risk of 
future harm.216 Defendants did not, however, contest the stand-
ing of the fourth named plaintiff, David Ourlicht.217  
The district court determined that Mr. Ourlicht overcame 
the repeated harm, speculative harm, and innocence barriers, 
thereby satisfying Article III standing on behalf of the plaintiffs’ 
class.218 First, unlike Mr. Lyons, “who alleged only one past in-
stance of unconstitutional police behavior,” Mr. Ourlicht had 
been stopped three times in 2008 and once after the lawsuit was 
filed in 2010.219 As the court noted, “[t]he possibility of recurring 
injury ceases to be speculative when actual repeated incidents 
are documented.”220 Moreover, the court found that “the fre-
quency of alleged injuries inflicted by the practices at issue here 
create[d] a likelihood of future injury sufficient to address any 
standing concerns.”221 The court distinguished the ten deaths at-
tributed to the LAPD’s chokehold policy from the NYPD’s 2.8 
million stops over six years, of which at least 60,000 were uncon-
stitutional (thirty facially unconstitutional stops a day).222 Judge 
Scheindlin determined the repeated nature of the harm provided 
an additional basis to overcome the speculative harm barrier.223 
Mr. Ourlicht’s risk of future injury was “real and immediate,” 
and “not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”224  
 
01034), ECF No. 176 [hereinafter Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176] (arguing 
plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives for three reasons: (1) their fail-
ure to meet the standing requirement; (2) several officers remained unidentified 
John Doe defendants; and (3) none of the named class representatives were La-
tino). 
 216. Id. at 19–21. 
 217. Defendants reserved the ability to raise Mr. Ourlicht’s standing later. 
Id.  
 218. See Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The presence of 
one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement.” (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 
U.S. 47, 53 n.2 (2006)).  
 219. See id.  
 220. Id. at 169 (citing Nicacio v. United States Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 768 F. 2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1985)).  
 221. Id. at 170. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 169 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).  
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Finally, the innocence barrier was satisfied. Unlike Mr. Ly-
ons’s situation, where a burned out tail light led to a stop and an 
officer’s alleged provocation, Mr. Ourlicht’s encounters did not 
depend on arrests for unlawful conduct.225 The court observed 
that Mr. Ourlicht was stopped while engaging in everyday life—
walking down the sidewalk, sitting on a bench outside a friend’s 
home, and getting into a car.226 His inability to avoid future 
harm by “following the law” distinguished the case from Ly-
ons.227 He satisfied Article III standing for the class. 
2. Municipal Liability: Monell 
Municipal liability was litigated twice, first at summary 
judgment and again at trial. Defendants requested summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims against the 
City of New York—failure to train, supervise, monitor or disci-
pline police officers.228 As in Daniels, the Floyd plaintiffs alleged, 
first, that the NYPD had conducted stops and frisks without rea-
sonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and, 
second, that the NYPD had conducted stops and frisks on the 
basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; defend-
ant was liable as a municipality under Monell and its progeny.229 
However, the court ultimately denied summary judgment for 
plaintiffs’ Monell claims based on a number of disputed factual 
issues, including those presented within each party’s statistical 
expert’s report, discussed later in the case study, and the specific 
written and unwritten policies related to training and supervi-
sion.230 
In considering the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court reviewed voluminous submissions from 
the parties, required the parties to enter mediation, and ordered 
subsequent briefing to narrow the disputed material issues of 
fact. The City of New York had followed the Supreme Court’s 
 
 225. Id. at 169–70. 
 226. Id. at 170. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Defendants also re-
quested summary judgment for the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment claims and sought to dismiss the individual stops on the basis of qualified 
immunity. Id. at 444; see also Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 813 F. Supp. 
2d 457, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reinstating Floyd’s claims arising out of 2008 stop).  
 229. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
 230. Id. at 446–49, 453, 456. 
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roadmap in seeking to dismiss plaintiffs’ municipal liability (Mo-
nell) claims. For each of the “failure to” counts, defendants pre-
sented their written protocols and procedures and submitted 
declarations from high level officials as evidence of adequate 
training, supervision, discipline, and monitoring. In response, 
plaintiffs pointed to the practices on the ground to show disputed 
issues of fact.231  
Judge Scheindlin thus oversaw a somewhat dizzying back-
and-forth between the parties at the summary judgment stage. 
Each party attacked and parried with contradictory documen-
tary and testimonial support about the NYPD’s practices of 
training, supervising, monitoring, and disciplining its officers for 
stops and frisks conducted in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.232 The court aptly summarized the evidentiary battle:  
For every officer whose testimony defendants cite in support of the ex-
istence of such policies, plaintiffs respond with testimony from another 
officer who testified that he has never heard of, seen, or been instructed 
with regard to those policies. While defendants have submitted exten-
sive written and audiovisual training materials as evidence that NYPD 
training is sufficient, plaintiffs have submitted written and audio evi-
dence that there is significant pressure on commands and officers to 
produce stops, summonses, and arrests, whether or not they are con-
stitutionally justified, in contravention of those training materials.  
Defendants describe numerous forms and layers of disciplinary proce-
dure, while plaintiffs present evidence that little discipline is actually 
meted out.233  
Take as an example the NYPD’s monitoring practices under 
its Quality Assurance Division (QAD). In support of their motion 
for summary judgment against plaintiffs’ failure to monitor 
claim, defendants put forward three existing audit protocols; 
plaintiffs countered by showing the insufficiency of the monitor-
ing protocols to actually prevent unconstitutional stops and 
frisks. First, defendants argued the NYPD conducted audits on 
a random department-wide basis.234 But plaintiffs responded 
that the NYPD did not actually use the audit to determine 
 
 231. Id. at 429 n.94 (“Defendants rely primarily on their formal written pol-
icies, and do not in any meaningful way dispute Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding 
the practices of NYPD supervisors and officers with respect to training, super-
vision, monitoring and discipline.” (quoting Plaintiff ’s Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Floyd I, 813 F. 
Supp. 2d 417)). 
 232. The evidence submitted at summary judgment is too voluminous to 
summarize in this Article.  
 233. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
 234. Id. at 431. 
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whether stops were based on reasonable suspicion.235 The stated 
purpose of the audits was determining the constitutionality of 
stops and frisks, but the NYPD commanders responsible for 
QAD testified at depositions that the audit only tested whether 
officers completed the stop and frisk forms (UF-250s).236 As 
Judge Scheindlin ultimately found after trial, completing the 
form does not correlate to following the Fourth Amendment re-
quirements for a stop and frisk.237 
Finally, to review the constitutionality of police activity, the 
QAD required its inspectors to review the memobooks police of-
ficers used to document their activity.238 Inspectors should cross-
check the reported activity with the UF-250 forms.239 By policy, 
however, an officer is only required to document the same infor-
mation in the memobook that is reported on the UF-250 form, 
thereby providing auditors with little additional information to 
test the legal sufficiency of a stop, frisk, or use of force docu-
mented on the UF-250 form.240 Defendants maintained that 
“[b]ecause the information indicated by the checkmarks on the 
UF250 represents substantive justification for a stop, the audit 
confirms that a UF250 with the required checkmarks indicates 
a valid stop, absent indicia to the contrary on the remainder of 
the form.”241 Thus, and once again, QAD’s review only ensured 
completion of the UF-250 form, rather than determining the le-
gality of an officer’s stops and frisks.  
Ultimately, Judge Scheindlin held that the plaintiffs had 
successfully demonstrated numerous issues of fact and denied 
summary judgment.242 The lessons for other cases are general-
izable. Plaintiffs must use the discovery process with vigor, de-
termine if the policies on paper match the practices of police of-
ficers on the beat, and analyze any available hard data on police 
interactions with potential class members. When litigating with 
a department as large as the NYPD, shoring up proof that un-
 
 235. Id. at 432. 
 236. See id. at 432. 
 237. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 582–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 238. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 434. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11 n.23, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (No. 
1:08-cv-01034), ECF No. 141. 
 242. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d. at 456.  
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constitutional practices are pervasive throughout the depart-
ment is also critical to overcoming the “widespread practice” bar-
rier to municipal liability. 
On the Fourteenth Amendment question of racial disparity 
in stops and frisks, defendants pointed to McKleskey v. Kemp to 
suggest that discretionary judgments (such as the exercise of 
stop authority) within the criminal justice system “demand ex-
ceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion 
had been abused.”243 Defendants essentially suggested plaintiffs 
must prove all stops were discriminatory in order to substantiate 
an Equal Protection claim. They cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins and 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot to argue that the racial disparities be-
tween stops and frisks of whites, on the one hand, and Blacks 
and Latinos/as, on the other hand, were insufficient to prove dis-
criminatory purpose.244  
Defendants further argued, and Judge Scheindlin agreed, 
that Professor Jeffrey Fagan’s statistical analysis, representing 
an essential piece of evidence for the plaintiffs, was insufficient 
on its own to prove discrimination.245 However, Judge Scheindlin 
found that other evidence, beyond the expert’s analysis, strongly 
supported plaintiffs’ contentions that the NYPD knew of its of-
ficers’ discriminatory practices.246 The plaintiffs’ evidence in-
cluded the prior, nearly identical, Daniels litigation, a labor com-
plaint filed by officers alleging they were being compelled to stop 
and frisk based on a quota to avoid negative performance re-
views, the New York Attorney General’s 1999 report demon-
strating racial disparities in stops and frisks, and the NYPD’s 
own commissioned study from the RAND Corporation.247 Alto-
gether they supported the theory that the NYPD had sufficient 
notice of a problem and had failed to correct it.248  
In sum, Judge Scheindlin’s August 17, 2011 summary judg-
ment opinion and order determined that plaintiffs had estab-
lished triable issues of fact as to whether: (i) the NYPD engaged 
 
 243. Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No. 135, supra note 214, at 23 (quoting 
McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987)). 
 244. See id. at 24 (arguing that the case did not amount to the same level of 
disparity as in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) or Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
 245. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. at 449, 451. 
 248. See id. at 449, 453. 
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in a widespread practice of suspicionless stops and frisks;249 (ii) 
NYPD supervisors had a widespread custom or practice of im-
posing quotas on enforcement activity, and such quotas were a 
“moving force” behind the widespread suspicionless stops;250 (iii) 
the NYPD had intentionally engaged in a widespread pattern 
and practice of race-based stops targeting primarily Black and 
Latino/a pedestrians;251 and (iv) the NYPD’s internal stop and 
frisk audits were so inadequate as to demonstrate a deliberate 
indifference to the need to monitor officers adequately to prevent 
a widespread pattern of suspicionless stops.252 
At trial, the court revisited whether the plaintiffs had satis-
fied the requirements to establish municipal liability. The Floyd 
plaintiffs demonstrated—through data, official policy, and testi-
mony elicited during cross-examination of high-level NYPD offi-
cials—that the “customs” or “practices” of unlawful stops and 
frisks were “sufficiently widespread that they had the force of 
law.”253 The evidence was voluminous. I provide here a few key 
points, including the statistical evidence presented through the 
testimony of Professor Jeffrey Fagan, to show the type of evi-
dence plaintiffs marshaled to prove their claims: 
• On the issue of indifference, plaintiffs chronicled a time-
line of notice beginning in 1999 with the N.Y. Attorney 
General’s scathing report uncovering racial disparities in 
stops and frisks and use of force.254 For example, the 
NYPD failed to collect accurate data, or use data in its 
possession, to prevent unconstitutional stops.255 This 
same failure was raised in the 2007 report by the RAND 
Corporation, which the New York Police Foundation had 
commissioned to study and make recommendations to 
improve its racial disparity in stops and frisks.256  
• High-level officials were found to have deliberately main-
tained, and even ratcheted up, widespread Fourth 
Amendment violations.257 The pressure to perform was 
evident from “numerous, mutually reinforcing sources of 
 
 249. Id. at 446–48.  
 250. Id. at 448–49. 
 251. Id. at 451–53. 
 252. Id. at 456. 
 253. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 254. Id. at 658–59. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 434–35. 
 257. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 591–92.  
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evidence at trial including live testimony, depositions, 
roll call recordings, internal NYPD documents, and sur-
vey results.”258  
• Senior NYPD officials conceded to knowing of failures in 
training, discipline, supervision and monitoring, but did 
nothing to improve them to protect class members 
against unconstitutional stops.259 
Professor Fagan’s expert testimony was central to proving a 
widespread practice of deliberate indifference to Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations at trial. To 
evaluate how often the NYPD’s stops lacked reasonable suspi-
cion under the Fourth Amendment, he analyzed a database of 
the NYPD’s UF-250 forms.260 The UF-250 form utilizes check 
boxes where officers may check off the basis for stops performed, 
and in a different portion of the form, the bases for frisks and 
searches. He categorized each stop as “apparently justified” 
(based on reasonable suspicion),261 “apparently unjustified” 
(lacking reasonable suspicion),262 or “ungeneralizable” (insuffi-
cient information to make a determination).263  
According to Fagan’s analysis, six percent of stops were le-
gally unjustified.264 While the City maintained that even if this 
were true, this would not “necessarily” constitute a widespread 
pattern requiring a remedy,265 the court pointed out that this 
 
 258. Id. at 592.  
 259. See id. at 589–90, 604.  
 260. Id. at 579. 
 261. Id. For this determination, he relied on any of the following Side One 
boxes alone: (1) Actions Indicative Of “Casing” Victims Or Location, (2) Actions 
Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction (“Drug Transaction”), and (3) Ac-
tions Indicative Of Engaging In Violent Crimes (“Violent Crime”). The remain-
der of Side One boxes (except the “Other” box) were categorized as conditionally 
justified: (4) Carrying Objects In Plain View Used In Commission Of Crime e.g., 
Slim Jim/Pry Bar, etc., (5) Suspicious Bulge/Object (Describe), (6) Actions Indic-
ative Of Acting As A Lookout; (7) Fits Description; (8) Furtive Movements; and 
(9) Wearing Clothes/Disguises Commonly Used In Commission Of Crime. If 
“Other” is the only box checked, Fagan categorized the stop as ungeneralizable. 
Id. 
 262. Id. For this determination, Fagan looked for: (a) no Side One stop cate-
gory warranting “apparently justified” treatment indicated and only one Side 
Two additional circumstance checked, or (b) only one Side One stop indicated 
and no Side Two circumstance checked. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 580.  
 265. Id. at 659. 
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figure represents 200,000 stops.266 “Even this number of wrong-
ful stops produces a significant human toll.”267 The figure was 
conservative according to Professor Fagan, and the court further 
reviewed combinations of justifications he did not categorize as 
apparently unjustified (e.g., suspicious bulge and furtive move-
ment).268  
For several reasons, the court agreed with his determination 
that the two most frequently checked stop factors on the form 
used to document stops and frisks—furtive movements and high 
crime area—were unreliable bases for suspecting criminality.269 
First, despite the frequency with which these boxes were 
checked and the low number of arrests following stops (only six 
percent), stops were more likely to result in arrest when neither 
stop factor was checked.270 Coupled with deposition testimony, 
this conclusion supported the view that officers overused the 
subjective factors and were not trained on the meaning of such 
factors or the Fourth Amendment standard.271 It was further 
used to show a failure to supervise officers in stop and frisk prac-
tices.272 Second, the court noted—though not with any heavy re-
liance—psychological research indicating that unconscious ra-
cial bias may play a role in police officers’ overuse of the furtive 
movement stop factor.273 For all stops analyzed, “Furtive Move-
ments,” was checked as a basis for the stop 48% of the time for 
Black suspects, and 45% of the time for Hispanic suspects, 
whereas only 40% of the time for white suspects.274 Third, “High 
Crime Area” had been interpreted so broadly by some officers 
that it did very little to justify a stop.275 Fagan’s analysis showed 
that regardless of the amount of crime in a precinct or census 
tract as measured by crime complaints, officers checked this stop 
basis roughly 55% of the time.276 When questioned at trial, one 
 
 266. Id. at 582.  
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 559, 578–79. 
 269. Id. at 580–82. This is significant because similar subjective justifica-
tions are likely used in other jurisdictions and his analysis may support corol-
lary studies elsewhere. 
 270. Id. at 582. 
 271. Id. at 582, 613–14. 
 272. See id. at 613, 617. 
 273. See id. at 580–81. 
 274. Id. at 581. 
 275. See id.  
 276. See id.  
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officer explained that when checking “High Crime Area” to jus-
tify the stop of a class member witness, the area he referred to 
was the entire borough of Queens.277  
In addition, Professor Fagan’s expert testimony supported 
the plaintiffs’ theory that officers develop “scripts” for checking 
off stop factors.278 Officer Gonzalez engaged in a high number of 
stops and checked the same four boxes on 99% of his UF-250 
forms.279 And Officer Dang, among the highest stoppers in the 
third quarter of 2009, checked “area has high incidence of re-
ported offense of type under investigation” in 75% of stops, even 
though the stop locations were widely dispersed throughout a 
racially and socioeconomically heterogeneous precinct.280 Fur-
ther support for the “script” theory came from testifying offic-
ers.281 
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim asserted that 
Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more frequently than they 
would be if officers did not discriminate on the basis of race.282 
The question for the statistical experts was: “[I]s there statistical 
evidence of racial discrimination in the NYPD’s stop prac-
tices?”283 The court compared the rates of Blacks and Hispanics 
stopped to a standard point of reference, known as a “bench-
mark.”284 The court adopted Professor Fagan’s benchmark anal-
ysis.285 He used population and reported crime as benchmarks 
for understanding the racial distribution of police-citizen con-
tacts.286  
Based on Professor Fagan’s benchmark analysis, the court 
found the NYPD carried out more stops in predominantly Black 
and Hispanic areas, even when controlling for other variables.287 
The strongest predictor for stops in a geographical area (precinct 
or census tract) was the racial make-up of that area, not the 
 
 277. See id. at 581 n.161. 
 278. See id. at 581. 
 279. See id. at 582. 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. See id. at 583. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Id. at 584. Defendants’ expert relied on crime suspect data—the rates 
at which various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime victims—
which the court found unreliable for a number of reasons. See id. at 584–86.  
 286. Id. at 583. 
 287. Id. at 584. 
  
2308 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
known crime rate.288 This same finding applied across precincts 
and census tracts and over time.289 Moreover, regardless of unit 
of measurement, Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than 
whites to be stopped, even after controlling for racial make-up, 
crime rate, patrol strength, and socioeconomic characteristics.290 
This was true even in white areas and areas with low crime 
rates.291 Blacks were 30% more likely than whites to be arrested 
after a stop for the same suspected crime, even after controlling 
for other variables.292 Blacks were 14% more likely, and Hispan-
ics 9% more likely, than whites to be subjected to use of force.293 
The court further found stops and frisks were significantly more 
frequent for Black and Hispanic residents than for whites, even 
after adjusting for local crime rates, race, number of officers in a 
particular geographic area, and other socioeconomic factors.294 
Thus, relying on statistical evidence as well as testimony from 
dozens of witnesses, the court held the NYPD did conduct stops 
and frisks in a racially discriminatory manner. 
In brief, the court found that the municipality was liable un-
der section 1983 through its indifference to unconstitutional 
stops, frisks, and searches. The plaintiffs presented evidence, 
and the court agreed, that the City was on notice of widespread 
racial disparities in stops since at least 1999.295 The ongoing na-
ture of the violations, testimony of officers up the chain of com-
mand, the history of recalcitrance despite study after study re-
inforcing the fact of discriminatory policing, and the settlement 
agreement in Daniels all supported a finding of deliberate indif-
ference and a longstanding, widespread deprivation of plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights.  
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
Only a few months after the Supreme Court decided Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Floyd plaintiffs requested, and were 
ultimately granted, class certification.296 At the time, it was not 
 
 288. Id.  
 289. See id. at 588–89. 
 290. Id. at 560. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. 
 296. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Cer-
tification, ECF No. 166, supra note 214; see also Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 
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evident whether Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (a Title VII employment 
matter for damages) would influence courts reviewing cases such 
as Floyd (a Rule 23(b)(2) structural reform litigation without 
class-wide damage claims).297  
To obtain treatment as a class action, Rule 23(a) requires 
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”298 
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. determined that the 
questions must be “apt to drive the resolution of the litiga-
tion.”299 The Court applied dicta from a footnote in General  
Telephone Co. v. Falcon300 (another Title VII case), and decided 
that when challenging the disparate impact of a policy or prac-
tice involving decentralized and subjective decision-making, 
plaintiffs must show “[s]ignificant proof” of a general policy of 
discrimination to meet the commonality requirement.301 Plain-
tiffs “must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently 
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” at the 
pleading stage.302 
The Floyd plaintiffs identified four common questions of law 
and fact that would resolve all Monell claims against the City on 
a class-wide basis:303 
• Does the NYPD have a policy or practice of stops and 
frisks without reasonable suspicion?304 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). The plaintiff class was defined as:  
All persons who since January 31, 2005 have been, or in the future will 
be, subjected to the New York Police Department’s policies and/or wide-
spread customs or practices of stopping, or stopping and frisking, per-
sons in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity has taken, is taking, or is about to take place in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, including persons stopped or stopped and frisked 
on the basis of being Black or Latino in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, 
ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 1. 
 297. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 298. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 299. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, 
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 
(2009)). 
 300. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 301. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Falcon, 457 US. 
at 159 n.15); supra Part I.C. 
 302. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original). 
 303. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Cer-
tification, ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 12–13. 
 304. Id. at 13. 
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• Does the NYPD have a policy or practice of stopping 
Black and Latino persons on the basis of race without 
reasonable suspicion?305  
• Do the NYPD’s department-wide auditing and self-in-
spection protocols and procedures demonstrate a delib-
erate indifference to the need to monitor officers ade-
quately to prevent widespread pattern of suspicionless 
and race-based stops?306 
• Is the NYPD’s policy and practice of imposing productiv-
ity standards and/or quotas on stops and frisks, sum-
mons, and other enforcement activity of officers a mov-
ing force behind widespread suspicionless stops by 
NYPD officers?307 
For these questions to resolve matters on a class basis at 
trial, however, plaintiffs must demonstrate policies, practices, or 
customs of suspicionless or racially discriminatory stops and 
frisks. In their attempt to meet the “significant proof of a general 
policy” standard, plaintiffs provided statistical and anecdotal ev-
idence in the form of fourteen class member declarations, depo-
sition testimony, expert statistical analysis, and police policies 
and procedures.308  
In response, the City of New York argued that, as in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., plaintiffs’ evidence failed to link various indi-
vidual officer’s actions with the NYPD’s own policies.309 Just as 
each Wal-Mart supervisor makes his or her own individual pay 
and promotion decisions, each officer, defendants suggested, 
made his or her own independent decision to stop a pedes-
trian.310 One officer’s bad decision had no bearing on other offic-
ers, especially for officers in different patrol units, precincts, or 
boroughs.311 Thus, defendants urged, the statistical evidence 
from Professor Fagan’s expert report submitted in support of 
class certification, did not demonstrate “the glue” holding to-
 
 305. Id. at 12–13. 
 306. Id. at 13. 
 307. Id.  
 308. Id. at 17–20. 
 309. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 7 (pointing to the 
NYPD’s written policy against racial profiling and training regarding the 
Fourth Amendment standard for reasonable suspicion). 
 310. Id. at 8. 
 311. Id. 
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gether the millions of individual decisions to stop and frisk pe-
destrians, and failed to establish that the NYPD had a written 
policy amounting to racial profiling.312  
Plaintiffs, however, countered that the evidence was not as 
disaggregated as defendants characterized it to be. In fact, Pro-
fessor Fagan’s declaration “point[ed] to evidence that every pre-
cinct, regardless of racial composition or crime rate, has similar 
rates of racial disparity in stop rates” and “show[ed] that race-
based and otherwise suspicionless stops occur in every area of 
the [c]ity.”313 The expert opinions thus indicated a centralized 
“glue” holding together officers’ decisions in every precinct or 
borough. This argument seemed like a strong one: Even the 
Floyd defendants conceded that the NYPD employed a “hierar-
chical supervisory structure to effect and reinforce its depart-
ment-wide policies” and adopted a “centralized source” for its 
policies.314  
The City, however, also argued that the existence of a cen-
tralized policy was not detrimental to their opposition to class 
certification because the NYPD’s policy was one of exercising dis-
cretion rather than discrimination. Even though the stop and 
frisk practices stem from a department-wide policy, “individual 
officers’ decisions to make stops were analogous to the Wal-Mart 
policy of allowing discretion to supervisors over employment 
matters.”315 Floyd’s defendants urged the court to determine 
that, just as in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the “invalidity of an indi-
vidual officer’s judgment about conducting a stop will do nothing 
to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s.”316 Indeed, defend-
ants argued that the NYPD’s policy was “essentially a policy 
against having a uniform practice” even though the same brief 
acknowledged the “centralized source” for its stop and frisk pol-
icy.317  
In a key portion of the Floyd class certification decision, ap-
plicable to other policing litigation, the court rejected this argu-
ment, finding Wal-Mart’s policy distinguishable.318 According to 
Judge Scheindlin, “the exercise of judgment in implementing a 
 
 312. See id. at 5. 
 313. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certifi-
cation, ECF No. 166, supra note 214, at 14. 
 314. See Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 8. 
 315. Id. at 8 n.9. 
 316. Id. at 8.  
 317. Id. at 8 & n.9. 
 318. See Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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centralized policy” is clearly different than “the exercise of dis-
cretion in formulating a local store policy or practice.”319 In Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., “the putative class members were subjected to 
an enormous array of different employment practices,” according 
to the Supreme Court.320 In Floyd, the same practice—stop and 
frisk—harmed all class members.321 
The City’s most forceful argument challenged both plain-
tiffs’ proffer of statistical evidence and the evidence itself. On the 
same day as their brief in opposition to class certification, de-
fendants filed a motion to exclude the evidence of plaintiffs’ ex-
pert Professor Fagan.322 In both the Daubert challenge to Profes-
sor Fagan’s expertise and its class certification opposition, 
defendants attacked the reliability of the statistical regressions 
used—arguing that they failed to appropriately account for stops 
based on suspect descriptions—and the expert’s categorization 
of “justified,” “unjustified,” and “indeterminate” stops.323  
Concurrent challenges to expert testimony and class certifi-
cation will continue to be defining features of structural reform 
litigation following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Interestingly, the Mo-
nell theories and class certification work hand-in-hand for police 
litigation. After Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., class certification re-
quires some proof of a central decision-maker, and municipal li-
ability is permitted, at least under one theory, where a central 
decision-maker enforces an illegal practice. Thus, if the plain-
tiffs’ expert report was excluded, defendants assumed the plain-
tiffs could not show centrality of decision-making to sustain class 
action status. 
The court, following the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. to look to the merits at the class certification 
stage,324 held a Daubert hearing to review Professor Fagan’s 
 
 319. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 8 & n.9. 
 320. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 172. 
 321. See id. at 173–75. 
 322. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Exclude 
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Expert Reports, Opinions and Testimony of Jeffrey Fagan, 
Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:08-cv-01034), ECF No. 
179. The court held a Daubert hearing and issued an order granting, in part, 
defendants’ motion, prior to deciding plaintiffs’ request for class certification. 
See Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 278–79. 
 323. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Exclude 
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Expert Reports, Opinions and Testimony of Jeffrey Fagan 
at 2–4, Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274 (No. 1:08-cv-01034), ECF No. 187.  
 324. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 160–61. 
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qualifications and methodology.325 On the Fourth Amendment 
analysis, Judge Scheindlin agreed with Professor Fagan that 
NYPD officers engaged in at least 170,000 unlawful stops be-
tween 2004 and 2009, and 62,000 stops were facially unlawful 
because police officers only provided “furtive movement” as a jus-
tification for the stop.326 She deemed Fagan’s methodology sound 
for the Fourteenth Amendment subclass, which used precinct, 
neighborhood, and census tracts.327  
Defendants raised another challenge common in structural 
litigation and class actions: they attacked the number of individ-
ual stops plaintiffs put forward (approximately 20 out of 2.8 mil-
lion) as inadequate to warrant an inference of a common practice 
of unlawful stops and frisks.328 Judge Scheindlin rejected de-
fendants’ argument and agreed with plaintiffs that “a class wide 
proceeding here [would] ‘generate common answers’ to these 
questions that are ‘apt to drive the resolution of the litiga-
tion.’”329 Her opinion noted that the NYPD had conceded the uni-
formity of its stop and frisk practices.330 Further, the court 
pointed to the defendants’ own facts in their summary judgment 
motion, which indicated that the NYPD’s policies were central-
ized and hierarchical.331 Therefore, the statistical evidence, cou-
pled with the deposition testimony of NYPD officials and super-
visors, demonstrated, unlike Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., that the stop 
and frisk practices occurred in all areas of New York City.  
In sum, based on the evidence presented, the court found 
that a preponderance of the evidence showed the existence of a 
Fourth Amendment class and a Fourteenth Amendment sub-
class, and therefore granted certification. Plaintiffs demon-
strated all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). The hierar-
chical nature of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices, statistical 
evidence, and anecdotal evidence allowed plaintiffs to jump the 
certification hurdle. 
 
 325. Floyd III, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 279–90. 
 326. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 167 
 327. Id. at 167, 168.  
 328. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 176, supra note 215, at 9. 
 329. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. at 175.  
 330. Id. at 174. 
 331. Id.  
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4. Jumping Hurdles at Trial and Remedy 
After five years of pre-trial litigation and nine weeks of 
trial,332 Judge Scheindlin determined the NYPD had violated the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through its “unwritten pol-
icy of targeting ‘the right people’ for stops” and its high-level sen-
ior officials’ deliberate indifference to the discriminatory use of 
stop and frisk.333 The majority of stops were justified in police 
paperwork through specious categories such as “high crime 
area,” “furtive movement,” and “suspicious bulge”334—these 
broad, vague, and subjective categories are the type Terry and 
subsequent lower court decisions disfavor. Judge Scheindlin 
granted the Floyd plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.335 
The story of Floyd and New York’s stop and frisk practices 
did not end, however, with the close of trial and a finding of lia-
bility. As with most structural reform litigation, the granting of 
injunctive relief also marked the start of another battleground: 
enforcement and implementation of remedies. Judge 
Scheindlin’s order first recognized a number of reforms that re-
quired speedy implementation as part of an “Immediate Reform” 
process.336 Second, the order also called for a pilot program using 
body cameras to increase police accountability. Officers in at 
least five precincts across the city would wear body cameras to 
record street encounters.337 Third, the court appointed an inde-
pendent monitor, Peter Zimroth, to oversee reform of the NYPD’s 
practices and bring them into compliance with the law.338  
In an interesting departure from remedial orders in civil 
rights cases, Judge Scheindlin ordered the initiation of a “Joint 
Remedial Process” between the parties and community mem-
bers.339 A facilitator would solicit additional solutions from im-
pacted New Yorkers on how the NYPD should further reform its 
 
 332. I have limited the discussion of the trial testimony and evidence when 
compared to its significance. I made this decision because the focus of this Arti-
cle is to show that police structural reform litigation can withstand the various 
procedural hurdles. 
 333. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 334. Id. at 559, 575, 578, 580–83. 
 335. Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd VI), 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671–75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 336. Id. at 678–84. 
 337. Id. at 684–86. 
 338. Id. at 688–89. 
 339. Id. at 686–88. 
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practices. The process would involve the plaintiffs’ class, commu-
nity stakeholders, local elected officials, law enforcement repre-
sentatives, ethnic and religious organizations, academics, and 
NYPD officials. Judge Scheindlin highlighted the importance of 
community input, writing that “[n]o amount of legal or policing 
expertise can replace a community’s understanding of the likely 
practical consequences of reforms in terms of both liberty and 
safety.”340 She then appointed the Executive Director of the Vera 
Institute, a reputable criminal justice research and policy organ-
ization, as a “Facilitator” to guide the joint remedial process.341 
The decision, and the remedial order including a community-ori-
ented process for developing reforms, was considered a major vic-
tory for the broader campaign for police accountability and part 
of a larger process to hold the NYPD accountable.342 Communi-
ties United for Police Reform and the Black, Latino, and Asian 
Caucus of the city council were active in the pre-trial phase with 
amicus briefs, and at trial by organizing constituent groups to 
watch trial every day.343 
The 2012 election of Bill de Blasio as the next mayor of New 
York may have rescued the results of the litigation. De Blasio 
ran on rejecting the strategies of the Bloomberg and Giuliani ad-
ministrations and promising to address stop and frisk.344 Thus, 
the de Blasio administration agreed to drop the City’s appeal of 
Judge Scheindlin’s decisions and begin the reform and joint re-
medial processes immediately after he took office. The police un-
ions, however, opposed Mayor de Blasio’s decision and attempted 
 
 340. Id. at 686. Judge Scheindlin enlisted academics from New York area 
law schools to serve on an advisory committee to assist with the remedial pro-
cess. Id. at 687. 
 341. Id. at 687–88. 
 342. See Joint Remedial Process in Floyd v. City of New York: What You 
Need To Know, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (June 23, 2014), https:// 
ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/timeline 
-floyd-v-city-new-york [https://perma.cc/4FRC-2KF9] (calling the ordered relief 
a “landmark community input process”). 
 343. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Communities United for Police Reform 
(CPR) at 1–2, Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-1034(SAS)), 
ECF No. 377; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus of 
the Council of the City of New York in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Request to 
Include the Community in a Collaborative Process Towards Reform at 1–2, 
Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08-1034(SAS)), ECF No. 378; see also Hyun-
Kang, supra note 155. 




2316 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
to derail the process. In October 2014, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit at last allowed the City to offi-
cially withdraw its appeal,345 and the joint reform process offi-
cially began.  
What unfolded after trial—withdrawal of the city’s appeal, 
joint remedy process, resistance from city officials even under 
the progressive de Blasio administration, and dissatisfaction 
from plaintiffs and community groups—is its own story.346  
III.  ORTEGA-MELENDRES V. ARPAIO: MCSO CRIME 
SUPPRESSION SWEEPS   
The next case study, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, examines 
how systemic police reform litigation, largely involving vehicle 
stops, succeeded in the immigration context. This Part shows 
how plaintiffs successfully jumped the standing, municipal lia-
bility, and class action hurdles to obtain injunctive relief against 
a notoriously anti-immigrant sheriff in a hostile jurisdiction. To 
understand the relationship between information gathering 
prior to discovery and overcoming doctrinal barriers, this Part 
begins by describing anti-immigrant events and policies in Mar-
icopa County, Arizona and nationwide that led community mem-
bers to initiate litigation. The case study then closely examines 
how litigants overcame the specific doctrinal hurdles imposed by 
Lyons, Monell, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
A. ARIZONA IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES AND 
CONTEXT 
For nearly a quarter of a century, former Sheriff Joe Arpaio 
of Maricopa County, Arizona, was known for hard-nosed, tough-
on-crime tactics.347 Largely in response to anti-immigrant senti-
ment among Arizona residents in the last decade—and the 
broader populist anti-immigrant movement—Arpaio prioritized 
fighting alleged border-crossing “crime.”348  
 
 345. Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1054 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 346. This Article does not address what occurred in the remedial phase of 
the case beyond the prior brief summary, but another project will. 
 347. In June of 2005, the Associated Press quoted Sheriff Arpaio as saying, 
“I don’t expect to concentrate on some guy in a truck with six illegals. . . . I want 
to go after the professional smugglers who do this for money, the top people.” 
Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Gilbin, Reasonable Doubt: Joe Arpaio’s Evolution, EAST 
VALLEY TRIB. (July 9, 2008), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/ryan-gabrielson 
-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB]. 
 348. This was not always the case. See Robert Anglen & Yvonne Wingett, 
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Arpaio’s nativist turn was reflected in his actions shortly fol-
lowing the passage of S.B. 1372, also known as the “Coyote 
Law.”349 The Coyote Law had established human smuggling as 
a crime and penalized facilitating the transportation of migrants 
by suspected sex traffickers and smugglers.350 Sheriff Arpaio de-
cided to enforce the Coyote Law not only against drivers of vehi-
cles engaged in human smuggling, but also against any of its 
passengers, including trafficking victims themselves.351 To en-
force the law, Arpaio established an “Illegal Immigration and In-
terdiction” unit, or the “Triple I Unit,” within the Maricopa 
County Sherriff ’s Office (MCSO) to focus on immigration en-
forcement activities.352 The Triple I Unit engaged in “saturation 
patrols,” involving concentrated traffic stops in one area.353 
Within Triple I, he formed the Human Smuggling Unit, whose 
officers stopped cars for pretextual reasons, such as darkened 
license plate lights or overly tinted windows, to inspect vehicle 
drivers and passengers.354 If there was any evidence that pas-
sengers paid for the ride, both driver and passenger were prose-
cuted under S.B. 1372 for felony conspiracy to commit human 
smuggling of themselves.355  
 
Feds Question Freeing Reservist, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2005, at B1 (discuss-
ing motivations behind the release of a man involved in a car chase in an at-
tempted arrest of several Latinx U.S. citizens); Alexander Provan, The Vigi-
lante, GQ (Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.gq.com/story/joe-arpaio-sheriff-phoenix 
-mexico-border-immigration [https://perma.cc/98QW-KKMY] (providing an in-
depth discussion of the events catalyzing Arpaio’s nativist turn). 
 349. Melissa Gira Grant & Debbie Nathan, Trump Has Turned the War on 
Trafficking into a War on Immigrants, APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019), https://theappeal 
.org/trump-has-turned-the-war-on-trafficking-into-a-war-on-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3BR-8LR3] (explaining how the “Coyote Law” came about 
and opining that it “launched the career of Joe Arpaio”). Former Arizona Gov-
ernor Janet Napolitano signed S.B. 1372 into law in March of 2005, and the law 
went into effect in July. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEIR EXPERIENCE 126 (Anna Ochoa O’Leary ed. 2014).  
 350. Grant & Nathan, supra note 349.  
 351. First Amended Complaint at 17–18, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio (Or-
tega IV), 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS), ECF 
No. 26. 
 352. Id. at 6–7. 
 353. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: Sweeps Break the 
Rules, EAST VALLEY TRIB. (July 11, 2008), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/ 
ryan-gabrielson-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB]. 
 354. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: At What Cost?, EAST 
VALLEY TRIB. (July 9, 2009), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/ryan-gabrielson 
-and-paul-giblin [https://perma.cc/KYW2-93UB]. 
 355. Id. The practice of charging individuals with conspiracy to smuggle 
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Many of the officers within the Human Smuggling Unit 
were certified under the controversial 287(g) agreement.356 Since 
August 14, 2007, when Arpaio and the MCSO entered into an 
agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigra-
tion Nationality Act,357 160 MCSO personnel were authorized to 
perform certain federal immigration enforcement functions. The 
scope of duties included stopping, arresting, and detaining indi-
viduals—based upon reasonable suspicion—for violations of fed-
eral immigration and anti-trafficking laws.358  
Important to the later expert witness report in the Ortega-
Melendres litigation, Arpaio also instituted a telephone “hotline” 
to generate and pursue “tips” from the general public about sus-
pected immigration violations.359 The MCSO relied on these tel-
ephone “tips” to conduct raids against homes, places of employ-
ment, churches, and beyond.360 The hotline invited racial 
discrimination, as it encouraged individuals to equate race with 
immigration status and allowed others to pursue personal griev-
ances by way of hotline complaints. Some enforcement actions, 
for example, took place after the MCSO received little more than 
a barebones complaint that “described no criminal activity but 
referred to people with ‘dark skin’ or Spanish speakers congre-
gating in an area.”361 Taking immigration enforcement actions 
based on such tips does not account for the general lack of train-
ing, knowledge, and experience among the public in the complex 
area of immigration law.  
 
themselves was later found unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine in 
Somos America v. Maricopa County, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 356. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 8–9. 
 357. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT C-50-07-058-2-00 (Feb. 24, 2007), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/maricopacounty.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z3W8-2MP8] [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT]; Letter from Joseph 
Arpaio, Sheriff, Maricopa Cty. Sheriff ’s Office, to Julie L. Myers, Assistant 
Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 14, 
2007), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/maricopacounty.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/Z3W8-2MP8]. See generally CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, A PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHAL-
LENGES FOR 287(g) (2010) (providing background and history on section 287(g)). 
 358. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 357, at 3. 
 359. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 16. 
 360. Id. at 12. 
 361. Marc Lacey, U.S. Finds Pervasive Bias Against Latinos by Arizona 
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Local shop owners and business leaders initiated a number 
of complaints. As a result, day laborers found themselves on the 
receiving end of “saturation patrols” and other enforcement ac-
tions pursuant to the Coyote Law and Arizona’s Employer Sanc-
tion Law.362 Salvador Reza, a longtime organizer of day laborers 
and one of the founders of the local human rights organization, 
Tonatierra, began to mobilize the community in response.363 Mr. 
Reza and members of Tonatierra began to sound the alarm in 
the Latinx community, many of whom were day laborers, and to 
protest Arpaio’s actions.364 Tonatierra included a constituency of 
day laborers called Puente, which would eventually become its 
own organization, Puente Arizona.365 Tonatierra and Puente en-
gaged national networks to draw attention to Arpaio’s abusive 
tactics, often through the National Day Laborer Organizing Net-
work (NDLON).366  
Instead of utilizing its authority under 287(g) to prosecute 
serious crimes, such as narcotics smuggling, the MCSO focused 
on minor crimes, such as speeding and using fraudulent docu-
ments.367 Indeed, only weeks after the ink was dry on 287(g), Ar-
paio and MCSO used the agreement as a mechanism to author-
ize and ramp up the saturation patrols. In early 2008, Arpaio 
began a series of high-volume “crime suppression sweeps.”368 As 
part of these larger-scale versions of saturation patrols, large 
numbers of MCSO deputies and volunteer “posse” members 
would overwhelm an area.369 They were instructed to make pre-
textual traffic stops to find evidence of any violations of the law 
 
 362. Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353. 
 363. See JEFF BIGGERS, STATE OUT OF THE UNION: ARIZONA AND THE FINAL 
SHOWDOWN OVER THE AMERICAN DREAM 114 (2012) (noting the “Arrest Arpaio, 
Not the People” activist campaign); Lawrence Downs, In Arpaio’s Arizona, They 
Fought Back, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/ 
opinion/sunday/in-arpaios-arizona-they-fought-back.html [https://perma.cc/ 
JM4B-WDX6] (discussing Reza’s involvement in local organizing efforts). 
 364. Downs, supra note 363.  
 365. See Michelle Téllez, Arizona: A Reflection and Conversation on the Mi-
grants Rights Movement, 2015, 42 SOC. JUST. 200, 205 (2015). 
 366. See, e.g., Puente Calls for Immediate Federal Action, Shut Off S-Comm 
in State, as DOJ Arpaio Case Heads to Court, NDLON (May 10, 2012), https:// 
ndlon.org/doj-scomm-az/ [https://perma.cc/F86T-KK2N]. 
 367. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353 (providing examples of individ-
uals stopped for minor crimes, such as speeding). 
 368. Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 347. 
 369. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 3. 
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they could.370 Supervisors instructed deputies in patrol cars to 
look for vehicles with unauthorized immigrants, then detectives 
in undercover cars would follow to establish probable cause for a 
traffic stop.371 Records show broken tail lights, tires over yellow 
lane lines, and tinted windows often formed the basis of stops.372 
Mass arrests in the Latinx community were one standard out-
come of the sweeps. 
The MCSO called this practice “zero tolerance,” and it par-
alleled broken windows policing or stop and frisk in other con-
texts.373 Latinx drivers and passengers were subjected to time-
consuming and sometimes harassing stops, interrogations, and 
arrests. This treatment was not limited to the time during which 
the sweeps occurred, causing substantial fear in the Latinx and 
Native American communities of Maricopa County.374 Stops 
could result in an investigation of immigration status. Deputies 
often asked for identification as a proxy for investigating immi-
gration status, even when explicit questions about status were 
not asked initially.375 Investigating immigration status some-
times formed the only reason for an arrest.376  
As collaborations between ICE and local law enforcement 
agencies across the country grew, and the momentum from 
NDLON and others grew, Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO became 
targets of national advocacy to prevent local police from engag-
ing in federal immigration enforcement functions.377 Against 
 
 370. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 353 (providing examples of pre-
textual stops for minor violations).  
 371. Id. (recounting how the head of the Human Smuggling Unit explained 
the use of undercover cars to establish probable cause). 
 372. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 10–16.  
 373. See Andrew Cohen, Federal Judge Chronicles Lawlessness of Joe Ar-
paio-Led Sheriff’s Office, ATLANTIC (May 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic 
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 374. Evelyn H. Cruz & Robert J. McWhirter, G-Men Run Amuck: The 287(g) 
Men and Immigration Law, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July/Aug. 2009, at 34–36. 
 375. See First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 18. 
 376. Id. at 18–20. 
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forcement, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1083 (2010); Letter from Marielena Hincapie, Exec. 
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this backdrop, the local Arizona American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) office decided to bring a class action lawsuit in collabo-
ration with local advocates and organizers.378 Dan Pochoda, a 
New York civil rights attorney, had joined the ACLU of Arizona 
as its legal director in 2006. In his early months in the position, 
he met with local community leaders about the MCSO’s prac-
tices. It became clear to him that litigation would be the only 
mechanism to “force a response” from the sheriff.379 Moreover, 
even if “[l]itigation may do little to prevent the saturation pa-
trols, [] community leaders were clear that something must be 
done.”380  
An opportunity for structural reform litigation arose in late 
2007, when Mr. Ortega-Melendres filed a lawsuit against Sheriff 
Arpaio following a stop during a saturation patrol in late 2007.381 
He sought damages and an injunction against the sweep based 
on the Fourth Amendment.382 The Somos America coalition, of 
which he was a member, included the ACLU of Arizona, To-
natierra, and Puente. The coalition decided to sue Sheriff Arpaio 
and the MCSO for their implementation of the 287(g) program 
and their immigration enforcement practices.383 
 
.phoenixnewtimes.com/3140100.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7NX-MRSS] (regard-
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B. JUMPING HURDLES IN THE ORTEGA-MELENDRES LITIGATION 
In July 2008, three individuals and the Somos America coa-
lition384 filed an amended complaint alleging violations of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments before Judge G. Murray 
Snow in the District Court of Arizona.385 The ACLU of Arizona, 
ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project (IRP), Mexican American Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and the law firm 
of Steptoe and Johnson also joined the case.386 The complaint 
was filed as a class action on behalf of all Latinx drivers and 
passengers stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO 
officers.387 Plaintiffs alleged the MCSO used the 287(g) agree-
ment to racially profile the Latinx community.388 Plaintiffs also 
alleged that the MCSO engaged in practices of targeting persons 
who appeared Latinx for stops, interrogation, and arrests with-
out reasonable suspicion, citing Sheriff Arpaio’s own statement 
that the sweeps were aimed to “go after illegals . . . . You go after 
them, and you lock them up.”389  
The amended complaint described saturation patrols and 
crime suppression sweeps that targeted Latino neighborhoods 
and day laborer sites as affecting U.S. citizens, Permanent Res-
idents, and Native Americans.390 For example, in one instance, 
a brother and sister, both U.S. citizens, were followed by MCSO 
officers during a sweep solely because they had pulled into a gas 
station while listening to a Spanish-language radio station.391 
 
 384. Somos America is composed of organizations and individuals whose 
work involves issues affecting migrant and immigrant communities. Somos 
America was formed in 2006 with a broad immigration reform agenda. It di-
verted time and resources in response to anti-immigration legislation and Sher-
iff Joe Arpaio’s raids on businesses and the Latinx community. This formed a 
basis for its organizational standing. See generally SOMOS AMERICA, https:// 
somosamerica.org/ [https://perma.cc/DB95-BARP].  
 385. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 17–18. Mr. 
Ortega-Melendres first filed suit in December of 2007 in a complaint for dam-
ages and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated 
individuals. See Initial Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 381, at 19–21.  
 386. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 1–2. 
 387. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1, Ortega-Melen-
dres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 420. 
 388. Id. at 7. 
 389. First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26, supra note 351, at 11. 
 390. Id. at 14. 
 391. MALDEF Sues Maricopa County Sheriff for Racial Profiling and Civil 
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The deputies arrived at their family’s business after following 
the pair, and shoved the brother against one of the police cars, 
handcuffing him while they checked his identification.392 Their 
practices and use of racial profiling thus harmed Latinx individ-
uals, regardless of immigration or citizenship status, and com-
promised the public safety of the broader community. 
As the parties litigated the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allega-
tions of unconstitutional police practices and their certifiability 
as a class, relationships between community advocates and the 
attorneys, such as Pochoda and a law fellow Annie Lai, were im-
portant for several reasons, including to locate the appropriate 
class representatives in a climate where non-citizens feared re-
prisals from the sheriff ’s office. Prior to formal discovery, the re-
lationships with community residents and organizers supported 
information gathering for facts showing policy and practice alle-
gations and class-wide relief. 
Defendants attempted to dismiss the litigation for failure to 
sufficiently plead discriminatory intent on multiple occasions.393 
They challenged plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims and con-
tested the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment allega-
tions related to Terry stops, which require individualized, artic-
ulable, reasonable suspicion for stopping and questioning; 
seizures without probable cause; and investigations and pro-
longed investigatory stops for immigration purposes.394 Surpris-
 
 392. Id.  
 393. Defendants raised this same argument, with some variation, at least 
four times. See Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion 
To Dismiss at 2–4, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-
02513-GMS), ECF No. 12 [hereinafter Motion To Dismiss Initial Complaint, 
ECF No. 12]; Defendants Arpaio and Maricopa County’s Response in Opposition 
to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Leave To Amend Complaint at 11 n.2, Ortega-Melendres 
IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 19 (basing argument 
on the futility exception to the liberal standard permitting plaintiffs to amend 
initial pleadings); Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First 
Amended Complaint at 8 n.2, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 
2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Motion To Dismiss First 
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32]; Defendants Arpaio and MCSO’s Rule 12(c) 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 5–6, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. 
Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS), ECF No. 90 [hereinafter Defendants’ 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90].  
 394. The district court denied defendants’ claims that Sheriff Arpaio and the 
MCSO were entitled to qualified immunity when addressing defendants’ motion 
to dismiss. The determination fell squarely on well-established precedent that 
“qualified immunity is only an immunity from a suit for damages, and does not 
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ingly, in the initial stages of litigation, though the MCSO chal-
lenged plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate their constitutional 
claims, they did not challenge plaintiffs’ discriminatory police 
practice allegations as insufficient under Monell’s municipal lia-
bility theory.395  
1. Standing To Seek an Injunction: Lyons 
The court considered plaintiffs’ standing based on Lyons in 
three rounds of motion practice and eventually determined 
MCSO engaged in an official policy of race and/or national origin 
discrimination.396 During the next round of Lyons motion prac-
tice, the district court considered defendants’ motions for judg-
ment on the pleadings based on lack of standing for equitable 
relief, as well as plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.397 The 
 
provide immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief.” Ortega-Melen-
dres v. Arpaio (Ortega-Melendres II) 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 n.1 (D. Ariz. 
2009) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007)). As with 
other structural reform litigation, because plaintiffs were only seeking injunc-
tive relief, and not damages, qualified immunity was not available as a defense. 
Id. 
 395. Instead, they argued plaintiffs had incorrectly named Sheriff Joe Ar-
paio and the MCSO as the defendants because the MCSO was not a jural entity. 
Rather, Maricopa County, defendants argued, was the proper entity. See Motion 
To Dismiss First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32, supra note 393, at 6–12; 
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra note 393, 
at 6–7. The court, however, permitted plaintiffs to continue against MCSO and 
decided that the Sherriff could be sued in his official capacity as the final deci-
sion-maker on county law enforcement matters. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio 
(Ortega-Melendres V), 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 890 (D. Ariz. 2013) (connecting Ar-
paio to MSCO through Arpaio’s “final decisionmaking [sic] authority” on 
MSCO’s policies). 
 396. Defendants initially raised standing in their motion to dismiss the first 
complaint. In response, plaintiffs requested, and the court permitted, amend-
ment of the pleadings to add class claims and additional named plaintiffs. De-
fendants’ motion was dismissed as moot. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio (Or-
tega-Melendres I), No. CV07-2513-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4174918, at *6 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 5, 2008); Motion To Dismiss Initial Complaint, ECF No. 12, supra note 
393, at 6–8. 
 397. See Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification at 6–7, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-
cv-02513-PHX-MHM), ECF No. 100 (responding to plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification, which mentioned the “preliminary matter” that the class had 
standing to pursue equitable relief); Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 14–17, Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (No. 2:07-cv-02513-
GMS), ECF No. 413; Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF 
No. 90, supra note 393, at 8. 
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MCSO argued that plaintiffs had failed to show standing for ei-
ther the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims and that it 
deserved judgment on the pleadings as a result.398 First, defend-
ants raised the speculative harm barrier: they disagreed that 
plaintiffs had a “‘credible’ and ‘genuine’ threat” of defendants 
stopping, questioning, searching or arresting them again, and 
because plaintiffs relied on contingent future events, they did 
not suffer ongoing harms.399 The prior stops were insufficient to 
support an injunction for prospective future harm.400 Second, re-
lying on Lyons’s discussion of innocence, defendants argued that 
plaintiffs’ unlawful actions, based on potential violations of state 
law due to immigration status, shielded defendants from liabil-
ity.401 Just as Mr. Lyons could choose to drive without a tail light, 
the MCSO suggested plaintiffs could avoid future harm by com-
plying with state immigration law and driving with persons who 
do the same.402  
Without a developed factual record, the court adopted a Rule 
12(b)(6) standard.403 It viewed plaintiffs’ allegations as true and 
construed them in their favor.404 The complaint provided con-
crete and sufficient allegations of a pattern, practice, or custom 
of unlawful police practices. Based on the complaint, the threat 
of future harm was not predicated on future illegal conduct by 
plaintiffs, so the court determined that plaintiffs had standing 
to pursue their equitable claims.405 The court found plaintiffs 
had sufficiently alleged a real and immediate threat of future 
 
 398. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra 
note 393, at 4–9. 
 399. Id. at 5; Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Class Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 4–5. 
 400. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra 
note 393, at 6–7 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974); Farm 
Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 723, 
729–30 (N.D. Ohio 2000)). 
 401. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 90, supra 
note 393, at 6–7. 
 402. Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 7. 
 403. Ortega-Melendres v. Maricopa County (Ortega-Melendres III), No. CV-
07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009) (“In the 
absence of such a record, the Court must look to the Complaint, take its allega-
tions as true, and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to Plain-
tiffs.”). 
 404. Id. 
 405. See id. at *5–6. 
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injury, even though the plaintiffs only pled one stop each.406 The 
court explained, however, that it would require an evidentiary 
record to determine whether a practice in fact existed to over-
come the Lyons standing hurdle.407 In the same motion, the court 
denied class certification without prejudice, relying on the ap-
proach that standing should be resolved prior to granting class 
certification.408  
To review the information gathered by parties, the district 
court revisited standing two years later, following discovery, 
when deciding plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification 
and each parties’ motions for summary judgment.409 Plaintiffs 
overcame the standing barriers by demonstrating an official pol-
icy.410 Even so, the court analyzed the case through the lens of 
the speculative harm, repeated harm, and innocence require-
ments.411 First, plaintiffs responded to the defendants’ argument 
regarding speculative, future harm. Because there was nothing 
plaintiffs could do to avoid injury, they were likely—if not cer-
tain—to endure the MCSO’s unconstitutional conduct again in 
the future.412 Each individual plaintiff was subjected to unrea-
sonable, racially motivated traffic stops. Because the MCSO took 
enforcement actions against both vehicle drivers and passen-
gers, plaintiffs’ only option to avoid unlawful traffic stops would 
be to forgo any motor vehicle travel. 
Second, distinguishing the speculative harm barrier of Ly-
ons specifically, plaintiffs argued there was no series of contin-
gent events that would have to occur for plaintiffs to be subject 
 
 406. See id. at *1–2. 
 407. Id. at *4 (citing Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 
(9th Cir. 1999)). 
 408. Id. at *6 (citing Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004), 
and distinguishing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). Courts apply 
different approaches to the standing and class certification question. See gener-
ally ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 76–86 
(William B. Rubenstein ed., 5th ed. 2011) (discussing the various ways courts 
have approached standing in class actions). 
 409. The arguments and discussion that follows is based on the 2009 and 
2011 motion practice and court orders. See, e.g., Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 
2707241, at *7–8. 
 410. Id. at *1. 
 411. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 978–92 (D. Ariz. 2011) 
(analyzing Plaintiffs’ claims and granting partial summary judgment to Plain-
tiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims); Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 
2707241, at *2–5.  
 412. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *3 (discussing Plaintiffs’ al-
leged future harms). 
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to racial profiling (as either drivers or passengers).413 Plaintiffs 
had pled specific statements and policies of racially motivated 
sweeps in Latinx areas of Maricopa County. This policy and 
practice allegation, they argued, created the future likelihood 
that plaintiffs would be subjected to traffic stops based on race, 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.414 The Supreme 
Court in Lyons had determined the Los Angeles chokehold policy 
was not reasonably pled nor demonstrated through the record.415 
With regard to the innocence barrier of Lyons, the court dis-
agreed with defendants’ contentions that plaintiffs had engaged 
in illegal behavior predicating their stops. In particular, defend-
ants argued that two individual named plaintiffs were not inno-
cent because they had been cited for ignoring a “road closed” 
sign.416 In fact, no named plaintiffs were issued citations. The 
court found the facts alleged in the complaint “could plausibly be 
read to allege that Plaintiffs did nothing illegal to warrant the 
actions of MCSO officers.”417 
In both decisions where Lyons was substantively considered, 
the court found instructive a series of Ninth Circuit cases distin-
guishing Lyons, including Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina.418 In 
Hodgers-Durgin, plaintiffs, who had been stopped by border 
agents on a “roving patrol,”419 challenged this practice under the 
Fourth Amendment and requested injunctive relief. Plaintiffs 
argued they had a sufficient likelihood of future injury because 
they drove every day through a region in which INS agents pa-
trolled “all over the place.”420  
On the Lyons question, the Hodgers-Durgin court found 
plaintiffs overcame the innocence hurdle because there was “no 
string of contingencies necessary to produce an injury.”421 The 
Hodgers plaintiffs “engaged in entirely innocent conduct,” and 
 
 413. Id. at *2. 
 414. Id. at *4–5. 
 415. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7 (1983); see also 
supra Part I.A. 
 416. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *1. 
 417. Id. at *3. 
 418. Id. at *3–4. 
 419. Id. at *3. “Roving patrols” reference border agent operations in the in-
terior of the United States, rather than at the U.S.-Mexico border. During these 
roving patrols, border agents stop, and sometimes detain, individuals for immi-
gration- or smuggling-related violations. 
 420. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 
1999) (en banc). 
 421. Id. at 1041–42. 
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they were also powerless to prevent further interaction with po-
lice officers.422 Plaintiffs “would not have to take any action, such 
as offering resistance, to reproduce the injury.”423 Thus, plain-
tiffs established that the same chain of events would likely re-
produce the plaintiffs’ injuries in the future and satisfied Lyons’s 
first prong.  
But ultimately, the Ninth Circuit determined the facts of the 
case could not overcome the speculative harm or future injury 
barriers.424 In ten years, the Hodgers named plaintiffs had expe-
rienced only one roving border patrol encounter, despite regu-
larly driving hundreds of miles a week in close proximity to the 
Border Patrol.425 
The district court in Ortega-Melendres distinguished 
Hodgers-Durgin and Lyons. First, unlike Hodgers-Durgin, the 
plaintiffs had alleged that the MCSO’s practices involved more 
than a single stop.426 Though plaintiffs had, as with the plaintiffs 
in Hodgers-Durgin, only endured one stop during the course of 
the litigation, the court held that the plaintiffs had “presented 
sufficient evidence aside from the stops themselves” of the 
MCSO’s repeated unconstitutional behavior.427  
Relatedly, and most importantly, the court held that plain-
tiffs sufficiently pled that the Maricopa County Sheriff ’s depu-
ties had stopped plaintiffs pursuant to an officially sanctioned 
policy, practice, or pattern of stopping, questioning, searching, 
and sometimes arresting Latinx persons without probable cause 
 
 422. Id. at 1041. 
 423. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *3 (citing City of Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983)). 
 424. See Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1044. (“We hold that Mr. Lopez and 
Ms. Hodgers-Durgin have not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of injury to 
warrant equitable relief.”). 
 425. Id. In Ortega-Melendres, the court noted that without a developed fac-
tual record, it could not test plaintiffs’ allegations. Other district courts had 
pointed out that after summary judgment, or at another stage after a fully de-
veloped factual record, was a more appropriate time to raise the arguments de-
fendants had presented. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (citing 
Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 
Bassette v. City of Oakland, No. C-00-1645 JCS, 2000 WL 33376593, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2000)). 
 426. See Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (“The Complaint al-
leges that the challenged conduct occurs not only as a general practice, but also 
through widespread and ongoing ‘crime suppression sweeps.’”). 
 427. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 987 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
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or reasonable suspicion.428 The Lyons Court had stated that vic-
tims of police misconduct could satisfy standing if department 
officials “ordered or authorized police officers to act” in an un-
lawful manner.429 Ortega-Melendres presented such a case. The 
MCSO itself had argued “its officers [were] authorized to stop 
individuals based only on reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
that a person is not authorized to be in the United States.”430 
This assertion not only demonstrated an official policy, but was 
“wrong as a matter of law.”431 Moreover, other Ninth Circuit 
cases further made clear that allegations of a widespread, ongo-
ing, and sanctioned policy or practice “lends special weight to the 
likelihood of future harm.”432 Therefore, the court determined 
that the plaintiffs satisfied Lyons’s standing requirement for in-
junctive relief, and demonstrated a “sufficient likelihood” that 
their rights would be violated in the future.433  
Importantly, the department-wide practices claim grounded 
in Monell helped the plaintiffs overcome a common and challeng-
ing issue in police injunctive suits—the single stop problem. As 
Lyons and Hodgers-Durgin show, courts often find that a single 
police encounter resulting in “injury and death unconstitution-
ally inflicted on the victim”—while “unfortunate”—does not 
demonstrate a likely future injury and thus does not confer 
standing for injunctive relief.434 Yet, Judge Snow explained that 
the fact that individual plaintiffs were only subject to a single 
stop did not preclude standing to seek injunctive relief in their 
 
 428. Id. at 989. 
 429. Id. at 979 (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 106 (1983)).  
 430. Id. Moreover, as an incorrect assertion of law, the court determined 
plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment for their Fourth Amend-
ment claim. Id. at 980. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009) 
(explanatory parentheticals in original) (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 
849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that one of the ways in which plaintiffs can 
“demonstrate that [an] injury is likely to recur” is to “demonstrate that the harm 
is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned behavior”); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway 
Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs who 
were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged racial profiling sur-
vived a motion to dismiss and relying on the fact that, unlike Lyons, the plain-
tiffs “allege[d] a pattern and practice of illegal law enforcement activity”); cf. 
Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1990); LaDuke v. Nelson, 
762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 433. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 985 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 434. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983). 
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Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims.435 Rather, the 
MCSO’s official policy to illegally detain people based on their 
race and/or national origin necessarily exposed the named plain-
tiffs to an ongoing harm and evidenced that there is “sufficient 
likelihood” that plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights will be violated again.436  
Concurrent events also affected the litigation. Following 
considerable local and national activism, in October 2009 the 
federal government withdrew an aspect of its 287(g) Memoran-
dum of Agreement with MCSO.437 Deputies lost the authority to 
investigate and make arrests during street encounters based on 
suspected unlawful presence alone.438 Although MCSO deputies 
no longer had the federal government’s approval to engage in 
street-based sweeps, they could continue to enforce immigration 
law following pretextual stops, and had the authority to verify 
immigration status.439 In 2010, Arizona became ground zero for 
the immigration debate when Governor Jan Brewer signed a law 
purporting to require all law enforcement agencies in the state 
to enforce immigration laws, among other provisions.440 Locally, 
in Phoenix, demonstrations against Arpaio’s Tent City and con-
tinued crime suppression sweeps mounted.441 The Department 
of Justice’s criminal division opened an investigation into abuse 
of power by the MCSO’s public corruption squad, and the DOJ 
 
 435. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 436. Id. at 979 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111). 
 437. Ray Stern, Feds Pull 287(g) Authority from Maricopa County Jails Be-




 438. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (“MCSO officers no 
longer had authority to enforce federal civil immigration violations in the field, 
but could continue to do so in the jails.”). 
 439. See id. (noting instances when officers could continue to enforce immi-
gration law following loss of 287(g) authority). 
 440. See Ted Hesson, 3 Reasons Arizona Is Ground Zero for Immigration 
Policy, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013, 2:16 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_ 
Univision/Politics/reasons-arizona-ground-immigration-policy/story?id= 
19885446 [https://perma.cc/7LUR-P5KJ]. 
 441. See Sadie Jo Smokey, Dancers, Students, Families Protest Arpaio, NE. 
PHX. REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 2010, at 4 (describing the protests against Sheriff Ar-
paio’s unjust treatment of Hispanics).  
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Civil Rights Division issued a report in December 2011 finding 
MCSO had engaged in unconstitutional policing.442 
2. Municipal Liability: Monell 
The plaintiffs presented remarkable evidence of an official 
policy to racially profile Latinx persons to support their request 
for summary judgment. Consequently, the court determined 
plaintiffs’ evidence overcame the widespread practices and fac-
tual parallel barriers associated with practice or custom allega-
tions.443 The evidence included Sheriff Arpaio’s public state-
ments endorsing racial profiling and the detention of people 
based on “their speech, what they look like, if they look like they 
came from another country.”444 Emails associated with the spe-
cial raids that were circulated among MCSO officers compared 
Mexicans to dogs and portrayed them as “drunks.”445 In addition, 
the court found significant the MCSO’s equating of day laborers 
with unlawful status, and that this motivated where officers con-
ducted saturation patrols.446 
Plaintiffs also relied upon statistical evidence demonstrat-
ing Hispanics were stopped at significantly higher rates during 
the saturation patrols. Dr. Ralph Taylor, a professor of criminol-
ogy at Temple University and plaintiffs’ statistical expert, pre-
sented findings from his study analyzing computer-aided dis-
patch (CAD) reports that documented vehicle stops by MCSO 
officers on patrol.447 Dr. Taylor conducted a study of CAD records 
during large-scale saturation patrols to determine whether the 
patrols focused on cars with Hispanic occupants.448 He compared 
the names of individuals whom MCSO officers stopped and 
called into central dispatch during saturation patrols to the 
 
 442. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE 2 (2011), https://www 
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/mcso_findletter_12-15-11 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4S2-WTED]. 
 443. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
 444. Id. at 986. 
 445. Id. at 987. 
 446. Id.; see also Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 850 (D. Ariz. 
2013) (“The MCSO almost always scheduled its day labor and small-scale satu-
ration patrols where Latino day laborers congregated; the same is true for a 
considerable number of its large-scale saturation patrols.”). 
 447. Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 872. Each time an MCSO dep-
uty asks for dispatch to run a name, the CAD database records the name of the 
individual and records the type of stop. Id. 
 448. Id. 
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names called in by officers during non-saturation patrol days.449 
He also compared all names called in on saturation patrol days, 
regardless of whether the report was from a saturation patrol or 
not.450 He concluded, among other findings, that officers were 
forty-six to fifty-four percent more likely to stop an individual 
with a Hispanic surname during saturation patrols.451 Though 
defendants challenged Dr. Taylor’s conclusions with their own 
statistical expert’s testimony at trial, the court found Dr. Taylor 
more credible.452 Moreover, the court found Dr. Taylor’s study 
“probative” of plaintiffs’ claim that the MCSO officers used race 
as a discriminatory factor in their saturation patrols despite in-
structions not to racially profile.453 The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that anywhere from fifty-seven to ninety-seven percent of 
those arrested during saturation patrols were persons with His-
panic names.454 The percentage of passengers with Hispanic sur-
names was even higher, ranging from eighty-one to ninety-five 
percent.455  
Plaintiffs next presented evidence to show that the sheriff ’s 
office was liable for its officers’ actions under a “failure to” train 
and supervise theory.456 Plaintiffs pointed to the MCSO’s lack of 
safeguards to prevent racial profiling.457 The MCSO did not have 
an agency-wide anti-racial profiling policy, nor had the agency 
provided an adequate definition to officers.458 The only training 
 
 449. Id. at 873. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. at 874 (“As between Dr. Taylor and Dr. Camarota in this respect, 
the Court credits the opinion of Dr. Taylor.”). 
 453. Id. at 875–76. 
 454. Id. at 868. Dr. Taylor used U.S. census data to correlate whether the 
owners of a given surname identified as Hispanic. Id. at 873. 
 455. Id. at 869. The court decided to give more weight to Dr. Taylor than the 
defendants’ expert, Dr. Steven Camarota. Id. at 874. Dr. Camarota did not take 
issue with Dr. Taylor’s analysis or methodology. Id. Instead, he offered the al-
ternative explanation that poverty rates could explain the disparate rates of 
stops, because “people with low incomes are going to have more diffi-
culty . . . meeting the equipment standards.” Id. He presented no analysis of the 
stop rates when corrected for income to support this view. Id. Ultimately, the 
court determined these statements were mere “speculation.” Id.  
 456. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 28, Ortega-Melen-
dres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS), ECF 
No. 421. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
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material produced in the litigation—from an Arizona law en-
forcement board—incorrectly prohibited profiling only when con-
ducted solely on the basis of race.459 Indeed, officers and super-
visors had testified at depositions that “apparent Mexican 
ancestry,” “speak[ing] only Spanish,” and presence in “illegal al-
ien locale” were bases for investigatory action.460 No in-house 
training was required nor provided.461 ICE’s 287(g) training had 
little material relevance to racial profiling.462 No documentation 
on the race, ethnicity, or basis of the stop was required, let alone 
checked by supervisors to ensure reasonable suspicion or proba-
ble cause formed the bases for the stop, interrogation, or sei-
zure.463  
Furthermore, plaintiffs demonstrated that the MCSO habit-
ually turned a blind eye to reports of discriminatory policing.464 
Plaintiffs characterized the attitudes of MCSO supervisors as 
“cavalier” because they “trust[ed]” their subordinates not to ra-
cially profile.465 Moreover, the supervisors themselves initiated 
or spread racial bias, such as when a sergeant circulated an 
email about a “Mexican Yoga” or did nothing when officers dis-
tributed “Mexican Word of the Day” or derogatory jokes about 
Mexicans or Mexican culture.466  
The court found that if the policy plaintiffs claimed existed 
was in fact a policy, then it presented “a ‘sufficient likelihood’ 
that the named Plaintiffs will suffer ongoing harm.”467 Ulti-
mately, the court granted a preliminary injunction, finding 
“[i]njunctive relief is appropriate when plaintiffs show that po-
lice misconduct ‘is purposefully aimed at minorities and that 
such misconduct was condoned and tacitly authorized by depart-
ment policy makers.’”468  
Importantly, the court noted that consideration of race need 
not be the “dominant or primary” purpose of a policy for it to be 
 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. at 28–29 (alteration in original). 
 461. Id. at 29. 
 462. See id. 
 463. Id. at 29–30. 
 464. Id. at 29. 
 465. Id. at 29–30. 
 466. Id. at 30–31. 
 467. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 987. 
 468. Id. at 985 (quoting Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 
(9th Cir. 1992)). 
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discriminatory.469 Instead, a fact finder must decide whether dis-
criminatory purpose was “a motivating factor” in the policy.470 
This could be shown if the policy was “based in part on reports 
that referred to explicit racial characteristics.”471  
Ultimately, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment based on the Fourteenth Amendment, but it did grant 
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim and injunc-
tive relief “to the extent that Defendants are detaining persons 
without reasonable suspicion that the state human smuggling 
statute has been violated,” and instead solely on the basis of sus-
pected immigration status.472 Defendants did not claim Mr. Or-
tega-Melendres matched a particular description of a crime sus-
pect,473 which is a permissible basis for a stop under the Fourth 
Amendment. Rather, his stop arose because he was dressed as a 
member of a work crew.474 A deputy stopped him for driving 
thirty-four miles per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone, 
but called another deputy to investigate the passengers’ immi-
gration status.475 The officers had no reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that the church from which Mr. Ortega-Melendres had 
been driving was engaged in any criminal activity.476 Based on 
deposition testimony, the court found the deputy relied on an 
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” that did not 
provide objectively reasonable suspicion of smuggling.477  
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.  
The Ortega-Melendres plaintiffs sought to certify a class, 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), composed of “[a]ll Latino persons who, 
since January 2007, [had] been or [would] be in the future, 
stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents 
 
 469. Id. at 986. 
 470. Id. (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
 471. Id. (quoting Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 472. Id. at 980. Plaintiffs Nieto and Meraz were ordered to leave the conven-
ience store and back-up officers were called. Id. at 984. The back-up officers 
followed them into the parking lot of an auto repair shop owned by Nieto’s fa-
ther. Id. at 985. Nieto was removed forcibly from the car and handcuffed while 
the police checked his ID. Id. They were released without being charged. Id.  
 473. Id. at 981–92. 
 474. Id. at 982. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 
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while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or park-
ing area in Maricopa County, Arizona.”478 The initial motion for 
class certification filed in 2009 was denied without prejudice.479 
The court determined it required a developed factual record prior 
to determining whether plaintiffs satisfied standing to pursue 
equitable relief.480 Plaintiffs renewed their motion in 2011 and 
defendants made several arguments, including that plaintiffs 
had not satisfied commonality.481 
To satisfy commonality (and typicality), plaintiffs’ renewed 
motion for class certification relied upon statistical and anecdo-
tal evidence suggesting that the representative plaintiffs and 
class members were likely to be stopped again.482 Anecdotal evi-
dence included the defendants’ actions based upon “constituent 
letters explicitly calling for racial profiling,” and that Sheriff Ar-
paio, “endorsed such letters and passed them on to his subordi-
nates for use in the planning and implementation of enforcement 
operations, including saturation patrols.”483 The plaintiffs also 
argued that Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO officers had “distributed 
offensive materials about Hispanics” within the department, 
 
 478. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420, supra 
note 387, at 1. 
 479. Ortega-Melendres III, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at 
*7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2009). 
 480. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 403–08. The court did not 
resolve the issue at that stage, quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
831 (1999) for the position that standing should be resolved prior to class certi-
fication because “any [ ]  Article III court must be sure of its own jurisdiction 
before getting to the merits.” Ortega-Melendres III, 2009 WL 2707241, at *6. 
The Fibreboard case announced an exception to when class certification is a 
prerequisite to standing. Id. (citing Fibreboard, 527 U.S. at 831). The Ortega-
Melendres court did not find this principle at odds with the rule that courts 
should determine whether to certify a suit as a class action “[a]t an early prac-
ticable time.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A)). 
Additionally, the court concluded that some determinations of standing cannot 
be squarely resolved without the benefit of discovery. Id. (citing Doninger v. Pac. 
Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court denied the motion 
without prejudice. Id. at *7. 
 481. Defendant Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, ECF No. 100, supra note 397, at 2–9. 
 482. See Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420, 
supra note 387, at 2–8 (detailing “how Defendants [were] engaged in a pattern 
and practice of discrimination against Hispanics in traffic stops” resulting in 
the plaintiffs being unable to do anything “to avoid a repeat of the injury”).  
 483. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs first sought class certification at an earlier stage of 
the case, but the court denied the motion without prejudice. See supra notes 
479–80 and accompanying text. 
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which showed “that negative stereotypes about Hispanics [were] 
deeply and widely felt within the agency.”484 The plaintiffs also 
pointed to public statements by Sheriff Arpaio “equat[ing] His-
panics with illegal immigrants.”485 Specifically, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that “Sheriff Arpaio has repeatedly stated that his enforce-
ment operations are intended to ‘go after illegals,’ and that they 
can be spotted based on ‘what they look like’”; they asserted that 
those statements illustrate that the department used race as a 
motivating force to enforce immigration laws.486  
The court found that plaintiffs had satisfied commonality 
and all other requirements for an injunctive class action under 
Rule 23(b)(2).487 Of note, this decision occurred on plaintiffs’ sec-
ond request for certification, two years after the first, and follow-
ing extensive expert discovery.  
4. Trial and Remedy 
The months preceding trial coincided with growing national 
attention on Sheriff Arpaio’s unconstitutional practices and Ari-
zona’s anti-immigrant climate. On May 10, 2012, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice Civil Rights Division filed suit against Mar-
icopa County.488 
Judge Snow presided over a three-week bench trial primar-
ily addressing plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.489 The 
court’s conclusions of law and fact pointed to an extensive evi-
dentiary record, including Dr. Taylor’s statistical findings that 
drivers and passengers with Hispanic names were more likely to 
be stopped, and stopped for longer, from which it could conclude 
MCSO engages in racial profiling of Latinx people.490 The court 
 
 484. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 420, supra 
note 387, at 3. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id.  
 487. See Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 993 (D. Ariz. 2011) 
(“Plaintiffs have met their burden for class certification under Rule 23.”). 
 488. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Department 
of Justice Files Lawsuit in Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County 
Sheriff ’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (May 10, 2012), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-lawsuit-arizona-against-maricopa 
-county-maricopa-county-sheriff-s [https://perma.cc/H5D7-WEDV].  
 489. See Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 490. Id. at 872–74 (crediting Dr. Taylor’s findings that on saturation patrol 
days, those stopped “were between 26% to 39% more likely to be Hispanic” than 
those on non-saturation patrol days, and that stops of Hispanics “lasted between 
two and three minutes longer than comparable stops” of non-Hispanics). 
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reviewed Arpaio’s public statements, orders to his officers, and 
files of letters and clippings, all of which openly espoused racial 
profiling.491 The fact that his policies were in part a response to 
citizens’ requests to target immigrants also suggested that the 
MCSO’s special operations were conducted based on race versus 
evidence of a crime.492  
Moreover, the court concluded these actions were pursuant 
to an official policy. The court determined that the MCSO’s Law 
Enforcement Agency Response (LEAR) policy, which 
require[d] a deputy (1) to detain persons she or he believes only to be 
in the country without authorization, (2) to contact MCSO supervisors, 
and then (3) to await contact with ICE pending a determination how to 
proceed, result[ed] in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution.493  
This trial evidence substantiated that the defendants were al-
ready violating the court’s December 2011 Fourth Amendment 
injunction.494 Because ICE had revoked the MCSO’s 287(g) au-
thority, the court stated that the MCSO could not have a policy 
of “enforcing” immigration law pursuant to the 287(g) agree-
ment.495 The court, therefore, granted plaintiffs’ permanent in-
junction.496 
 
 491. Id. at 830–31 (quoting Sheriff Arpaio during a press conference as stat-
ing, “Actually, . . . ours is an operation, whether it’s the state law or the federal, 
to go after illegals, not the crime first, that they happen to be illegals. My pro-
gram, my philosophy is a pure program. You go after illegals. I’m not afraid to 
say that. And you go after them and you lock them up.”); see also Ortega-Melen-
dres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 986–87 (discussing additional statements made by 
Sheriff Arpaio and other files of Sheriff Arpaio showing racial profiling). 
 492. See Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (noting that several of 
the large-scale saturation patrols “occurred in locations for which the Sheriff 
had received previous complaints about the presence of Mexicans or day labor-
ers or both”). 
 493. Id. at 826–27. In the absence of additional facts that would provide rea-
sonable suspicion that a person committed a federal criminal offense either in 
entering or staying in this country, it is not a violation of federal criminal law 
to be in this country without authorization in and of itself. See id. at 886 (de-
scribing the “erroneous premise that being an unauthorized alien in this coun-
try in and of itself established a criminal violation of federal immigration law”). 
 494. See id. at 887–90 (concluding that “essentially, nothing ha[d] changed” 
following the injunction, and that the MCSO “continue[d] to arrest those it be-
lieve[d] to be unauthorized aliens”). 
 495. See id. 
 496. Id. at 910. The parties engaged in extensive discussions and the court 
ultimately issued a broad injunction. See Melendres v. Arpaio (Ortega-Melen-
dres VI), No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 
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The fallout from the court’s decision—when combined with 
on-the-ground advocacy—led to big changes in Maricopa County. 
Four months after the Ortega-Melendres trial, Sheriff Arpaio 
faced a tough re-election fight. Latinxs organized, using the trial 
to increase voter registration and drum up opposition to his can-
didacy.497 Though he was re-elected as a six-time incumbent, it 
was only by six percentage points—his narrowest victory.498 The 
case against the MCSO for racial profiling and stops, detentions, 
and arrests without reasonable suspicion or probable cause is 
ongoing. An independent monitor, Chief Robert Warsaw, was ap-
pointed499 and the community was permitted to have direct in-
volvement in monitoring the remedial order.500 Yet, even under 
the new sheriff, Paul Penzone, racial disparities persist and the 
community has decried and protested his continued cooperation 
with ICE.501  
IV.  BAILEY V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA: PHILADELPHIA 
STOP AND FRISK   
The case study in this Part provides in-depth consideration 
of Philadelphia’s stop and frisk practices. The case study begins 
with a review of years of litigation, attempts to prevent discrim-
inatory policing in Philadelphia, and ends with the settlement of 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia. The story here is distinct from 
 
2013) (“Parties desired to negotiate the terms of a consent decree to ensure De-
fendants’ compliance with the injunctions.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part 
by Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 497. Daniel González, Latino Voters Surge in Ariz., ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 
2012, at A1; E.J. Montini, Arpaio Victory Good for Latinos?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Nov. 16, 2012, at B1. 
 498. Ross D. Franklin, Arizona Sheriff Arpaio Charged with Contempt, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 18, 2016, at 8. 
 499. See Ortega-Melendres VI, 2013 WL 5498218, at *30 (“The Court shall 
appoint an Independent Monitor to assist with implementation of, and assess 
compliance with, this order.”). The MCSO monitoring team has a website where 
all monitoring reports and other updates are located. Changing the Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office, ACLU ARIZ., http://www.changingmcso.org/resources/ 
monitoring-reports/ [https://perma.cc/G3MW-T3WQ].  
 500. Community involvement has been in the form of a Community Out-
reach Plan, the creation of a Community Advisory Board (CAB), and even al-
lowing community member participation in the training of police. See Ortega 
-Melendres VI, 2013 WL 5498218, at *29–30. 
 501. Jack Lechich, Protesters Call on Sheriff Paul Penzone to Stop Cooperat-
ing with ICE, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/ 
news/local/phoenix-breaking/2018/08/22/protesters-urge-sheriff-paul-penzone 
-stop-cooperating-ice/1069547002/ [https://perma.cc/48DP-L2WP].  
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that of New York and Maricopa County because it ended in set-
tlement between the parties and did not require a trial to obtain 
a court order. The backdrop of negative publicity against the 
NYPD and the election of a reform-minded mayor were im-
portant to overcoming the hurdles in this instance.  
A. BAILEY’S ORIGINS: A LONG HISTORY OF RACIALLY 
MOTIVATED POLICE PRACTICES 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia arose out of a decades-long 
struggle to address stop and frisk policing in Philadelphia. In the 
1980s, the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) engaged in 
high-profile and aggressive police operations that sparked a se-
ries of court injunctions and community organizing cam-
paigns.502 On March 27, 1985, the Philadelphia Police  
Commissioner initiated Operation Cold Turkey.503 Using com-
puterized police equipment, he located the fifty street corners 
with the most drug arrests and sent massive police “strike 
teams” to detain and search anyone in the area.504 Officers were 
instructed to “clear” corners and surrounding areas to cut off the 
drug trade “cold turkey.”505 The local ACLU, working with the 
local progressive firm Kairys & Rudovsky, filed a class action a 
week later on behalf of 1200—primarily Black—individuals.506 
Within two weeks, the media attention and public pressure led 
to a consent decree to avoid violations of the Fourth Amendment 
rights of persons living in “high-crime” areas.507  
 
 502. I start this version of the story in the 1980s, but the tradition of com-
munity organizing on police issues carries back many decades. The Coalition of 
Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility and the 
Coalition Against Police Abuse operated in the 1970s. They were strong enough 
to pressure Ed Rendell, after winning the District Attorney race in 1977, to cre-
ate a separate unit to prosecute police. This promise arose during the campaign, 
and both he and his Republican opponent pledged to create such a unit. See 
DAVID KAIRYS, PHILADELPHIA FREEDOM 332 (2008). For a good review of the 
history of police accountability efforts, including early litigation to achieve po-
lice-citizen oversight, see Richard J. Terrill, Police Accountability in Philadel-
phia: Retrospects and Prospects, 7 AM. J. POLICE 79, 81–84 (1988).  
 503. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 318.  
 504. Id. 
 505. Id.  
 506. Id. at 319. 
 507. Id. at 320. The terms of the injunction stated the police “shall not stop, 
frisk, question, search, interrogate, detain, or arrest any person” based on “a 
person’s presence in a high-crime location” or with less basis or cause than per-
mitted under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
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A few months later, the Puerto Rican residents of Spring 
Garden were subjected to rampant illegal searches and arrests 
following the death of a police officer who was found shot in his 
patrol car.508 One elderly man was cooking for his invalid wife 
when police demanded he come to the station for questioning.509 
He was not even permitted to turn off the stove or notify family 
to care for his wife until his return.510 Spring Garden United 
Neighbors (SGUN) called the ACLU and the same Kairys & Ru-
dovsky lawyers to its meeting to hear from residents and discuss 
possible action.511 As an organization, SGUN has many priori-
ties, including preventing gentrification from pushing out its 
low-income Puerto Rican membership.512 Police sweeps were 
viewed as part of the city’s plan to displace the community, mak-
ing the events central to the group’s mission and membership.513 
Following a hearing, a federal judge granted a preliminary 
injunction on behalf of a class of Spring Garden residents in 
SGUN v. City of Philadelphia.514 All those questioned were of 
Puerto Rican origin, none were charged with crimes, and none 
had information related to the officer’s death.515 The court found 
it important that the police engaged in such sweeps shortly after 
the Operation Cold Turkey injunction.516 In his oral opinion, the 
judge noted,  
This . . . makes it clear to me that the defendants would conduct a 
‘sweep’ again if they believed they could escape unscathed. To permit 
that would make a mockery of our constitutional right to be free from 
undue restraint in our daily lives, on the street, in front of our homes 
and inside our homes.517  
The City settled following the court’s pronouncements.518 The 
temporary injunction became permanent; attorneys’ fees and 
minimal damages were awarded.519 
 
 508. Id.  
 509. Id. at 330. 
 510. Id.  
 511. Id. at 320–21. 
 512. Id. at 321. 
 513. Id. 
 514. Spring Garden United Neighbors, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 614 F. 
Supp. 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
 515. Id. at 1351. 
 516. Id. at 1353. 
 517. Id.  
 518. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 332. 
 519. Id.  
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Following this activity and other operations, including the 
PPD’s controversial bombing of MOVE activists’ homes,520 advo-
cates convened the first Coalition of Police Accountability (CPA) 
in Philadelphia.521 The coalition consisted of a range of commu-
nity, civil rights, religious, and advocacy groups, including an or-
ganization of minority police officers, Tenant Action Group, Phil-
adelphia Prison Project, and the American Friends Service 
Committee.522 The coalition’s formation was assisted by David 
Kairys, of Kairys & Rudovsky, and the ACLU.523 As chair of the 
coalition, David Kairys researched and drafted a report to ex-
plain and document the state of police concerns.524 The report 
included thirteen specific recommendations and was released in 
1986 with much public fanfare.525 It traced well-documented re-
ports of police abuse from the Department of Justice and U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission back to the 1960s, but pointed to the 
current state of affairs as reaching the violence of the “Rizzo 
years”—a time marked with complete impunity.526 Some of the 
recommendations were adopted over time, following sustained 
pressure.527  
 
 520. See generally Emma Eisenberg, Three Decades After Philly Dropped a 
Bomb on Its Home, MOVE Org Survives, VICE NEWS (May 19, 2017), https:// 
www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbqkb4/three-decades-after-philly-dropped 
-a-bomb-on-its-home-move-org-survives [https://perma.cc/P4T7-JCQW]; Time-




 521. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 332. 
 522. Id. 
 523. Id. 
 524. Id. at 333; see also Christopher Hepp, Coalition Submits Reforms to Re-
duce Police Misconduct, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 1986, at B6. 
 525. KAIRYS, supra note 502, at 333–34. 
 526. Id.; see also id. at 140–42. 
 527. See Jeff Gammage, Hearings Begin on Police Review Panel, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Dec. 16, 1992, at B3 (discussing city council hearings on the establish-
ment of a Police Advisory Board to independently investigate police miscon-
duct); Christopher Hepp, Coalition Says Police Report Lenient on Misconduct, 
Hiring, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 1987, at B1 (discussing remedies proposed 
by the coalition in response to the shortcomings of a Philadelphia Police Study 
Task Force Report); Edward Moran, Coalition: Police Brutality on the Rise, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 1986, at 4 (detailing the coalition’s activities in 
response to little reduction of police brutality cases).  
  
2342 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
The CPA disbanded by the late 1980s, yet police department 
statistics showed complaints of physical abuse by officers in-
creased by thirty-seven percent from 1989 to 1991.528 In the early 
1990s, officers in the 39th Police District in Philadelphia ar-
rested, searched, and prosecuted hundreds of persons on false 
drug charges.529 Nearly all were African-American or Latinx. A 
joint federal and city investigation into corruption and miscon-
duct in the 39th District resulted in the conviction of six officers 
and the overturning of 150 convictions.530  
In 1996, the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP and North 
Philadelphia’s Police-Barrio Relations Project filed a class action 
lawsuit as organizational plaintiffs against the PPD in NAACP 
v. City of Philadelphia.531 The ACLU of Pennsylvania, Earl W. 
Trent of the NAACP, private counsel Alan Ytvin, David Rudov-
sky (of Kairys & Rudovsky), and Professor Seth Kreimer were 
also part of the suit.532 The federal action chronicled the PPD’s 
history of racism, corruption, and abuse of civil liberties, “cou-
pled with the collapse of internal discipline.”533 It raised munic-
ipal liability claims for illegal searches and arrests under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.534 Due to enormous public 
pressure leading up to the lawsuit, the parties quickly settled; 
the district attorney’s office eventually agreed to vacate hun-
dreds of convictions and paid over six million dollars in compen-
sation.535  
 
 528. BRURIA TAL, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE IN PHILADELPHIA: THE 
FIRST 50 YEARS 8–9 (Nov. 2003), https://www.phila.gov/pac/PDF/ 
HistoryofOversight.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20190608034326/http:// 
www.phila.gov/pac/PDF/HistoryofOversight.pdf]. 
 529. See id. at 10; see also JACK R. GREENE ET AL., POLICE INTEGRITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PHILADELPHIA: PREDICTING AND ASSESSING POLICE MIS-
CONDUCT 12–13 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/207823.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5QB6-SVXE] (discussing “charges of brutality, robbery, and 
various procedural violations” committed by officers in the 39th District).  
 530. JACK R. GREENE ET AL., supra note 529, at 13. 
 531. Complaint, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
4, 1996), ECF No. 1. 
 532. Id. at 6. 
 533. Mark Fazlollah & Richard Jones, Suit to Seek U.S. Takeover of Police 
Reform, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 7, 1995, at A1. 
 534. See Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 531, at 3–4. 
 535. See Complaint at 19, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1 (follow-up case to NAACP v. City of Phila-
delphia) (noting that as a result of the settlement in NAACP v. City of Philadel-
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As part of the 1996 NAACP settlement, defendants agreed 
to appoint an Integrity and Accountability Officer (IAO) to mon-
itor compliance with the agreement.536 The parties also agreed 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would continue monitoring defendants’ com-
pliance with the agreement.537 The IAO and plaintiffs’ counsel 
received “reviews of” police incident reports (PPD Form 75-48a) 
that documented stops, frisks, and detentions by the PPD and 
the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion.538 Plaintiffs’ 
counsel reviewed the stop and arrest data and periodically sub-
mitted reports to the federal court.539 The agreement was termi-
nated in 2005, despite continued racial disparity in stops, frisks, 
and arrests.540  
B. CONTINUED RACIAL DISPARITIES IN STOP AND FRISK AND 
INFORMATION GATHERING TO JUMP THE HURDLES 
Once the settlement terminated, stop and frisk resumed 
with vigor. Responding to a 2006–07 spike in homicides in Phil-
adelphia, Black city councilman and mayoral candidate Michael 
Nutter ran on an aggressive anti-crime platform centered on in-
creasing the use of stop and frisk.541 When Mayor Nutter was 
elected in 2008, he ordered the police department to increase 
stop and frisk activity.542 Mayor Nutter’s order had an immedi-
ate and alarming impact. Kairys & Rudovsky, the law firm re-
sponsible for monitoring the settlement in NAACP, saw a large 
 
phia, “the District Attorney of Philadelphia agreed to vacate hundreds of con-
victions, and the City of Philadelphia agreed to pay compensation to those 
wrongfully accused in a total amount of over $6 million”). 
 536. Settlement & Monitoring Agreement & Stipulations of the Parties at 4–
5, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1996), ECF No. 
2 (“[The City] will create a new position of Integrity and Accountability Officer 
to be responsible for assessing, auditing, and/or reviewing Departmental poli-
cies . . . .”). 
 537. Id. at 2. 
 538. See id. 
 539. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ First Monitoring Report: Complaints Against Police, 
NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1997), ECF No. 
7. 
 540. See Order, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. July 
21, 2005), ECF No. 53 (ordering the parties shall file their views on “whether 
the monitoring agreement should continue” by Sept. 30, 2005, with no more en-
tries following). 
 541. Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, Partner, Kairys, Rudovsky, 
Messing & Feinberg (Aug. 17, 2018). 
 542. Id. 
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increase in the raw numbers of stops and frisks, and began re-
ceiving calls from Black and Latinx residents.543 Several individ-
ual actions were filed.544 During discovery for these individual 
cases, officers admitted to being told to “stop Black kids hanging 
around corners,” apparently without needing any suspicion of 
criminal conduct.545 Several media stories exposed the extent of 
the problem, and local organizers viewed ongoing litigation as 
useful to broader reform efforts.546 
When a statistical analysis of the monitoring data showed 
that the increase in stops surpassed police stops in New York on 
a per capita basis, the same individuals and organizations that 
were involved with the NAACP case—the ACLU of Pennsylva-
nia, with Kairys & Rudovsky, and University of Pennsylvania 
School of Law Professor Seth Friedman—drafted a class action 
complaint on behalf of Karys Bailey, seeking injunctive relief.547 
In early 2011, they shared the drafted complaint with the law 
department of the City of Philadelphia, and after the department 
confirmed the allegations, the City was ready to discuss terms of 
settlement.548 Following discussions between the parties, on No-
vember 4, 2010, the class action suit Bailey v. City of Philadel-
phia was filed against the City of Philadelphia by a group of 
eight African American and Latinx individuals, requesting in-
junctive and compensatory relief.549 
The Bailey plaintiffs alleged that PPD implemented a policy 
and practice of unconstitutional stops, frisks, searches, deten-
tions, and uses of unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.550 They additionally alleged that 
the PPD conducted stops on the basis of race and/or national 
origin—primarily upon Black and Latino men—and that the 
PPD and its commissioner, Charles Ramsey, acted with deliber-
ate indifference in failing to address the attendant harms.551 For 
the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought to cer-
tify a class of all of the people in Philadelphia who had been or 
would in the future be “subjected to defendants’ policy, practice 
 
 543. Id. 
 544. Id. 
 545. Id. 
 546. See supra Part II.D.  
 547. Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, supra note 541. 
 548. Id.  
 549. Complaint, ECF. No. 1, supra note 535. 
 550. Id. at 2. 
 551. Id.  
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and/or custom of stopping, seizing, frisking, searching and de-
taining persons in the absence of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, or on the basis of race and/or national origin, in viola-
tion of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”552  
With regard to its Monell claims, the complaint directly re-
lated to the prior NAACP litigation. It included specific allega-
tions of racial disparities in stops and arrests, increased use of 
force and abuse complaints, and evidence of failure to discipline 
and monitor PPD officer activity.553 The allegations were based 
on the plaintiffs’ personal experiences with the PPD, hard data 
acquired following the litigation in NAACP v. City of Philadel-
phia,554 and internal data collected by the PPD for the years 2005 
through 2009.555 The data showed that in 2005 the PPD stopped 
approximately 102,000 persons.556 Only four years later, that 
number increased by more than 148% to 253,000. Of the 253,333 
stops conducted in Philadelphia in 2009, 72.2% (183,000) of 
those stops were conducted on African Americans, despite the 
fact that African Americans make up only 44% of the city’s pop-
ulation.557 In a city of 1.52 million,558 this corresponds to a stop 
ratio of 1 in 6. By comparison, in the same year in New York 
 
 552. Id. at 5.  
 553. Id. at 19–21. 
 554. No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  
 555. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF No. 16. In 
1996, in the matter of NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-6045 (E.D. Pa. 
1996), the parties had entered a settlement agreement that compelled a man-
datory review of PPD policies to ensure that the PPD was compliant according 
to the demands of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Agreement 
required appointment of an “Integrity and Accountability Officer” (IAO) who 
would monitor the City’s compliance. Settlement & Monitoring Agreement & 
Stipulations of the Parties, supra note 536, at 4–5. The IAO released its “report 
on the Philadelphia Police Department’s disciplinary system,” finding that the 
disciplinary system was “fundamentally ineffective, inadequate, and unpredict-
able.” ELLEN GREEN-CEISLER, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT INTEGRITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE: DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM (2003), https://www 
.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0002-0010.pdf [https://perma.cc/F76P 
-XU44]. 
 556. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 19–21. 
 557. Id.  
 558. Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www 
.census.gov/quickfacts/philadelphiacountypennsylvania [https://perma.cc/ 
6HLG-9MMG] (reporting the population of Philadelphia based on the 2010 Cen-
sus). 
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City, police made 575,000 stops in a city of 8.2 million—a ratio 
of 1 in 14.559  
The complaint also cited district court decisions denying de-
fendants’ motions for summary judgment on Monell municipal 
liability claims to demonstrate that the City was on notice of a 
potential practice or custom of illegal stops and frisks.560  
The broader Philadelphia police-reform community 
mounted pressure, which led to additional information that un-
intentionally assisted the litigants. Institutional reports and in-
vestigations also evidenced the PPD’s failure to address abuses. 
Following community pressure from advocates, in December 
2003 the IAO issued a report on the PPD’s disciplinary System, 
which concluded that the “disciplinary system in the Philadel-
phia Police Department remains fundamentally ineffective, in-
adequate, and unpredictable.”561 The Mayor’s Task Force had 
also issued a report the previous year.562 Both reports cited seri-
ous training, discipline, and monitoring problems.563 From 2001 
to 2010, the number of physical abuse complaints had dou-
bled.564  
A police practices expert’s review of 1000 Internal Affairs 
Division (IAD) investigations further confirmed the inadequa-
cies of the police department’s disciplinary process. According to 
Dr. Paul McCauley, a professor of criminology at Indiana Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, deficiencies the IAD had reported in 
2003 continued.565 He determined that the PPD’s internal inves-
tigation process had fallen below accepted practices and was “ar-
bitrary and inconsistent”; progressive discipline was not imple-
mented, meaning repeat violators were not penalized in 
 
 559. See Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 12, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk 
.html [https://perma.cc/VSB9-8BAZ]; New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [https:// 
perma.cc/PZY3-S4FP] (reporting the population of New York City based on the 
2010 Census). 
 560. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 23 (citing Tindley v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 09-CV-0169 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Lyons v. City of Philadelphia, 
No. 06-CV-5195, 2007 WL 3018945, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2007); Henderson v. 
City of Philadelphia, No. 06-CV-532 (E.D. Pa. 2006)). 
 561. GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 555. 
 562. JOANNE EPPS ET AL., MAYOR’S TASK FORCE ON POLICE DISCIPLINE: RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2001). 
 563. Id.; GREEN-CEISLER, supra note 555.  
 564. Complaint, ECF No. 1, supra note 535, at 22. 
 565. Id. at 23. 
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proportion to the number of violations; IAD investigators were 
inadequately trained and supervised when conducting investi-
gations; a “Code of Silence” prevailed; and IAD lacked an effec-
tive early warning system.566 
In a remarkably short timeline, on June 21, 2011, Judge 
Stewart Dalzell entered three orders, effectively moving the case 
to a remedial phase. That same date, Judge Dalzell approved the 
parties’ Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree (Settlement 
Agreement).567 Furthermore, the court granted class certifica- 
tion568 and appointed JoAnne A. Epps, Dean of Temple School of 
Law, to serve as the court monitor.569 The monitor was granted 
the authority to make recommendations to the court and the par-
ties concerning measures necessary to ensure compliance with 
the court’s order.570 Although the City of Philadelphia denied 
any practice of unconstitutional searches and seizures, the city 
agreed to establish “appropriate measures that should be imple-
mented as a matter of City policy and practice to ensure that 
stops and frisks by the PPD are conducted consistent with con-
stitutional mandates.”571  
The case is an example of how a city may make a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine if it would be politically and financially 
costly to go to trial; the City of Philadelphia chose not to dispute 
the high numbers of stops and frisks since Mayor Nutter came 
into office.572 Neither the mayor nor the police chief wanted the 
negative press and community pressure that occurred in New 
York.573 They agreed to a settlement to avoid litigation and head-
lines.  
The Settlement Agreement included numerous terms, 
which I provide in detail to demonstrate the type of information 
 
 566. Id. at 22–23.  
 567. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555. Neither the parties nor the court discussed the plain-
tiff ’s standing to seek injunctive relief under Lyons, Monell liability, or qualified 
immunity in the pretrial briefings.  
 568. Order Approving Consent Decree and Granting Class Certification, 
Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF 
No. 14. 
 569. Order Appointing Monitor, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-
05952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), ECF No. 15. 
 570. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555, at 5.  
 571. Id. at 2. 
 572. See supra Part II.D. 
 573. See supra Part II. 
  
2348 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
police may collect, or be required to collect, for oversight of reme-
diating racial profiling. First, defendants agreed to provide 
plaintiffs with data and other information as remedial discov-
ery.574 This included, for the class period: activity forms (75-48a 
Forms) for two week periods; training materials governing stop 
and frisk practices, including codes for the 75-48a Form; audits, 
reports, and internal activity data analysis prepared by and for 
the PPD; PPD Compstat and research and planning numbers re-
garding arrests, reported crime, seizures of contraband (guns 
and/or drugs) pursuant to stops and frisks; and hard data related 
to PPD deployment.575 Second, the parties agreed to discuss fur-
ther disclosures necessary to monitor stop and frisk practices.576 
Third, defendants agreed to begin entering all 75-48a Forms into 
an electronic database with digitized information sufficient to 
analyze the legality of stops and frisks.577 Fourth, the Settlement 
Agreement allowed plaintiffs to review current and propose ad-
ditional training, supervision, and disciplinary policies to deter-
mine necessary changes to ensure constitutional stops and 
frisks.578  
The court order also included Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment declaratory relief.579 With respect to the Fourth 
Amendment, the court order declared that stops and frisks  
shall not be permissible, without limitation, where the officer has only 
anonymous information of criminal conduct, or because the person is 
only “loitering” or engaged in “furtive movements,” or is acting “suspi-
ciously,” or for the purpose of “investigation of person,” or on the basis 
of non-articulated “flash information,” or only because the person is in 
a “high crime” or “high drug” area. These restrictions are not exclusive 
and the parties agree that stops and frisks shall not be made without 
the requisite reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and 
Pennsylvania Constitution.580  
On the Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court order declared 
that defendant 
 
 574. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555, at 3. 
 575. Id. 
 576. Id. at 4. 
 577. Id. at 3. 
 578. Id. at 4. In addition, seven of the named plaintiffs in the case were each 
paid $115,000 as part of the agreement. Larry Miller, Nutter Enacts ‘Stop and 
Frisk’ Reforms, PHILA. TRIB., June 24, 2011, at 2B. 
 579. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555, at 6. 
 580. Id. at 4. 
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agrees to implement policies and practices to ensure that stops and 
frisks are not conducted on the basis of the race or ethnic origin of the 
suspect, except where the law permits race or ethnic origin to be con-
sidered in determining whether a person shall be stopped or frisked 
(e.g., where a suspect has been described by his race).581  
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is important to note 
executive orders issued in direct response to the Bailey settle-
ment. These executive orders represented the triangulation of 
three factors: new reformist Philadelphia Mayor James Kinney’s 
platform to change policing; experimentation with civilian over-
sight supported by the DOJ; and the influence of statistical anal-
ysis of numerical data. The executive orders updated the proce-
dures for citizen complaints against police officers and 
established new procedures to track and audit arrestees held in 
temporary investigative detention.  
Multiple orders were signed.582 The first order established a 
searchable electronic database of pedestrian stops.583 This data-
base would support increased monitoring and audits of investi-
gative detentions, frisks, and searches.584 The city also commit-
ted to public reporting for the annual internal audits.585 The 
second order addressed internal processing of alleged police mis-
conduct, including the investigation, review, and disposition of 
complaints.586 Mayor Kenney reestablished a civilian oversight 
board through a third executive order.587 The civilian oversight 
board continues to review the implementation of recommenda-
tions provided by the Final Report of the President’s Task Force 
 
 581. Id. Additional provisions governed monitoring and compliance and the 
creation of audits and periodic reviews. Id. at 5–7. 
 582. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 5-17, Processing of Civilian Complaints Alleg-
ing Police Misconduct (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/ 
Executive%20Orders/eo6517.pdf [https://perma.cc/48Z9-DKHJ]; Exec. Order 
No. 2-17, Police Advisory Commission (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.phila.gov/ 
ExecutiveOrders/Executive%20Orders/eo3217%20Police%20Advisory%20 
Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC46-Z3TF]; Exec. Order No. 6-11, Establish-
ing a Procedure to Track and Audit Investigative Detentions Conducted by Po-
lice Officers (June 21, 2011), https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/ 
Executive%20Orders/2011_EO06-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN9H-EER7].  
 583. Exec. Order No. 6-11, supra note 582. 
 584. Id. 
 585. Id. at 2. 
 586. Exec. Order No. 5-17, supra note 582; Miller, supra note 578. 
 587. Exec. Order No. 2-17, supra note 582; Patricia Madej, Kenney Reestab-
lishes Police Advisory Commission, Emphasizes Goal to Strengthen Community 
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on 21st Century Policing, and retained its ability to subpoena 
and investigate within a police district.588 The Commission also 
releases an annual report on its accomplishments and recom-
mendations from the preceding year.589  
The Bailey resolution, following nothing more than the filing 
of a complaint and discussions with the city, contrasts sharply 
with Ortega-Melendres and Floyd, which involved years of con-
tested, costly discovery and federal court trials. There are some 
benefits to this strategy—the costs shifted to the defendants im-
mediately and all parties moved to begin fixing the problem, ra-
ther than contesting whether the police department engaged in 
an unconstitutional practice.590 In addition, Philadelphia offi-
cials avoided the negative political fallout faced by Sheriff Arpaio 
and former Mayor Bloomberg. The Chief of PPD, Charles Ram-
sey, and Mayor Nutter were rewarded nationally—Ramsey be-
came chair of President Obama’s 21st Century Policing Task 
Force,591 and Nutter was appointed to several prestigious chair 
positions with political prospects in the Democratic party.592  
 
 588. Exec. Order No. 2-17, supra note 582. 
 589. Id.  
 590. See Gilles, supra note 206, at 858–67 (describing the “informational” 
and “fault-fixing” functions of constitutional damages actions); Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1681 (2003) (describing 
how negative publicity regarding lawsuits “can trigger embarrassing political 
inquiry and even firings, resignations, or election losses”). However, another 
consequence of avoiding contested adversarial litigation may be decreased op-
portunity for community engagement or community organizers role in the liti-
gation or remedial process. Instead, Charles Ramsey worked with the DOJ 
Community Oriented Police Services to start an advisory board that had no 
teeth and eventually stopped meeting. See Sean Carlin, Mayor Michael Nutter 
Implements Oversight Committee on Police-Involved Shootings, NBC PHILA. 
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/philadelphia 
-police-deadly-force-nutter/132448/ [https://perma.cc/8XPP-ZTLY]; Christopher 
Norris, Philadelphia Police Oversight Board in Transition Amidst Dormancy, 
GOOD MEN PROJECT (Aug. 16, 2016), https://goodmenproject.com/good-feed 
-blog/philadelphia-police-oversight-board-in-transition-amidst-dormancy 
-cnorris/ [https://perma.cc/2ZKG-Y3SU] (noting members of the board had ap-
parently become disillusioned by the process and opted to withdraw participa-
tion). 
 591. David Gambacorta, Obama Taps Ramsey for Policing Task Force, 
MORNING CALL (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc 
-philly-obama-ramsey-ferguson-20141202-story.html [https://perma.cc/M3BF 
-XF53]. 
 592. Emily Babay, Could Former Philly Mayor Michael Nutter Be the Busiest 
Part Timer in America?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www 
.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/real-time/All-of-former-Philadelphia-Mayor-Michael 
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In summary, Parts II, III, and IV present three examples of 
legal mobilization with class action challenges against municipal 
law enforcement departments. The in-depth consideration of lit-
igation strategy shows how procedural hurdles act to shape the 
litigation process, the choices litigators make, and ultimately af-
fect the outcome of lower court opinions. This Article does not 
provide a playbook for plaintiffs’ success in police structural re-
form litigation, nor does it provide a naïvely optimistic view of 
obtaining merits review. Though the litigants here took doctrine 
seriously and satisfied the standards for structural reform in-
junctions, nothing is meant to suggest an overly formalistic ap-
proach. Many factors in addition to law determine the outcome 
of such cases. Moreover, the case examples demonstrate how Ly-
ons, Monell, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. were overcome through 
innovative information gathering strategies, as opposed to offer-
ing what some may consider bolder suggestions to expand the  
the doctrine of standing to obtain injunctions against police de-
partments or new theories to prove municipal-level culpability 
for harms to class members. Despite the likelihood that the Su-
preme Court may view the evidence provided to the district 
courts in Part II, III, and IV differently, these litigants won and, 
as with a vast number of cases at the district court level, avoided 
appellate review. Even if only a few cases manage to succeed and 
avoid the Court’s review, they have assisted thousands to avoid 
racial profiling, the accompanying attacks on human dignity, 
and the potential for further harm through use of force.  
 
-Nutters-new-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/8YWG-AL34] (noting former Mayor 
Nutter’s numerous prestigious appointments and speculating political ambi-
tion); Brooke DiGia, Former Phila. Mayor Michael Nutter Is Joining the School 
of Social Policy and Practice, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Feb. 16, 2017), https:// 
www.thedp.com/article/2017/02/michael-nutter-returning-to-penn [https:// 
perma.cc/539C-P8V5]. Most recently, the former mayor was tapped as campaign 
chairman of Bloomberg’s campaign for the presidential nomination in 2020. Al-
icia V. Lozano, Former Philly Mayor Nutter Joins Bloomberg Campaign, NBC 
PHILA. (Dec. 20, 2019) https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/former 
-philly-mayor-nutter-joins-bloomberg-campaign/2264143/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TYS2-XDXF]; Julia Terruso, Michael Bloomberg Just Landed His First Pa. En-
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V.  OVERCOMING DOCTRINAL HURDLES IN POLICE 
STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION   
Even as one must acknowledge the limits of case studies as 
exemplars, the cases examined in Parts II, III, and IV reveal 
common themes discussed in this Part, and opportunities for fur-
ther study. The case studies show that certain types of claims—
those challenging racial-profiling practices, such as unlawful use 
of stops and frisks—have been able to match the high eviden-
tiary standards required to establish standing, municipal liabil-
ity, and class certification. In this Part, I use the case studies to 
examine: What evidence allowed legal advocates to overcome 
pre-trial barriers and achieve class-wide injunctive relief against 
police departments’ racial profiling practices? How did the cate-
gories of evidence used to challenge unconstitutional and racially 
discriminatory stop practices—the claim in all three case stud-
ies—operate to satisfy the Supreme Court doctrines? And I ana-
lyze the extent to which racial profiling structural reform litiga-
tion such as Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey is replicable, 
as well as how the examples affirm what is difficult with struc-
tural reform litigation as a tool for correcting unconstitutional 
police-department practices.  
Section A begins by layering the doctrinal barriers discussed 
in Part I onto the evidence presented by the parties in the three 
case studies. Synthesizing the evidence used in each case shows 
a potential evidentiary convergence, where the same infor-
mation and data overcomes multiple doctrinal barriers. Section 
B examines how certain types of evidence helped plaintiffs over-
come the standing, municipal liability, and class certification 
barriers: namely, statistical evidence, statements by decision-
makers, and proof of a history of failure to correct a known un-
constitutional practice. Section C identifies mechanisms outside 
the traditional discovery process to obtain evidence in police 
structural reform litigation: relationships with advocates and 
grassroots organizers; publicity that leads to exposure of more 
information; and court orders requiring data tracking and dis-
closures following prior litigation. It mentions other methods of 
gathering hard data besides court orders.  
A. JUMPING HURDLES IN FLOYD, ORTEGA-MELENDRES, AND 
BAILEY  
This Section synthesizes the arguments and types of evi-
dence plaintiffs used to overcome standing, municipal liability, 
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and class certification hurdles in the case examples. The synthe-
sis shows a potential doctrinal and evidentiary convergence—an 
overlap in the evidence needed to overcome each doctrine and an 
overlap in some aspects of the doctrinal requirements, the com-
mon thread being strong numerical data. The convergence claim 
is a soft one because it requires further consideration beyond the 
cases in this Article in order to understand its operation among 
the trial courts. 
1. Standing: Lyons 
As discussed in Section I.A, Lyons established three barriers 
to police structural reform litigation: the repeated harm, specu-
lative harm, and innocence requirements.593 Moreover, Lyons 
specifically distinguished claims for damages and injunctive re-
lief against unlawful police policy or practice claims.  
In Floyd, plaintiffs met the high repeated harm requirement 
in part by showing the sheer volume of potentially unlawful 
stops by the NYPD, using the NYPD’s own documentation.594 In 
addition, the named plaintiffs and trial witnesses had been sub-
jected to multiple unlawful stops, including during the pendency 
of the litigation, concretizing the high likelihood of future in-
jury.595 Judge Scheindlin compared the NYPD’s thousands of fa-
cially unjustified stops and frisks to the approximately ten 
deaths following the LAPD’s chokehold policy cited by the Su-
preme Court’s majority in Lyons.596 Given the much greater vol-
ume of unjustified actions and repeated unlawful stops by class 
member witnesses at trial, she found plaintiffs would be unable 
to avoid a future injury while simply engaging in their everyday 
life activities, meeting the Lyons burden.597  
Maricopa County Sherriff ’s Office (MCSO) utilized crime 
suppression sweeps for the purpose of finding Latino “illegals” to 
target for deportation.598 Although the named plaintiffs were not 
 
 593. See supra Part I.A. 
 594. Floyd IV, 283 F.R.D. 153, 169–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 595. Id. 
 596. Id. 
 597. Id. 
 598. The defendants appealed the court’s order instituting a preliminary in-
junction against detaining persons based only on a suspicion that they are pre-
sent in the U.S. without authorization in the absence of other facts. See Ortega-
Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 986 (D. Ariz. 2011). The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the injunction and reiterated that unauthorized presence in the United 
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themselves stopped multiple times, the sheriff ’s own proclama-
tions and his deputies’ admissions revealed that they were tar-
geting Latino areas for law enforcement operations. The MCSO’s 
stated policy and practice, as revealed by testimony presented in 
depositions and trial, was to detain persons believed to be unau-
thorized even when they could not be arrested for state criminal 
charges.599  
The speculative harm barrier requires plaintiffs to establish 
a likelihood of immediate injury. In Floyd and Ortega-Melendres, 
this requirement was overcome through evidence of repeated 
harms. In Floyd, the evidence was similar to that used to over-
come the repeated harm requirement, such as multiple unlawful 
stops of named plaintiffs. The Maricopa sheriff ’s proclamations 
and his deputies’ admissions that they target Latinos for arrest 
demonstrated a “real threat” of repeated and immediate injury. 
Because the department explicitly relied on race rather than rea-
sonable suspicion to engage in Terry stops, and the policies and 
practices were pervasive, ongoing, and repetitive, the district 
courts determined plaintiffs had overcome the speculative harm 
requirement.600  
The innocence obstacle was also overcome in the case stud-
ies. The Lyons majority found Mr. Lyons’s harm speculative be-
cause events leading to the police officer’s application of an ille-
gal chokehold required Mr. Lyons to break the law—namely, a 
burned-out tail light and provocation of the police that precipi-
tated the injurious chokehold.601 By contrast, for the Floyd and 
Bailey plaintiffs, unlawful Terry stops occurred without any al-
leged misconduct on the plaintiffs’ parts.602  
The district courts treated the investigatory practices at is-
sue—car or pedestrian stops, frisks, or detentions—differently 
 
States is not a crime. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
 599. Ortega-Melendres V, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 892 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 600. Id. at 890–91 (citing LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 (9th Cir. 
1985) (explanatory parenthetical in original) (“holding that plaintiffs ‘do not 
have to induce a police encounter before the possibility of injury can occur’ be-
cause stops are the result of an ‘unconstitutional pattern of conduct’”) and 
Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (explanatory 
parenthetical in original) (“stating that injunctive relief is appropriate when 
plaintiffs show that police misconduct ‘is purposefully aimed at minorities and 
that such misconduct was condoned and tacitly authorized by department policy 
makers’”)). 
 601. See supra Part I.A. 
 602. See supra Parts II.B & IV.B. 
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from the chokehold policy challenged in Lyons because they in-
volved police interactions with innocent plaintiffs that often 
went without arrest or even documentation.603 Mr. Floyd and his 
fellow plaintiffs were stopped during “everyday activities,” such 
as going to school or work;604 and the Ortega-Melendres class 
members were targeted in such a way that merely leaving their 
homes made them subject to unconstitutional sweeps.605 Prefa-
tory language in the Bailey court orders specifically cited the 
lack of any basis for the stops conducted by Philadelphia Police 
Department officers, let alone reasonable suspicion.606 When 
there is no basis for stops, class members overcome the inno-
cence barrier.607  
As we have seen, these cases met the Lyons repeat harm, 
speculative harm, and innocence hurdles. In some respects, 
these kinds of successes are replicable, and in others multiple 
factors are at play, making the success attenuated. Showing the 
probability of repeated harm could be more likely because police 
data is increasingly available, and the innocence hurdle may be 
jumped if litigants can show police actions systematically have 
no basis or amount to an official unwritten policy. However, 
some evidence is very particular to the case, such as Sheriff Ar-
paio’s blatant admissions608 or Mayor Bloomberg’s statement 
suggesting a targeting based on race.609 Again, with social media 
and the electronic discovery requirements, such statements are 
likely more available than in prior decades.610 
This Article has shown that plaintiffs may succeed in struc-
tural litigation over certain unconstitutional police practices. 
However, in use of force matters, there may be challenges to 
reaching substantive review from the Lyons hurdle. But all is 
not lost. First, use of force is viewed on a spectrum, and need not 
only include practices such as chokeholds or lethal force. Data 
 
 603. See supra Part I.A. 
 604. See supra Part II.A. 
 605. See supra Part III.A. 
 606. See supra Part IV.A. 
 607. I note that while I observe these distinctions in the court opinions, I do 
not align myself with the factual account of the majority in Lyons. The alleged 
provocation is in doubt based on the complete factual record and the district 
court decision. Nor do I agree with the premise that innocence should be re-
quired for a court to prevent harm against individuals. 
 608. See supra Part III.B. 
 609. See supra Part II.B. 
 610. See discussion infra Part V.B.2 and note 672. 
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and evidence that provide context to police stops is more readily 
available. For example, in New York City, the form officers use 
to document stops and frisks includes boxes for force (e.g., draw-
ing a gun or putting a suspect against a wall).611 Second, with 
advancements in recording police interactions digitally and elec-
tronically, the data and proof necessary to overcome standing in 
contexts other than stops are more readily available than when 
Lyons was decided.612 Nonetheless, plaintiffs must address 
whether they have engaged in any activity to “provoke or resist” 
the police.613 Police officers’ control over whether an arrestee is 
labeled as “resisting” raises concerns for the replicability of the 
police racial profiling wins. 
2. Municipal Liability: Monell 
Monell and its progeny established that to overcome the mu-
nicipal liability hurdle, plaintiffs must demonstrate a wide-
spread practice or deliberate indifference to changing it, as well 
as factual parallel between the examples used to establish an 
unlawful policy, practice, or custom. Plaintiffs in Floyd and Or-
tega-Melendres succeeded in establishing municipal liability for 
police practices in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
To overcome the widespread practices and factual parallel 
requirements, these cases relied on evidence of discriminatory 
statements, expert analysis of hard data, and, in Floyd and Bai-
ley, failure to reform unconstitutional practices following a set-
tlement in a nearly identical matter. In Floyd, plaintiffs pre-
sented recordings obtained by two whistleblower officers 
demonstrating that the “brass” (command staff executives) were 
pressuring mid-level supervisors to obtain more stops and sum-
mons.614 Other evidence showed the command staff as central-
ized and coordinated. The judge also heard unrefuted testimony 
that Mayor Bloomberg viewed stop and frisk as a tactic focused 
on Black and Latino youth.615 Plaintiffs satisfied the widespread 
practice requirement by showing strong statistical evidence that 
race was the best predictor of stops in any precinct, and that the 
racial disparity of stops crossed all five boroughs.616 In Ortega- 
 
 611. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 612. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 613. See supra Part I.A. 
 614. See supra Part II. 
 615. See supra Part II.  
 616. See supra Part II. 
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Melendres, the statements and documents authorized or pub-
lished by Sheriff Arpaio, down the chain of command, directing 
that Maricopa County Sherriff ’s officers to stop any car with His-
panic-looking individuals, certainly assisted the plaintiffs in 
proving the stop practices were implemented “with the force of 
law.”617 Dr. Taylor’s expert statistical report also demonstrated 
the practice of stopping passengers, and the high rate of stops in 
predominately Hispanic areas.  
The district courts in Parts II, III, and IV found that the 
structural reform litigation satisfied Monell and its progeny, and 
granted structural reform injunctions to reform stop, frisk and 
detention practices. In two cases, Floyd and Bailey, the prior sys-
temic litigation failed; and in all three examples, internal inves-
tigations, external media exposure, and other civil rights inves-
tigations put police departments on notice for inadequate 
training, supervision, and/or oversight. The court in Floyd spe-
cifically looked to when defendants were given notice (at least as 
far back as the Attorney General’s 1999 report), lack of imple-
mentation of corrective measures following the Daniels settle-
ment, and the lengthy history of poor relationships between 
Black and Latinx communities and the NYPD. In the Ortega-
Melendres case study, although the court had no prior litigation 
to rely upon, the strength of officer and supervisor statements, 
coupled with Dr. Taylor’s statistical analysis, proved enough to 
demonstrate a practice of stopping and arresting Latinx-appear-
ing drivers and passengers. The Bailey complaint featured the 
Philadelphia Police Department’s history of failed attempts at 
reform, dating back to the 1990s. Although a product of settle-
ment negotiations, and not trial evidence, the final court orders 
in Bailey reference the history and long-term challenge to stem 
racial disparity within the stop and frisk practices of the Phila-
delphia Police Department. 
3. Class Certification: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
In the three case studies, plaintiffs overcame the common-
ality hurdle along with what I have characterized as the early 
merits inquiry obstacle. Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) 
was ultimately granted in all three case studies, and the major-
ity of concerns raised in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., relevant to Rule 
23(b)(3), are inapplicable in these examples. 
 
 617. See supra Part III. 
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As some commentators have noted, following Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., district and circuit courts have distinguished Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. in two general contexts: (a) cases where super-
visors exercise their discretion pursuant to an explicit nation-
wide company policy and (b) cases where a plaintiff class chal-
lenges upper management’s discretionary decision-making as 
discriminatory.618 The racial profiling actions in this Article fall 
under the first: each officer and mid-level supervisor exercised 
some discretion, at the behest of the chief decision maker in each 
department—Commissioner Kelly in New York, Sheriff Arpaio 
in Maricopa County, and Chief Ramsey in Philadelphia—along 
with other high level department decision-makers. 
The case studies affirm the general view that a court need 
not adjudicate each individual class member’s claim prior to cer-
tification under Rule 23(b)(2) where plaintiffs seek injunctive re-
lief. Even before Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., defendants argued (b)(2) 
class definitions were overly broad or that class members are un-
ascertainable.619 For example, the City of New York believed 
“mini-trial” determinations were required under Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.620 As the district courts in this Article affirmed, nei-
ther precedent nor the text or history of Rule 23 requires adjudi-
cation of hundreds of thousands of individual stops in a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action.621 Judge Sheindlin did not take up the de-
fendants’ request to decide whether each class member’s stop 
was unconstitutional prior to certifying the Rule 23(b)(2) class 
action.622 
 
 618. See Malveaux, supra note 127, at 371–75. Malveaux delineates these 
two categories of cases persuasively. She uses McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) as a prototype for the 
first category and Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 114, 119 (4th 
Cir. 2013) as demonstrative of the second. In McReynolds, although those who 
made the adverse discretionary decisions were local, low-level managers, their 
actions were tightly connected to centralized, nationwide policies created at the 
corporate level. 672 F.3d at 489–91. In Scott, those who made the adverse dis-
cretionary decisions were high-level managers, who exercised such centralized 
power and control that their actions were equivalent to corporate policy. 733 
F.3d at 114, 119. 
 619. See supra Part I.A. (discussion of class certification in Daniels); cf. Car-
roll, supra note 132, at 893. 
 620. See Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2007). 
 621. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and 
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013). 
 622. See Marcus, supra note 132, at 830–32; cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 
S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
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Nonetheless, the class certification process, a once routine 
and standard motion practice early in the life of litigation,623 now 
creates delays as federal district courts contend with defendants’ 
arguments regarding the applicability of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
to class certification decisions. The Ortega-Melendres plaintiffs 
requested certification twice before it was granted, and the court 
required a developed factual record to decide whether the case 
should proceed as a class action. Given the Court’s view that “sig-
nificant proof” of commonality is necessary to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(2), statistical expert analysis became central to class certi-
fication in Floyd and Ortega-Melendres.624 The Bailey class cer-
tification order was established without a court review of evi-
dence, yet the parties relied on statistical reports from the 
Mayor’s Task Force, as well as Dr. McCauley’s analysis of disci-
plinary reports in their negotiations.625  
In some ways, the early merits barrier raises challenges for 
replicability, but for some types of litigation, advancement in 
data collection and transparency may assist future litigants. 
With such a merits inquiry occurring earlier, courts may increas-
ingly need to resolve Daubert disputes in conjunction with class 
certification, even in the (b)(2) context.626 Relatedly, moving 
class certification to a later stage in the litigation can affect the 
plaintiffs’ right to discovery and the parties’ settlement postures. 
Early merits inquiry involving expensive statistical experts po-
tentially drive up litigation costs prior to trial, which in turn po-
tentially changes the opportunity for settlements.  
Another limitation for the replicability of the wins analyzed 
in this Article may arise for class actions that seek damages, 
where the necessity rule, notice and opt-out provisions, and as-
certainability will be required. Litigation for Rule 23(b)(2) class-
wide injunctions are not loaded with many of the Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. hurdles that accompany claims for Rule 23(b)(3) 
 
 623. See Marcus, supra note 132, at 785–89 (describing “old era” and “new 
era” class action features, including the regularity of granting (b)(2) class ac-
tions where plaintiffs merely put forward an injunctive claim). 
 624. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ortega-Melendres II, 
598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).  
 625. Order Approving Consent Decree and Granting Class Certification, 
ECF No. 14, supra note 568; Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky, supra 
note 541. 
 626. In dicta, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. suggested Daubert 
may be applicable at the certification stage. It “doubted” as “true” the district 
court’s determination that Daubert did not apply at the class certification stage. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011).  
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class-wide damages for an unnamed class. First, for Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions, courts have adopted a “necessity” require-
ment.627 However, the overarching treatment under Rule 23(b) 
allowed defendants in the case examples to make an argument 
that (b)(2) class certification is unnecessary because injunctive 
relief against state officials “is the archetype of [a case] where 
class designation is largely a formality.”628 A successful necessity 
argument focuses the litigation and remedy on individuals and 
potentially evades structural reform.629 Second, Rule 23(b)(3) in-
volves requirements that courts provide notice and permit indi-
vidual class members to opt out of the class action.630 Courts 
sometimes cite the unwieldy or costly nature of the opt-out re-
quirement of (b)(3) litigation as a basis to deny class certifica-
tion.631 However, Rule 23(b)(2) requires no notice or opt-out pro-
vision. Finally, in many circuits, an implicit requirement of an 
“ascertainable class” is read into Rule 23.632 Ascertainability of-
fers an administratively feasible way for the court to determine 
class membership when individuals are entitled to a monetary 
payout,633 and it is typically reserved for class actions in the Rule 
23(b)(3) context.634 While the courts involved with the case stud-
ies presented in Parts II, III, and IV determined these (b)(3) 
rules to be inapplicable to the (b)(2) cases, the rules are im-
portant to understand if attempting to replicate strategies dis-
cussed in this Article for class-wide damages actions against po-
lice departments.  
 
 627. See Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 
1978). But see Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1355 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 628. Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973).  
 629. The necessity principal nullifies the class action tool where a defendant 
is willing to stipulate that an order applied to an individual plaintiff will apply 
writ-large. See, e.g., id. 
 630. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 363 (“In the context of a class 
action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice 
and opt-out violates due process.”). 
 631. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 632. See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 633. See generally JD Moore, The Heightened Standard of Ascertainability: 
An Unnecessary Hurdle to Class Action Certification, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 247 
(2017) (explaining the purpose of the “heightened” certification standard 
adopted by five circuits). 
 634. Id.  
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4. The Doctrinal and Evidentiary Interaction Between 
Hurdles  
The information gathered and evidence presented in police 
structural reform litigation work together to achieve a type of 
convergence, utilizing overlapping—and sometimes identical—
evidentiary proof to overcome the doctrinal hurdles.635 Aspects 
of the doctrine overlap as well. This is significant because where 
the same set of evidence provides support to overcome multiple 
procedural obstacles, litigants can strategically balance costs 
and other choices in protracted discovery disputes. It may fur-
ther affect the claims development process where litigators de-
cide whether to allege municipal liability or seek class-wide re-
lief. The convergence described here is a preliminary and soft 
claim without the benefit of a broader review of trial court out-
comes.  
The overlap of evidence to satisfy multiple aspects of doctri-
nal hurdles is clearly evident with standing and municipal lia-
bility. The Lyons Court specified that victims of police miscon-
duct could satisfy standing if department officials “ordered or 
authorized police officers to act” in an unlawful manner.636 Evi-
dence at the individual level may not prove officially authorized 
action.637 But evidence of municipal violations against classes of 
plaintiffs should. Claims on behalf of a group, through the class 
certification tool, and challenges to municipal practices using the 
Monell doctrine, create one method of overcoming the Lyons 
 
 635. The idea of convergence builds on the work of others. See Leah Litman, 
Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1477 (2018) (discussing 
Monell doctrine in terms of convergence with qualified immunity and the lack 
of alternative remedies); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Les-
sons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011) 
(examining the influence constitutional tort doctrines have had on Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence). 
 636. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983).  
 637. An individual who seeks an injunction against a departmental practice 
may have an interest in raising structural claims on their own and without a 
class action. In this scenario, the evidence needed is not individual, but typically 
includes multiple instances of harm. Where there is no policy or practice, estab-
lishing municipal liability through a single incident has proven very difficult. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff ’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (find-
ing that an inmate died after not receiving medical care despite many attempts 
by other inmates to get him medical help).  
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standing barrier. Evidence of the official policy in Ortega-Melen-
dres and “policy or custom” in Floyd assisted litigants to satisfy 
Lyons and commonality for class certification.638  
Next, the case studies highlight that the evidence necessary 
to show municipal liability was similar, if not exactly the same, 
as that required by Rule 23(a)(3) to show commonality after Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.639 Class claims facilitate gathering evidence 
through discovery, which assists plaintiffs in overcoming the ex-
acting Lyons and Monell standards. Moreover, the evidence 
gathered for multiple parties can operate together, rather than 
on an individualized basis. When parties establish a policy, prac-
tice, or custom through Monell liability, the most difficult class 
action requirement for police litigants (commonality) is practi-
cally established. And as a class action, standing for an injunc-
tion (Lyons) is largely satisfied. As examples, in Ortega-Melen-
dres and Floyd, much of the same evidence used to support class 
certification was also used to show a widespread practice of dis-
criminatory conduct.640 Likewise, showing municipal liability 
through either the central decision-maker or the widespread 
practices theory necessarily requires evidence of a centralized 
policy. The “glue” holding together individual decisions by offic-
ers (and sergeants, lieutenants, etc.) should be satisfied when-
ever plaintiffs can muster the evidence to support the practices 
or central decision-maker theory of municipal liability. 
A similar overlap exists between standing and class certifi-
cation. In the case studies, the Lyons repeated harm require-
ment looked similar to Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity. The defendants 
asked the courts to determine how many specific instances of un-
lawful conduct are necessary to grant an individual plaintiff 
standing to pursue an injunction against a police practice.641 The 
operation of an injunctive class action mitigates this question 
because, where a class is certified, the plaintiffs have necessarily 
shown that a large enough number of individuals are likely to be 
subjected to a police practice to warrant certification. This, in 
turn, maps onto standing to avoid the Lyons repeated harm and 
speculative harm requirements. In Ortega-Melendres, the likeli-
hood of future harm warranting an injunction was proven 
 
 638. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 639. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 (2011). 
 640. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d 
1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).  
 641. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8. 
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through Dr. Taylor’s statistical analysis and by evidence of or-
ders by central decision-makers, down the chain of command, to 
target Latino drivers and passengers in Maricopa County for 
stop and possible arrest.642 In Bailey, the parties did not litigate 
the issue; however, the court issued an order granting class cer-
tification.643 
The three case studies successfully challenged stops viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to Terry or Whren, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The type 
of evidence used to overcome the innocence and repeated harm 
hurdles may be more available in stop contexts because of the 
sheer volume of these practices.644 Even the Court in Terry 
acknowledged stops can be a problem in minority communities 
where stops are deployed to harass and discriminate, rather 
than to investigate crime.645 This Article does not present a  
naïve view of how criminal courts deploy Terry and Whren to en-
trench the authority of police. It simply acknowledges that dis-
trict courts may be able and willing to act in certain, albeit lim-
ited, circumstances.  
The success of litigation against pedestrian and traffic stops 
has implications for excessive force claims. On the ground level, 
it encourages community groups to consider litigation as a tool 
for reform in particular circumstances and encourages attorneys 
to develop such claims. For example, in Campbell v. City of Chi-
cago, a use of force class action against the Chicago Police De-
partment was filed on behalf of Black Lives Matter–Chicago and 
other groups.646 This Article has not addressed the different 
questions, data, or anecdotal evidence necessary to overcome the 
doctrinal barriers in use of force claims or litigation for class-
wide damages. 
 
 642. See supra Part III. 
 643. See supra Part IV. 
 644. See infra Part V.C. 
 645. See infra Part V.C.  
 646. See Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 4467, 2018 WL 4352614, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2018). Campbell reached a settlement agreement on 
March 16, 2018. See also Memorandum of Agreement Between the Office of the 
Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago and Campbell v. City of Chi-
cago Plaintiffs and Communities United v. City of Chicago Plaintiffs, Campbell, 
No. 17 C 4467, 2018 WL 4352614, ECF No. 154-1. 
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B. EVIDENCE USED TO JUMP THE DOCTRINAL HURDLES 
This Section discusses categories of evidence used to prove 
the class-wide claims analyzed in Parts II, III, and IV: hard data 
and statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervi-
sors and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of no-
tice and failure to remedy a constitutional violation. This Part 
should not be viewed as depicting a plaintiffs’ playbook for suc-
cess, nor does it demonstrate unbridled optimism towards ob-
taining merits review with easily acquired information. Instead, 
it shows that standing, municipal liability for unwritten policies 
and practices, and class certification require rich data and evi-
dence of the underlying claims. Plaintiffs must essentially 
gather enough information through discovery (and other means) 
to prove an unconstitutional practice prior to trial—and, at 
times, prior to discovery.647 
1. Hard Data and Statistical Evidence 
Statistical evidence was critical for the plaintiffs in the case 
studies to overcome the doctrinal hurdles and, in the case of Bai-
ley, to convince an otherwise unfriendly mayor to settle and ad-
mit liability.648 This Section summarizes how the data was used 
and obtained, addresses challenges with this form of evidence, 
and briefly discusses other methods to obtain data.  
As Parts II, III, and IV suggest, statistical analysis of stops, 
frisks, or detentions were essential to proving deliberate indif-
ference.649 Judge Scheindlin and Judge Snow used data to find 
municipal liability was warranted and to determine that a cen-
tral decision-maker authorized the targeting of individuals on 
the basis of race or ethnic origin.650 Experts relied on police doc-
umentation that showed a lack of the requisite reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause in large numbers of individual police 
interactions.651 This in turn established a policy or practice of 
 
 647. The creep of the merits into justiciability and procedural rules has been 
recognized by others as a general concern. E.g., Fallon, supra note 42, at 663–
76; Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663–64 (1977) (“Decisions on questions of standing are 
concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. . . . The 
law of standing has thus become a surrogate for decisions on the merits . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
 648. See Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 649. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 650. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 651. Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 185. 
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unlawful Fourth Amendment activity in both Floyd and Ortega-
Melendres. Moreover, data was also critical to establishing the 
parties’ “failure to” theories of municipal liability that, in turn, 
were important to establishing standing for injunctive relief and 
class certification.652 Even though the data operated as more in-
direct proof of failure to train or supervise, the statistical evi-
dence of facially invalid UF-250s and numerous failed Quality 
Assurance Division audits were important evidence to demon-
strate a practice or custom of unconstitutional stops and 
frisks.653  
The hard data was available as a result of defendants’ own 
record keeping practices in the cases discussed in Parts II, III 
and IV. The data used in Floyd and Bailey was created due to 
the prior litigation filed by the same attorneys in Daniels and 
NAACP respectively.654 Plaintiffs were able to show, in both 
cases, the disparity in stops and frisks between Black and Latino 
residents and White residents increased since the prior settle-
ments. In Floyd, they were also able to show that this disparity 
existed throughout the city in question, even when statisticians 
controlled for factors such as crime rates or the volume of officers 
in particular neighborhoods.655 Even without a formal require-
ment to create and maintain race or ethnicity data, the expert in 
Ortega-Melendres used sheriff deputies’ vehicle stop reports to 
analyze hard data on the number of Latino drivers stopped in 
the county.656  
One must acknowledge the concern with replicability of le-
gal challenges relying upon statistical evidence due to the Su-
preme Court’s skeptical view of proving discrimination with  
statistics.657 And the current Court seems even more hostile.658 
 
 652. See Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 653. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 654. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 655. See supra Parts II, IV. 
 656. See supra notes 447–51 and accompanying text. 
 657. As seen in McCleskey and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court 
shows hostility towards sociological statistical evidence to prove discrimination. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279 (1987). The hostility towards data applies in other areas of civil 
rights as well. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (curtailing dis-
parate impact in Title VII litigation).  
 658. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, What Can Brown Do for 
You?: Addressing McCleskey v. Kemp as a Flawed Standard for Measuring the 
Constitutionally Significant Risk of Race Bias, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1301–
  
2366 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2257 
 
The Court’s hostility towards social science evidence may be dis-
tinguishable in this Article’s group of cases.659 The type of causal 
breakdown the Court found concerning with the statistical evi-
dence put forward in McCleskey v. Kemp, and Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., relied on proving bias.660 Neither Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, 
nor Bailey relied on stereotyping or the implicit bias of officers 
or decision-makers in the same way. A difference is that the de-
cisions of police officers and supervisors in New York, Philadel-
phia, and Maricopa County are documented, discoverable, or 
publicly available, and were reviewed systematically without re-
liance on the same inferences as in other types of cases. None-
theless, I acknowledge statistical analysis has its limits as a 
mechanism of proving police misconduct. Though the district 
courts in Parts II, III, and IV found data supported plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims, certainly other courts have found that 
data failed to support theories of unconstitutional police con-
duct.661 Further consideration is needed to make strong conclu-
sions on this front.  
Police departments may not be equipped or have the will to 
utilize their own department’s information to monitor the con-
stitutionality of officer actions.662 Floyd and Bailey demonstrate 
 
02 (2018) (comparing Brown, McCleskey, and Gill in the Supreme Court’s recent 
term). 
 659. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Sta-
tistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some 
Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018) (focusing on the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts restriction on proof of discriminatory purposes in equal 
protection claims); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Rea-
soned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1979). 
 660. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283–91 (reviewing the extensive data anal-
ysis showing racial disparities in prosecutors pursuing the death penalty). 
 661. See Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of 
Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 205–11 (2017) (collecting examples where 
courts found data insufficient to overcome procedural or evidentiary hurdles, 
but noting that the district courts suggested better data may change the out-
come of the cases); cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the 
Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate 
Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) (analyzing the impact 
internal police collection data for predictive policing has on communities of 
color). 
 662. See Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s 
Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014) (pointing to cultural and po-
litical pressure to show a drop in crime rates and led to major urban areas re-
moving rape complaints from crime databases). Moreover, journalists and crim-
inal law scholars have exposed police departments “cooking the books” to show 
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mere availability of raw data does little to promote internal 
change or executive regulation without more incentives or pres-
sure. New York and Philadelphia agreed to maintain extensive 
numerical information on stops and frisks, but never used the 
hard data to prevent or correct constitutional harms or racial 
disparities until public pressure mounted.663 The RAND corpo-
ration had provided the NYPD with an analysis of its highest 
stoppers, and other ways to improve internal controls, but the 
department did very little to implement its recommendations.664 
The Fagan Report identified numerous incomplete stop and frisk 
forms, and the Maricopa County Sheriff ’s Office failed to even 
maintain records of the race or ethnicity of those subject to driver 
checkpoints.665 
Overcoming doctrinal barriers to police structural reform 
litigation may ultimately rest on the availability and type of sys-
tem-wide data. Section C includes a preliminary discussion of 
recent improvements in police data collection and transparency 
that can support systemic pattern and practice claims. 
2. Discriminatory Statements  
As part of their anecdotal evidence, the plaintiffs in Ortega-
Melendres—and Floyd, to a lesser extent—relied on direct state-
ments from supervisors, up the chain of command, to prove the 
department-wide practices were motivated by race and/or na-
tional origin.666 The admission in Ortega-Melendres, that officers 
were instructed to stop and arrest Latino residents, was hardly 
refuted at trial.667 The Floyd plaintiffs relied on statements of 
sergeants and lieutenants directing officers to engage in stops 
and frisks without much regard to the legal requirements that 
were gathered through secret recordings.668 And a New York 
 
a reduction in crime. See, e.g., Ben Poston & Joel Rubin, Times Investigation: 
LAPD Misclassified Nearly 1,200 Violent Crimes as Minor Offenses, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 9, 2014, 6:04 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-crimestats-lapd 
-20140810-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZHD7-GG9R]. 
 663. Yung, supra note 662. 
 664. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 665. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D, in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend 
Order on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-01034), ECF No. 156. 
 666. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d 
1025, 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
 667. See supra Parts III.B, V.A for extensive description of the statements 
relevant to Ortega-Melendres. 
 668. Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
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Senator testified to Mayor Bloomberg’s statement that stop and 
frisk practices were used to target young Black men.669  
While this type of evidence is not necessary to meet the de-
liberate indifference requirement,670 it is notable that both cases 
that succeeded at trial relied on statements to support the theory 
that police target individuals for police activity without concern 
for constitutional standards.671 With the advent of social media, 
racially motivated police scandals have increasingly come to 
light.672 At the same time, it may still be difficult to gather evi-
dence that racial remarks (e.g., use of the “N” word) are suffi-
ciently widespread to show a culture of race or national origin-
based targeting.  
3. History of Discriminatory Policy or Practice and Failed 
Reforms  
Proof of a history of notice and failure to remedy the consti-
tutional violation at issue was important to the results of the 
litigation in Parts II, III, and IV to varying degrees. The New 
York and Philadelphia case studies involve prior structural re-
form settlements that did not achieve much change in stop and 
frisk practices, but which set the stage for subsequent injunc-
tions requiring reform measures.673 Judge Scheindlin’s post-trial 
order in Floyd relied upon the failures of the NYPD to remedy 
its stop and frisk practices following the Daniels settlement.674 
For example, plaintiffs relied on failed quality assurance reports 
developed after the 2002 Daniels settlement.675 The long history 
 
 669. See supra Part II.  
 670. See supra Part I.B. 
 671. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Ortega-Melendres II, 598 F. Supp. 2d 
1025. 
 672. See Michael Boren, Videos Show All What Some Have Endured for 
Years; People of Color, Overlooked by Traditional Media, See It as a Way to Find 
Others with Similar Experiences, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 2018, at B4; Joseph 
Serna & Matt Hamilton, S.F. Police Chief Quits Amid Tumult; He Loses Confi-
dence of Mayor After a Series of Scandals and Latest Shooting Involving an Of-
ficer Earlier in Day, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2016, at B1; Adrian Walker, A 
Chilling, Familiar Tale, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2018, at B1; Bobby Allyn, 72 
Philadelphia Police Officers Placed on Desk Duty over Offensive Social Media 
Posts, NPR (June 19, 2019, 10:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/ 
734241210/72-philadelphia-police-officers-placed-on-desk-duty-over-offensive 
-social-media [https://perma.cc/7H5V-KNQR]. 
 673. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 674. Floyd I, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 675. Id. 
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of the NYPD’s notice of discriminatory practices, dating back at 
least to the 1999 Attorney General’s report, was important to the 
court’s finding of deliberate indifference.676 Similarly, the Phila-
delphia litigants relied on data gathered as a result of the prior 
NAACP settlement to pressure the mayor and the city to negoti-
ate an agreement for a monitor and increased data collection re-
quirements.677  
In Phoenix, the public statements from Sherriff Arpaio and 
mid-level supervisors demonstrated a history and unwillingness 
to alter the department’s practice of targeting Hispanics for ar-
rest and detention.678 The court specifically cited defendants’ his-
tory of being “aggressively responsive” to local anti-immigrant 
sentiment when deciding the Fourteenth Amendment injunc-
tion.679 When reviewing the appropriateness of Judge Snow’s in-
junction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s conclusion 
that the history supported the injunctive relief and monitoring 
of the court’s orders.680 
C. GATHERING INFORMATION TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL 
HURDLES 
This section provides a synthesis of how plaintiffs are able 
to obtain information to overcome doctrinal hurdles prior to the 
initiation of formal discovery: relationships with advocates and 
community organizations; publicity that creates leads and op-
portunities for further fact gathering; and data from prior court 
orders requiring data tracking and disclosures. It discusses 
briefly other methods of gathering data to support structural re-
form police litigation.  
Each case study illuminates the role of relationship building 
between plaintiffs’ counsel and outside advocates to gather in-
formation beyond traditional discovery. The co-location of plain-
tiffs’ attorneys within police reform coalitions, such as Somos 
America and Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), al-
lowed attorneys to learn information crucial to plaintiffs’ success 
in litigation and to reap gains from collateral attention garnered 
by other advocates.  
 
 676. Id. at 451–53. 
 677. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555. 
 678. Ortega-Melendres IV, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 987 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 679. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 680. Id. 
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In addition, the attention surrounding NYPD stop and frisk 
practices, often mounted by advocates at NYCLU and grassroots 
groups, coalesced in the coalition CPR, led to gains in the discov-
ery process. Additional witnesses were discovered through me-
dia attention, whistleblower officers came forward, and more in-
dividual suits were filed (leading to further discovery).681 The 
atmosphere led to more city-level scrutiny and produced more 
advocacy and opportunities for information or transparency rel-
evant to the Floyd litigation. For example, city council hearings 
related to the weaknesses of the Civilian Complaint Review 
Board led to reports and data disclosures, which led to discovery 
requests related to plaintiffs’ failure to monitor and discipline 
theories.682 The same is true in Bailey, where the use of data and 
individual accounts of harm at the hands of Philadelphia’s police 
officers created pressure for the City to consider a quick settle-
ment.683 In Maricopa County, the Somos America coalition and 
Puente, among other groups, continued to inform plaintiffs’ at-
torneys when on-the-ground enforcement operations took place, 
which informed the discovery process. 
Finally, the prior court orders in New York from the Daniels 
litigation and Philadelphia from the NAACP settlement, re-
quired extensive and detailed collection and disclosure of stop 
and frisk data.684 Understanding the real-time basis for each of-
ficer’s decision to stop, frisk, and search each person subject to a 
Terry stop was foundational evidence critical to the subsequent 
Floyd and Bailey litigation.685 The fact that the evidence was 
maintained in a format conducive to analysis was also critical in 
each case.686  
Given the centrality of data in overcoming the doctrinal hur-
dles in the case studies, methods other than prior litigation to 
obtain granular level data are worthy of consideration for future 
plaintiffs. Alternative avenues for developing statistical infor-
mation include open records requests or state laws mandating 
 
 681. See supra Part II. 
 682. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 617–20, n.394 (2013) (relying on re-
ports on the CCRB to prove failure to discipline). 
 683. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, ECF 
No. 16, supra note 555, at 3. 
 684. Id.; Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 185. 
 685. See Floyd V, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 
2:10-CV-05952 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 686. See sources supra note 685. 
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data collection; voluntary collection and disclosure by police de-
partments; or analysis by institutions obtaining police data. 
First, state law may expand access to police data. Courts may 
induce data dissemination through open records litigation. The 
Washington Post has filed open records requests for every police 
shooting since 2014, and most police departments comply in 
providing the requested information.687 The ACLU affiliates in 
Boston688 and Washington D.C.,689 among others, have also suc-
cessfully compelled the release of stop data. A new law in Cali-
fornia permits the disclosure of police personnel records;690 and 
a database established by the Legal Aid Society in New York vis-
ually maps individual police officer complaints.691 
In addition, several states have begun requiring data collec-
tion related to individual police interactions, including deadly 
force, and the race and ethnicity of the officer and suspect.692 At 
least fifteen states collect demographic information for persons 
whose vehicles are stopped by police.693 Missouri, for example, 
requires every law enforcement agency to report, for every stop 
of a motor vehicle, the age, gender, race or minority group of the 
individual stopped, the reasons for the stop, and whether a 
 
 687. Fatal Force: 992 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in 2018, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2019, 9:06 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2018/national/police-shootings-2018/?utm_term=.e6378fe9eaf8 
[https://perma.cc/ZUB4-VBZS].  
 688. Boston Police Release More Stop-and-Frisk Data, ACLU MASS. (Jan. 29, 
2016, 8:52 PM), https://aclum.org/uncategorized/boston-police-release-more 
-stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/4344-3DJJ]. 
 689. Near Act Stop & Frisk Data Collection, ACLU OF D.C. (Mar. 28, 2018, 
10:15 AM), https://www.acludc.org/en/news/near-act-stop-frisk-data-collection 
[https://perma.cc/64RZ-W6XE]. 
 690. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(b) (West 2019). 
 691. Ali Winston, Looking for Details on Rogue N.Y. Police Officers? This 
Database Might Help, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/03/06/nyregion/nypd-capstat-legal-aid-society.html [https://perma.cc/ 
FQ4T-CL4V]. 
 692. Law Enforcement Overview (June 19, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx#3 [https://perma.cc/ 
RA3A-RD56]; see 1999 Conn. Acts 99-198 (Reg. Sess.); 2012 Conn. Acts 12-74 
(Reg. Sess.); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212; MINN. STAT. § 13.871 (2019); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2004), § 304.670 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-504 (2014); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 289.820 (2019); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ -21.2-6, -7, 21.1-4; TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.410 
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 17G-2-3 (2019). 
 693. Law Enforcement Overview, supra note 692. 
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search was conducted as a result of the stop.694 Beginning in 
2017, California requires every law enforcement agency to report 
to the Department of Justice all instances when a peace officer 
shoots or is shot by a civilian, or when an officer harms, kills, or 
is harmed or killed by a civilian.695  
Finally, some police departments began voluntarily disclos-
ing police data. Minneapolis provides an example. In August 
2017, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD)—responding to 
calls for greater transparency in police practices from groups like 
the ACLU and “as part of a broader department effort to improve 
transparency in so-called Terry stops”—debuted a “Mobile Digi-
tal Computer” dashboard system by which MPD officers can eas-
ily enter information about both pedestrian and motor vehicle 
stops.696 Additionally, the “data will be refreshed every morning 
and can be exported via the city’s open data portal,” where it can 
be accessed by the public.697 The automated input systems are 
lauded for addressing one common concern police officials raise 
with transparency and documentation—the time that complet-
ing forms takes away from fighting crime.698 
These moves to require more information gathering and 
analysis have the potential to support future systemic litiga-
tion.699 My view is not that data solves all evidentiary woes.700 
 
 694. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2004). 
 695. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12525.2 (West 2018). 
 696. See Libor Jany, Public Will be Able To Track Race, Other Data on People 
Stopped by Minneapolis Police, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2017, 6:23 PM), http://www 
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 699. See David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk De-
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about data collection on stop and frisk practices). A September 2014 NAACP 
special report about stop-and-frisk reported eighteen states requiring data col-
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data. CORNELL WILLIAM BROOKS ET AL., NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-
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 700. In fact, some are quite skeptical of police using big data in police oper-
ations. All data is not necessarily good data for police to collect or deploy. But 
where information on police operations is available and used for accountability 
to the public, and a department or city is unable to course correct, it could be 
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Rather, recent developments on the police data front can assist 
plaintiffs in overcoming justiciability and procedural barriers.  
This Part has discussed the procedural hurdles, and catego-
ries of evidence used by plaintiffs in the case studies—hard data 
and statistical evidence; discriminatory statements by supervi-
sors and central decision-makers; and/or proof of a history of no-
tice and failure to remedy constitutional violation. It reviews a 
potential evidentiary convergence to overcome the standing, mu-
nicipal liability, and class certification barriers to suing police 
departments. It shows the limits of replicability and the im-
portance of advocates and media exposure in locating infor-
mation to satisfy the doctrinal standards outside the discovery 
process.  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article presents case studies of three significant dis-
trict court police structural reform cases that overcame the dif-
ficult doctrinal barriers to standing, municipal liability, and 
class certification. Acknowledging the limits to case studies, the 
Floyd, Ortega-Melendres, and Bailey examples nevertheless illu-
minate ways to jump these doctrinal and procedural hurdles. 
They suggest that certain types of information and legal analysis 
satisfy exacting evidentiary standards: hard data and statistical 
evidence; discriminatory statements by supervisors and central 
decision-makers; and proof of a history of notice and failure to 
remedy constitutional violations. The cases show the signifi-
cance of information gathering methods beyond traditional dis-
covery, including relationships with advocates and community 
organizations; publicity that creates leads and opportunities for 
further fact gathering; and court orders requiring data tracking 
and disclosures following prior litigation. This Article should not 
be taken as presenting an easy way forward for future police 
structural reform litigation. The litigation accounts also affirm 
some of the potential boundaries surrounding Lyons, Monell and 
its progeny, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Further study is needed 
 
information collected through data driven police programs are particularly 
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to understand district courts as sites of resistance as police struc-
tural reform litigation progresses in this era following the 
Obama Administration.701 The Civil Rights Division of the De-
partment of Justice has changed course on police reform yet 
Black-led movements demand reform within law.  
These cases have been able to proceed, even with some sig-
nificant trouble, in their respective remedies processes. The 
cases have uniquely managed to avoid Supreme Court review, in 
part due to changes in local leadership. It may be that these ex-
amples represent the worst of the worst where doctrinal barriers 
operate as the Supreme Court has suggested. 
 
 
 701. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVI-
SION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994–PRESENT (2017). 
